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Thesis Abstract 
 
This thesis investigated the development, consistency and facilitators of children’s 
innovation in the physical, tool-use domain. Despite gaining increasing interest in 
developmental psychology, understanding of the ontogeny of innovation remains in 
its infancy. Following the formulation of an operational definition of innovation and 
associated criteria in Chapter 2, the innovatory ability of 4- to 9-year-old children 
was examined using the Multiple-Methods Box (MMB): a novel puzzle box from 
which a reward can be extracted using different tools, access points and exits. 
Findings reported in Chapter 3 demonstrated that few children innovated in the 
aftermath of social demonstrations of tool use (akin to innovation by modification); 
rather, they largely relied on the observed task solution. However, instances and 
rates of children’s innovation were seen to increase in response to inefficacious 
social information (Chapter 3) and when provided with additional time and explicit 
instructions/prompts to explore the MMB (Chapter 6). Individual differences in 
children’s innovative or imitative behaviour appeared largely independent of their 
performance on a battery of tasks assessing constructs related to innovation, as 
explored in Chapter 4. However, this study revealed some behavioural consistency in 
puzzle-box contexts, suggestive of consistent individual differences in children’s 
propensity, or preference, to engage in asocial/individual learning. Finally, in the 
intervention study of Chapter 5, individual achievement goals appeared of greater 
salience than cues to conventionality of innovative behaviour, which did not 
differentially enhance 8- to 9-year-olds’ innovation when presented with the MMB 
task in the absence of social demonstrations. Together, the thesis findings highlight 
the value of the dual study of imitation and innovation, in discovering adaptive trade-
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offs between the two, and the need to consider innovation in its various forms, owing 
to likely disparities in developmental trajectories, cognitive requirements, and 
primary difficulties. The educational applications and cultural implications are 
discussed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 
 
Note on Publications 
 
At the time this thesis was submitted for examination, one chapter had been 
published and one chapter was accepted for publication. 
 
Chapter 2: 
 
Carr, K., Kendal, R.L., & Flynn, E.G. (accepted). Eureka!: What is innovation, how 
does it develop and who does it? Child Development.  
 
Chapter 3: 
 
Carr, K., Kendal, R.L., & Flynn, E.G. (2015). Imitate or innovate? Children’s 
innovation is influenced by efficacy of observed behaviour. Cognition, 142, 
322-332. 
 
As lead author, I was responsible for reviewing and synthesising the literature, 
collecting and analysing data, and writing up results/theoretical conclusions. My 
supervisors and co-authors help to refine experimental designs, provide input in 
analysis and interpretation, and give feedback in the write up.  
 
These chapters are presented as they were accepted. However, any American English 
spelling has been altered to British English and the numbering system has been 
altered for consistency throughout the thesis. Where appropriate, cross-references 
between chapters have also been made. 
13 
 
Note on Ethics 
 
Prior to undertaking each empirical study, a written ethics application was made to 
Durham University’s Psychology Department Ethics Committee. Within this 
application it was confirmed that the proposed research adhered to the British 
Psychological Society (BPS) Code of Ethics and Conduct, and detail was given of 
the purpose of the project, methods and measurements, participants, along with 
intended consent and participant information and a statement of ethical 
considerations. Empirical studies commenced when ethical approval was granted by 
the department. A sample ethics consent letter is provided in Appendix Item 1a, 
along with emails from the departmental Ethics Committee granting approval for the 
studies (Appendix Item 1b).  
 
For those studies involving children, written informed consent was gained from 
school Head teachers and parents/guardians, and verbal consent was gained from the 
children themselves. All participating adults signed an information and consent form 
prior to taking part and were fully debriefed following participation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14 
 
Chapter 1  
General Introduction 
 
 When we consider the remarkable advances that have been made by humans, 
whether putting people on the moon, developing antibiotics and vaccines to treat 
deadly diseases, creating literary and artistic masterpieces, or colonising virtually 
every corner of the earth, we apprehend that innovation is foundational to our 
greatest achievements. In a changing world, innovation – denoting, in its simplest 
sense, a new idea, product or behaviour – allows us to overcome novel problems and 
is thus critical to our survival. Though other animal species innovate (Reader & 
Laland, 2003), the complexity, diversity and breadth of human innovation is 
unparalleled. Understanding the process and development of innovation, such that its 
applications may be fully harnessed, is imperative in the light of ever more complex 
environmental, technological and economic challenges. This pursuit of 
understanding will allow us to gain, in turn, a more thorough and complete 
conception of cumulative cultural evolution: an, arguably, uniquely human process 
and one which likely underpins our species’ exceptional success (Dean, Vale, 
Laland, Flynn, & Kendal, 2013).  
 The main lines of investigation within this thesis concern the development 
and individual consistency of children’s behavioural innovation, along with factors 
that potentially facilitate (or constrain) it. A necessary consequence of studying 
innovation, though undoubtedly a fortuitous one in terms of the potential for 
complementary insight and understanding, is that social learning is heavily 
implicated in this work. Social learning, involving the acquisition of knowledge from 
others, can be regarded as the antithesis of innovation: the opposite side of the 
15 
 
cumulative culture coin. Whilst the approach in this thesis is firmly developmental, it 
draws upon comparative and non-human animal research; primarily, owing to the 
relative lack of childhood innovation research, though this area has recently been 
met with increasing attention, and the comparative wealth of non-human animal 
innovation research, from which there are a number of lessons to be learned. The 
sections in this introductory chapter overview the motivation for this thesis, the 
importance and implications of studying innovation, and the terminology and 
experimental methods employed. It concludes with an outline of the ensuing thesis 
chapters.  
 
1.1 The Importance of Innovation 
 
 Owing to its array of cognitive, cultural and real-world ramifications, 
innovation is of wide societal interest and importance. From an applications 
perspective, understanding what facilitates or hinders the innovation process will 
allow the formulation of interventions to promote it. Though these interventions may 
be applied in a variety of industries, such as business and healthcare, they may be 
particularly fruitful in early educational settings wherein cognitive abilities that are 
associated with, and contribute to, innovation undergo critical developments (and 
thus may be targeted and advanced). Innovatory capacity supported in childhood 
could continue into adulthood. Innovation is of relevance not only on an individual 
level, but also in allowing solutions to novel problems or novel solutions to existing 
problems (Kummer & Goodall, 1985) to be produced on a wider population and 
cultural level. Together with social learning (“learning that is influenced by 
observation of, or interaction with, another animal (typically a conspecific) or its 
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products”; Heyes, 1994, p.208), innovation plays a vital role in the evolution of 
culture (Mesoudi et al., 2013; Richerson & Boyd, 2005; Tomasello, 1999). It is this 
contribution of social learning (in the form of high-fidelity transmission 
mechanisms) that helps distinguish animal innovations, which largely remain in their 
original form, from infinitely more complex human innovations.  
 Innovation is recognised as a major driver of human’s technical and cultural 
sophistication, enabled by the operation of the ‘ratchet effect’ (Tennie, Call, & 
Tomasello, 2009; Tomasello, Kruger, & Ratner, 1993). The ratchet effect describes 
the process by which cultural traits are maintained in populations, and across 
generations, until a modification or improvement (‘innovation’) is made, with the 
then modified or improved trait being learned and acquired by individuals in the 
population. In this way, the cultural trait ‘ratchets up’ in complexity or efficiency 
such that no single individual could have invented it alone (Boyd & Richerson, 
1996; Tomasello et al., 1993; Tomasello, 1999). This process therefore “relies both 
on inventiveness, for the cultural novelties, and on faithful transmission across 
generations to keep the novelties in place until other novelties come along” (Tennie 
et al., 2009, p.2405), thereby preventing trait loss. Cumulative culture is defined by 
humans’ ratcheting – repeated modification of cultural traits - ability (Dean et al., 
2013). It is now widely believed that cumulative cultural evolution is unique to 
humans (e.g., Dean et al., 2013; Tomasello, 2016) and defining of human culture 
(Richerson & Boyd, 2005). Innovation thus operates in tandem with, and indeed is 
reliant upon, high-fidelity transmission mechanisms to effect cumulative cultural 
change (Lewis & Laland, 2012; Tomasello, 1999). Moreover, the extent to which an 
innovation becomes established as a population-level tradition, with the opportunity 
to influence cultural evolution, is moderated by social learning processes, along with 
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adaptive transmission biases (Boyd & Richerson, 1985) or social learning strategies 
(Laland, 2004) that help direct what, when and from whom individuals learn.  
 Humans are separated from other animal species in their capacity for 
cumulative culture, but also in the fidelity of their social learning (e.g., Horner & 
Whiten, 2005). As an ‘ultra-social’ species (Herrmann, Call, Hernandez-Lloreda, 
Hare, & Tomasello, 2007), we desire and seek identification, affiliation and 
acceptance with our social group. The importance and adaptiveness of social 
learning, and specifically imitation (wherein the form of an action is copied; Whiten, 
McGuigan, Marshall-Pescini, & Hopper, 2009), is reflected in the early age at which 
children come to show themselves as ‘cultural magnets’ (Flynn, 2008) by faithfully 
reproducing and transmitting observed behaviour (Hopper, Flynn, Wood, & Whiten, 
2010). Though not without its potential costs (e.g., unreliable or outdated 
information acquisition; Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Laland, 2004), social learning 
provides a powerful shortcut to knowledge and behaviour, whether this is 
instrumental, in terms of learning how to achieve an explicit goal, or conventional, 
such as acquiring the cultural norms and rituals of one’s social group (Legare & 
Nielsen, 2015). The latter motivation is posited responsible for observations of so-
called ‘over-imitation’ (Lyons, Young, & Keil, 2007), wherein children (McGuigan, 
Whiten, Flynn, & Horner, 2007), and indeed adults (Flynn & Smith, 2012; 
McGuigan, Makinson, & Whiten, 2011), imitate actions that are causally 
unnecessary to the attainment of a goal (Keupp, Behne, & Rakoczy, 2013). Yet, as 
early as children display a competence for imitation (Meltzoff, 1985), they display a 
similarly early competence for selectivity and flexibility in their imitation (e.g., 
Carpenter, Akhtar, & Tomasello, 1998; Nielsen, 2006; see Over & Carpenter, 2012, 
2013); altering the extent, and fidelity, with which they reproduce behaviour in line 
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with a wide variety of contextual and social cues. The recognition that children are 
not blind and indiscriminate copiers of observed behaviour, particularly when that 
behaviour is inefficacious (Schulz, Hoopell, & Jenkins, 2008; Williamson, Meltzoff, 
& Markman, 2008), and that social learning is most adaptive when selectively 
utilised (Laland, 2004; see also Kendal, Coolen, & Laland, 2009), contributed to the 
theoretical rationale for the first empirical study presented in Chapter 3.  
Given that there is ample evidence of social learning in childhood, of the high 
fidelity yet flexible kind necessary to sustain cultural behaviours and traditions (i.e., 
imitation), is there evidence of innovation? As Legare and Nielsen (2015, p.693) 
note, “Imitation did not, in isolation, take us from being a cultural animal, like our 
closest living primate relatives, to a cumulatively cultural one” and thus we might 
expect to see innovation’s similarly early emergence. Discovering whether and when 
children opt to innovate, as opposed to imitate, as a function of both development 
and context, is one of the key research aims of this thesis. Specifically, it will help to 
shed light on the conditions under which imitation is judged a less effective or 
appropriate learning strategy. Thus, innovation is of interest not only with regard to 
cultural evolution but individual development. Though developmental psychologists 
have been interested in exploratory learning for decades, from Piaget’s early 
emphasis upon individual discovery for a child’s intellectual development to 
Gopnik’s (2012) ‘child-as-scientist’ portrayal, innovation as a possible outcome of 
children’s play, problem solving and exploration requires explicit investigation.  
Theoretical approaches, comparative research and non-human animal 
research are generating invaluable insights into the likely evolutionary origins, 
functions and emergence of innovation. To complement such findings, 
developmental studies are needed to establish its ontogeny, early manifestations, 
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associated cognitive factors and underlying mechanisms. Unlike the advanced 
understanding of the evolutionary basis of innovation, that of the ontogenetic 
foundations of innovation remains limited - especially when compared with what is 
now known of the ontogeny of social learning. This thesis is a response to the need 
for research in the area of children’s innovation.   
 
1.2 Childhood Innovation 
 
As alluded to earlier, there are reasons why studying and promoting 
innovation in childhood is of importance and why this approach is taken in the 
current work. First, examining innovation in childhood allows us to compare 
children’s abilities with those of non-human animals (when analogous tasks are 
used), shedding light onto aspects of cognition that are universal amongst species or, 
alternatively, uniquely human. This is because children are generally regarded as less 
enculturated or socialised than adults, making them closer points of comparison 
(though by no means equivalent). Second, by studying children, we are better placed 
to capture innovation early. Whilst children are proficient cultural learners from a 
very early age, evident in their faithful transmission of observed behaviour (Hopper 
et al., 2010), conformity to peers (Haun & Tomasello, 2011), and ritualistic 
interpretation of observed actions (Nielsen, Kapitány, & Elkins, 2015), it is probable 
that they are less bound by cultural conventions and norms than adults. With age, 
humans appear to become more embedded within normative processes (as shown, 
for example, with over-imitation; McGuigan et al., 2011), more biased towards 
existing knowledge (Gopnik, Griffiths, & Lucas, 2015), and more susceptible to the 
effects of functional fixedness (see below; Defeyter & German, 2003). Of course, at 
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the same time, with increasing age individuals will be better equipped to overcome 
such biases and/or produce novel alternative behaviour owing to greater cognitive 
maturity and flexibility. Third, the cognitive and motivational systems that underpin 
innovation in childhood are likely to be simpler than those that underpin innovation 
in adulthood, meaning the connections between innovation and its facilitators may be 
easier to explore.  
 All children who participated in the research of this thesis were aged 
between four and nine years, in line with existing childhood innovation research 
(Beck, Apperly, Chappell, Guthrie, & Cutting, 2011). This was deemed a sufficiently 
large age range in which to capture developmental changes in observed instances, 
rates, and facilitating factors of children’s innovation. Moreover, it allowed for 
comparison with developmental studies of children’s social learning.   
Investigating innovation, or any phenomenon, requires a clear understanding 
and operationalisation of the behaviour to be studied. In Chapter 2 of this thesis, a 
new operational definition of innovation is formulated following an analysis of 
existing conceptualisations: “in the physical realm, a behavioural innovation is a 
new, useful and potentially transmitted learned behaviour, arising from asocial 
learning (innovation by independent invention) or a combination of asocial and 
social learning (innovation by modification), that is produced so as to successfully 
solve a novel problem or an existing problem in a novel manner.” Explanation is 
provided in Chapter 2 for the components of this definition, why its formulation was 
required, and how it may facilitate future research. As referenced in the definition, 
however, this thesis focuses on physical innovations, and specifically those which 
occur in the tool-use domain. This has the obvious advantage of the direct 
observation and measurement of novel behaviour (that which has not been socially 
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observed or previously individually produced), and its permutations, whilst 
generating further knowledge of how humans are able to use, modify and produce 
expansive and diverse arrays of tools.  
Tools are a ubiquitous component of human culture (Vaesen, 2012), and tool 
use “a vital component of the human behavioural repertoire” (Biro, Haslam, & Rutz, 
2013, p.1). In its frequency, flexibility and complexity, human tool use is unique 
within the animal kingdom (Hunt, Gray, & Taylor, 2013; Kacelnik, 2009; Vaesen, 
2012). The sheer volume of artefacts which we produce, and continuously engage 
with, is representative of the cumulative nature of human material culture and its 
exceptional sophistication. Early and competent tool use by human ancestors may 
have contributed to the evolution of intelligence (Kacelnik, 2009), whilst also raising 
individual fitness (Biro et al., 2013). Tool-use learning has been investigated 
extensively in social learning paradigms with children (following Want & Harris, 
2002), which have aimed to understand its developmental process and the cognitive 
systems that differentiate humans from non-humans (Hernik & Csibra, 2009).  
Human children begin to use and understand tools in accordance with their 
functionality from an early age (e.g., use of spoons by twelve months; Barrett, Davis, 
& Needham, 2007). From two years, children evidence advanced abilities in their 
rapid learning about novel tools, requiring in some instances only one exposure to a 
new artefact to categorise its function (Casler & Kelemen, 2005; Phillips, Seston, & 
Kelemen, 2012), as well as differentiating physically optimal and sub-optimal/non-
functional tools (DiYanni & Kelemen, 2008; DiYanni, Nini, & Rheel, 2011). At four 
years, children possess ‘adult-like understanding’ of an artefact’s design (Kelemen, 
Seston, & Georges, 2012). Social learning (Hopper et al., 2010; Want & Harris, 
2001; Whiten & Flynn, 2010), but perhaps not individual learning through manual 
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exploration (Gardiner, Bjorklund, Greif, & Gray, 2012), helps children infer required 
action plans and desired end states in their use of tools. Arguably the major difficulty 
for children when inventing tools is the absence of such information bridging start 
states (apparatus/materials) and end states (achieving a goal; Cutting, Apperly, 
Chappell, & Beck, 2014). Nevertheless, one can appreciate how exploration of 
existing tools will generate a deeper appreciation of “functional relationships 
between objects and the environment that would allow [children] to effectively wield 
tools to solve a variety of problems” (Gardiner et al., 2012, p.240); in other words, to 
innovate. ‘Flexible’ or ‘creative’ tool use viably requires both individual and social 
learning (Biro et al., 2013), necessitating their dual study.  
With the benefits of early-emerging proficiency in tool use and 
understanding, there comes a cost. Categorising an artefact as ‘for’ a particular 
function means using that artefact in a way that was not initially intended by its 
design is difficult to entertain. This is known as ‘functional fixedness’: fixating upon 
the (demonstrated or learned) design function of an object as the proper, 
conventional or normative way to use it (Casler, Terziyan, & Greene, 2009; German 
& Barrett, 2005). Children appear motivated to gather function-based object 
information from preschool age (Casler et al., 2009). However, children are 
increasingly constrained with age (Defeyter, Avons, & German, 2007; DiYanni et 
al., 2011) such that ‘immunity’ to functional fixedness is granted to 5- but not 6-to 7-
year-olds (Defeyter & German, 2003; German & Defeyter, 2000). Moreover, 
functional fixedness may be induced in 6- to 7-year-olds simply by demonstrating 
the ‘function’ of novel objects presented within the context of a problem-solving task 
(Defeyter & German, 2003).  
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Although this phenomenon has implications for imitation, it is of special 
relevance to innovation wherein the use of objects for a novel and alternative 
purpose is fundamental. Yet, rather than always being an obstacle to artefact 
innovation or innovative problem solving, knowledge of the functionality of artefacts 
may help to promote it. For Phillips et al. (2012, p.2057), “When consultation of tool 
category knowledge suggests a functional need is unmet within an existing repertoire 
of tools, recognition of this fact provokes people to innovate new tool categories that 
are designed to fulfil that specific purpose”. Moreover, recent research suggests that 
children are motivated, despite prior personal knowledge, to incorporate new tool-
use task solutions into their behavioural repertoires rather than remain polarised to 
just one (Wood, Kendal, & Flynn, 2013, 2015). Examination of tool innovation in 
childhood, reviewed in Chapter 2, suggests that children are poor tool makers in the 
absence of social demonstrations (Beck et al., 2011; Hanus, Mendes, Tennie, & Call, 
2011; Nielsen, 2013), irrespective of cultural background (Nielsen, Tomaselli, 
Mushin, & Whiten, 2014). When considering innovation in terms of population-level 
dynamics and its wider cultural contributions, however, we must also pay greater 
attention to innovation by modification (wherein social information is directly 
implicated). It remains to be seen how children fare when required to modify tool-
use behaviour, as opposed to invent tools, and the primary difficulties they face, 
providing an imperative and further motivation for the current thesis.  
 
1.3 Methods to Study Innovation 
 
 From the early observations of primate problem solving (Köhler, 1925), 
innovation has been met with interest by animal behaviour researchers (see Reader & 
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Laland, 2003). Their work has been instrumental in establishing that innovation is 
not only an adaptive mechanism (though, as with social learning, also has potential 
costs), in allowing animals to respond to novel challenges and threats, but one which 
is capable of wielding a strong evolutionary force, by way of its association with the 
brain evolution of birds (Overington, Morand-Ferron, Boogert, & Lefebvre, 2009) 
and primates (Reader, Hager, & Laland, 2011; Reader & Laland, 2002). More 
generally, however, findings from the different investigative methods they have 
employed provide much insight and inspiration for the study of innovation in 
humans.  
Innovation in non-human animals is typically assessed by one of three routes: 
(1) the analysis of data within pre-existing (usually published) records and reports, 
(2) direct observation, and (3) experimental induction. Analyses of reported 
incidences of innovation have firmly instilled a conceptualisation of such behaviour 
as ‘novel’, ‘original’ and ‘never seen before’, with researchers using such search 
terms within large collated databases. This method has revealed incidence rates of 
innovation, across species and behavioural domains (including foraging and tool 
use), variation in innovation propensities due to sex, age and social rank differences 
(Reader & Laland, 2001), and relations with cognitive traits (Reader et al., 2011). As 
exploration of childhood innovation is in its infancy, there are few explicit studies 
from which data of this kind may be extracted and analysed (though currently an 
untapped source is the many investigations of children’s social learning wherein not 
all children opt to reproduce demonstrated behaviour).  
The direct observation of animals within their natural habitat offers rich real-
time data and external validity to the study of innovation. However, detection of 
innovations in the wild is often a lengthy practice and raises challenging issues in 
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terms of accurately determining the first instance of an innovative behaviour 
(achieved by van Schaik, van Noordwijk, & Wich, 2006). Given that innovation in 
the wild is largely evidenced by an individual solving a novel problem or an existing 
problem in a novel manner (in line with Kummer & Goodall’s (1985) delineation of 
innovation), problem solving has become coupled with the innovation phenomenon. 
Indeed, the use of problem solving to investigate innovation has received recent 
empirical support owing to correspondence in their underlying mechanisms and 
factors that influence their appearance (Griffin & Guez, 2014). Open diffusion 
studies (Whiten & Mesoudi, 2008) offer the closest parallel to observation of natural 
innovation in humans, involving the introduction of a task to a group of freely 
interacting novices (e.g., Whiten & Flynn, 2010). Whilst studies of this kind are 
clearly well suited to examining children’s innovation in ecologically-valid group 
settings (including how innovations spread and change, biases in transmission, and 
qualities of innovators and imitators), the research presented in this thesis employed 
a more controlled experimental method in combination with a dyadic design as is 
typical of social learning studies. Dyadic designs often involve, as in the current 
work, a knowledgeable adult experimenter and naïve participating child.  
The experimental induction method evades the difficulties of long-term 
observation, providing a viable and widely utilised alternative of observing a 
species’ innovative problem-solving ability via exposure to novel ecological and 
technical challenges (Benson-Amram, Weldele, & Holekamp, 2013; Kummer & 
Goodall, 1985). These challenges often take the form of novel extractive tool-based 
tasks, or ‘artificial fruits’ (Whiten, Custance, Gomez, Teixidor, & Bard, 1996), from 
which an individual must extract a reward by overcoming its defences. Artificial 
fruits have been used to great effect with humans and animals to explore social 
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learning and, increasingly, innovation, offering scope for multiple manipulations to 
address variables and questions of interest. With non-human species, these have 
included questions relating to the ‘properties’ or characteristics of innovators, 
inspiring the research of Chapter 4. As tools are implicated in everyday problem 
solving in many species (Bechtel, Jeschonek, & Pauen, 2013), their suitability in 
addressing questions of innovation, both practically and theoretically, is evident.  
  Implementing methodologies and tasks used with non-human animals, such 
as the hook task with New Caledonian crows (Weir, Chappell, & Kacelnik, 2002) 
and the floating peanut task with orangutans (Mendes, Hanus, & Call, 2007) in 
investigations of children’s innovation has been a successful strategy (e.g., Beck et 
al., 2011; Hanus et al., 2011). However, to date there is not a suitable existing tool-
use task that would allow for a range of novel behaviours to be produced. Thus in 
this thesis a novel task, the Multiple-Methods Box, was created for the purpose of 
investigating children’s innovative behaviour following social demonstrations 
(innovation by modification) and in the absence of social demonstrations (innovation 
by novel invention). In each case, children were provided with multiple attempt trials 
(opportunities to interact with the task), both to mirror the artefact learning process 
and to observe behavioural change, such as switching from imitation to innovation.  
 
1.4 Thesis Aims and Format 
 
 Innovation is an understudied area within developmental psychology. Many 
important questions concerning its appearance, development, individual variation, 
and cognitive or contextual facilitators remain to be addressed. This thesis aimed to 
advance such knowledge of children’s innovation in the physical, tool-use domain. 
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In the absence of an agreed-upon definition, Chapter 2 overviews existing 
theoretical, non-human animal and human developmental research to offer a working 
definition of behavioural innovation and criteria for its identification. In doing so, 
innovation is carefully separated from other related constructs such as exploration 
and creativity and a common ‘language’ established with which to discuss 
innovation. Along with a working definition, this chapter provides a hypothetical 
pathway to innovation (a starting point for considering how the innovation process is 
facilitated and constrained) and an innovation classification system (distinguishing 
different ‘levels’ of innovation and their cultural implications).  
This is followed in Chapter 3 by the first empirical study of children’s 
innovation by modification (as opposed to innovation by novel invention) in the 
context of a novel tool-use task (the Multiple-Methods Box; MMB). In the light of 
adaptive informational trade-offs in the use of social and personal (individual) 
information by non-humans, and children’s rational and flexible social learning, this 
study aimed to examine when children judge it futile to imitate and thus opt to 
innovate when given sufficient opportunity and means to do so. Although innovation 
was found to be a rare response for 4- to 9-year-old children (when compared with 
imitation) following social demonstrations of a task solution, increased innovation 
was found in response to lower levels of observed solution efficacy. Moreover, 
important developmental changes in imitation (decreasing from 6-7 years) and 
innovation (increasing from 8-9 years) were discovered. Children’s prioritisation of 
social information is discussed in relation to the known adaptive functions of social 
learning, the rarity of innovators in theoretical models of cultural evolution, and the 
difficulties of overriding socially-acquired information. As a small subset of children 
in this study distinguished themselves from their peers by innovating, questions 
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naturally arose regarding what may have set them apart. With the purpose of 
identifying and assessing factors that may underpin individual differences in 
children’s behavioural innovation, the research of Chapter 4 involved following up 
children identified as innovators or imitators in Chapter 3 and administering a range 
of tasks assessing constructs of theoretical and/or empirical relevance to innovation. 
Whilst the results indicated some behavioural consistency in children’s performance 
on puzzle-box tasks, the overall lack of innovator-imitator group differences 
suggested that, in such contexts, an individual’s ‘state’ may play a greater role than 
personality ‘traits’ in eliciting innovation.   
 The final two empirical studies, contained in Chapters 5 and 6, set out to test 
two possible interventions to promote appearances of innovation in children. 
Recognising that cues to conventionality of behaviour typically serve to promote 
imitation and reduce innovation, the first intervention study (Chapter 5) hypothesised 
that framing innovation as a normative behaviour may help to foster its occurrence. 
Verbal frames providing ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ information regarding the 
conventional performance of peers on the MMB (the number of different ways other 
children had purportedly found to extract rewards) did not, however, differentially 
affect innovative performance. This hinted at the operation of alternative 
individually-driven motives to complete the task. The second intervention (Chapter 
6) stemmed from an acknowledged need for more ecologically-valid experimental 
approaches that provide sufficient timeframes and space in which innovation can be 
evidenced. Children who had previously received social information and acquired 
personal experience with the MMB task (Chapter 3) were permitted additional, 
verbally-prompted, attempts with the task in a second phase. Increased instances and 
rates of both exploration and innovation were observed, indicative of a facilitatory 
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role of increased time and opportunity to explore the box along with explicit 
instructions and prompts to do so. The thesis concludes in Chapter 7 with a 
discussion of the implications of the thesis findings for an understanding of 
innovation from cognitive, developmental and cultural evolutionary perspectives. 
Here, avenues for future research are offered, and reflections made on the pathway to 
innovation presented in Chapter 2 in the light of the findings in this thesis.   
 The chapters presented in this thesis are in publication manuscript format. 
References are presented at the end of the corresponding chapter.  
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Chapter 2  
Eureka!: What is innovation, how does it develop and who does it? 
 
Abstract 
 
Innovation is not only central to changes in traditional practice, but arguably 
responsible for humanity’s remarkable success at colonising the earth and 
diversifying the products, technologies and systems within it. Surprisingly little is 
known of how this integral component of behavioural flexibility develops, and the 
factors that are responsible for individual differences therein. This review highlights 
two primary ways in which the process and development of innovation may be better 
understood: by emulating the critical advances of animal behaviour researchers in 
examining innovation in non-human species, and establishing a clearer 
conceptualisation of what is ‘innovation’. A pathway to innovation is suggested and 
an innovation classification system offered, to aid recognition of its appearance and 
potential cultural contributions.  
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2.1 Introduction 
 
Around 70,000 to 80,000 years ago, in the African Middle Stone Age, 
technological and behavioural innovations suggestive of modern human capacities 
appeared (Mellars, 2005). Although the widespread emergence of complex human 
culture is typically ascribed to the later developments of the European Upper 
Paleolithic (Shennan, 2001), there is little doubt that humanity’s creative revolution 
sparked some tens of thousands of years ago (long after the earliest displays of 
hominin tool use, estimated 2.6-1.4 million years ago; see Nielsen, 2012). 
Advances in human cognition over evolutionary history have engendered 
inventions and innovations of such sophistication, and complexity, that they surpass 
those of all other non-human species. Whether fuelled by one factor or a 
combination, including brain evolution, demography or social network size, climate 
change, emergence of language and cooperation (e.g., Elias, 2012), it is irrefutable 
that humans have creatively and culturally excelled. Given its critical importance to 
our success, it is surprising that our understanding of innovation in humans, 
including its evolutionary foundations, developmental trajectory and contextual 
facilitators, is still in its infancy. As such, developmental psychologists have much to 
contribute to the innovation discussion and much to gain.  
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2.2 Innovation 
 
2.2.1 Placing Developmental Psychology on the Stage of Innovation Research 
 
There is a rich history, across academic disciplines, of applying the concepts, 
theories and empirical advances of one field of study to another. Here, we aim to 
draw together knowledge from comparative psychology, developmental psychology 
and animal behaviour research to contend, as Want and Harris (2002) did in relation 
to the social learning of tool use, that the much-needed dedicated developmental 
study of innovation may be informed and accelerated by an analysis of research 
elsewhere. Though this analysis needs to be applied to all aspects of study, including 
research questions, techniques, tasks and findings, here our primary goal is 
developing an agreed-upon definition. An essential first step in advancing our 
understanding of innovation is determining precisely what is meant by this term. A 
clear definition will aid in decisions about, (i) who we conceptualise as innovators, 
(ii) the form of behaviour labelled as innovation, (iii) the frequency of innovation, 
and (iv) the contribution innovation makes to cumulative culture (a major discussion 
point in the ensuing sections). The current lack of operationalisation within 
developmental psychology, in contrast to work within the animal behaviour field, 
may be impeding research progress by preventing the establishment of a common 
‘language’ with which to discuss innovation; a language which carefully separates 
innovation from related yet conceptually and cognitively distinct constructs, uses 
similar terminology and criteria for identification (depending upon the ‘form’ that it 
takes; see Section 2.3.1, point i), and resists human-centricity such that comparisons 
with other species can be made. Achieving greater consistency in terminology use, 
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by delineating terms associated, but not synonymous, with innovation, and 
increasing collaboration between developmental and comparative researchers, is 
therefore imperative.  
Childhood innovations appear in a number of domains: games, pretend play, 
drawing, storytelling, and more general language. In this article, we focus on 
behavioural innovation in the physical domain, specifically novel problem solving in 
the context of tool use. We do so for several reasons. Firstly, novel objects, in the 
form of artifacts and tools, saturate our world, and we must understand and use an 
enormous array of them from a very early age. If “learning to use tools and artifacts 
is inextricably linked to the developmental study of imitation” (Carpenter & Nielsen, 
2008, p.225, emphasis added), then their invention or modification is inextricably 
linked to the developmental study of innovation. Secondly, in pursuing a working 
definition for developmental psychologists, we are mindful of the need for 
innovation to be a “useful and usable concept” (Reader & Laland, 2003, p.11); that 
is, one which affords transparency in meaning and with which researchers can 
theoretically and experimentally engage. An overarching definition is desirable, but 
how the innovation phenomenon is expressed between domains may be diverse. 
Hence, a narrowing of focus to the physical domain is necessary in this case. Finally, 
there is a wealth of tool innovation research with non-human animals from which 
knowledge may be drawn and critical cross-species comparisons made. This aids 
understanding of the phylogenetic (evolutionary) development of innovation and 
helps uncover phylogenetic relationships, uniqueness and origins of abilities, the 
influence of culture, language, and so on.  
An important question to address is why it is necessary to bring questions 
about innovation to the developmental field. Crucially, compared to research on 
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social learning (e.g., special issues in Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 
2008; Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B., 2009; Developmental 
Psychology, 2013), the development of innovation in humans has received little 
attention. However, innovation and social learning may be regarded as two sides of 
the same coin, closely related in terms of their likely underlying mechanisms (Heyes, 
2012) and their complementary roles in the acquisition, transmission and evolution 
of culture, meaning insights into one will be highly informative for the other. 
Furthermore, adaptive trade-offs operate between the two (Kendal, Coolen, van 
Bergen, & Laland, 2005) such that observing when children innovate will help reveal 
the conditions under which they judge imitation a comparatively less effective 
learning strategy (addressing a ‘why’ question of innovation). It makes little sense, 
therefore, to know so much about one side of the coin (social learning) and so little 
about the other (innovation).  
In general, observations of ‘innovative’ behaviour (in the sense of non-
copying) within the social learning literature have largely been treated as secondary 
or anomalous findings and thus not pursued. The lack of innovation research may be 
due to the rarity with which children deviate from social information in experimental 
contexts and, in turn, produce novel behaviour. This is compounded by the lack of 
opportunity for innovation in social learning studies given they are not designed to 
afford this. Importantly, infrequency does not equate to incapability. Furthering our 
understanding of how, and why, innovation operates ontogenetically (develops over 
time in an individual) is essential to understanding its typical trajectory, behavioural 
manifestations, mechanisms, relations with other aspects of cognition (constituent 
processes such as exploration, play, tool use and problem solving in the case of 
physical cognition), individual differences in ‘innovativeness’, and ultimately how it 
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may be enhanced (see also Chappell et al., 2015). Comparing innovative propensities 
across age groups will prove fundamental to establishing the developmental factors 
that impact upon innovation across the lifespan. Developmental changes in imitation 
(including ‘over-imitation’), normativity, functional fixedness, and cognitive 
flexibility are such potential influencing factors. 
First we reflect on the importance of innovation from the wider perspective 
of cultural evolution, demonstrating the need for a deeper understanding from 
developmental psychology of the development of and requirements for innovation. 
In Section 2.3 (‘Identifying Innovations’) we draw upon theoretical and non-human 
animal research to present an overview of the requirements for innovation, and 
construct a theoretical pathway to innovation. In Section 2.4 (‘Theoretical 
Contributions’), we formulate an operational definition of innovation and an 
accompanying classification system. We close in Section 2.5 (‘Conclusion and 
Future Directions’) by proposing future avenues for research.  
 
2.2.2 The Cultural and Evolutionary Importance of Innovation 
 
Cultural innovation is to cultural evolution what mutation is to biological evolution: 
without innovation, cultural traits and therefore cultural transmission would not 
exist. 
 
 Biologists Lehmann, Feldman and Kaeuffer (2010, p.2356) perfectly 
summarize the critical nature of innovation within cultural evolution. Innovations, 
whether products, actions or behaviour, have not only aided in the generation of 
cultures (group-typical behaviour patterns, shared by members of (animal) 
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communities, that are to some degree reliant on socially learned and transmitted 
information; Laland & Janik, 2006, p.542), but more elaborate cultural systems 
wherein knowledge is repeatedly built upon and products and practices progressively 
modified and improved. The repeated modification of cultural traits, increasing the 
trait’s complexity or efficiency, is the hallmark of a cumulative culture (Dean, Vale, 
Laland, Flynn, & Kendal, 2013). Technological innovations, in particular, are often 
not the output of any single individual, but the result of collective and incremental 
efforts over time. Concepts, ideas and discoveries of predecessors inform problems 
anew, such that designs may be honed, flaws corrected and efficiency increased. 
Such ‘cultural ratcheting’ (Tennie, Call, & Tomasello, 2009) would not be possible 
in the absence of high fidelity social learning (e.g., imitation, innovation’s cultural 
counterpart), enabling the intergenerational preservation of knowledge and the 
transmission of innovated modifications (Boyd & Richerson, 1985). These processes 
are intricately entwined; indeed, “the transmission process itself can be a continuous 
creator of innovation” (O’Brien & Shennan, 2010, p.8). Together, innovation and 
high-fidelity transmission establish traditions, afford cultural products the 
opportunity to proliferate and evolve, and are likely candidates in the search for what 
makes our species, and our capacity for cumulative culture, so unique (Dean et al., 
2013).  
 The above is, of course, an oversimplification of the development and 
maintenance of cultural systems, insofar as not all innovations are ‘good’ (i.e., solve 
problems or increase efficiency) nor are all ‘good’ innovations adopted. It is beyond 
the scope of this article to unpack the complexities of how cultural systems evolve, 
but we acknowledge that change will not inevitably ratchet ‘up’ sophistication and 
efficiency (of a technology or behaviour). Moreover, as different cultural traits enjoy 
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different levels of success and longevity, considering resistance to innovations is just 
as important as their adoption and transmission. 
 Whilst this review ultimately provides an individual-level definition of 
innovation, it is impossible to detach discussion of individual innovations from 
discussion of cultural innovations. This is because when assessing the impact or 
adaptive value of an innovation, it is more difficult (and subjective) when that 
innovation belongs to a sole individual. What may be adaptive to one individual may 
be non- or maladaptive to another, depending upon one’s criteria. Certainly, the 
value of an individual innovation is easier to infer when its usefulness or efficiency 
is readily apparent. However, a more objective measure of an innovation’s adaptive 
value, or capacity to induce change, is the degree to which it is a cultural innovation 
in being transmitted to other individuals (see Section 2.3.1, point vi).  
 In theory, the adaptive benefits of an individual-level innovation may be vast. 
To innovate is to potentially maximise exploitable resources, increase the efficacy of 
one’s behaviour and circumvent novel challenges and threats. By allowing 
individuals to better adapt and respond to changing environments, innovation 
maximises survival. In a positive feedback loop, novel behaviour favors more able 
individuals, creating selection pressures for brain areas responsible for complex 
technical behaviour (Reader & Laland, 2002) and, in turn, favoring the emergence of 
yet more complex behaviour. Indeed, greater numbers and diversity of technical 
innovations are implicated in the evolution of brain size in birds (Overington, 
Morand-Ferron, Boogert, & Lefebvre, 2009) and primates (Reader, Hager, & Laland, 
2011). As with social learning, however, there are costs to the indiscriminate use of a 
learning strategy. Innovation must be considered most adaptive when flexibly 
utilised (Toelch, Bruce, Meeus, & Reader, 2011). Moreover, deviating from 
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established behaviour is inherently risky, meaning “a certain level of hesitancy to 
adopting novel behaviors is warranted” (Brosnan & Hopper, 2014, p.1).  
 
2.3 Identifying Innovations 
 
 Innovation definitions and delineations from the animal behaviour field have 
abounded in recent years. Reader and Laland’s (2003) comprehensive appraisal of 
the animal innovation literature formulated two widely-cited definitions of the 
phenomenon: (a) an innovation (sensu product) is a new or modified learned 
behaviour not previously found in the population, and (b) innovation (sensu process) 
results in new or modified learned behaviour and introduces novel behavioural 
variants into a population’s repertoire. While there is no surer way of determining 
innovation than if it has never before been seen in a population, this definition raised 
the expectation of long-term monitoring in order to observe behavioural origins 
(which, while challenging, some have met; van Schaik, van Noordwijk, & Wich, 
2006). Ramsey, Bastian and van Schaik (2007) conversely endorsed the view that 
‘Innovation is the process that generates in an individual a novel learned behaviour’ 
(p.393, emphasis added). Determining the level at which to pitch innovation for 
developmental research is one of several reasons why it would not be appropriate to 
simply adopt existing definitions. As with applying the particular methods of animal 
behaviour researchers, it is important to consider how requirements for innovation 
translate between species.  
To fully understand the evolution, development, consistency and 
extensiveness of children’s innovation, a clear definition, workable across a variety 
of contexts, is needed. The shortage of developmental work necessitates that, in our 
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journey towards a definition, we reflect upon alternative bodies of literature 
(including animal and human adult). However, the focus remains on its relevance 
and applicability to childhood and development.  
 
2.3.1 Markers of Childhood Innovation 
 
 Childhood is a time of exploration, play and learning. The potential to 
discover and produce unusual or novel behaviour is vast. Are each of these 
occurrences to be considered an innovation? We think not. There are criteria which a 
potential innovation must meet, and this forms the basis of both the ensuing 
discussion and our innovation definition (see Section 2.4). 
 
i. Innovation can be the result of asocial learning or a combination of asocial 
and social learning, but it must be novel.  
 
 At the upper-most level of distinction, learning may be social (information is 
acquired from others), asocial/individual (independent of social observation or 
interaction), or a combination of the two. Whilst innovation may be considered 
“largely asocial learning” (Kendal, Giraldeau, & Laland, 2009, p.218), in that the 
innovator ultimately produces behaviour that has not, in its full form, been socially 
observed, it is often an evaluation of information acquired socially that induces 
innovation; specifically, judging “that a novel solution to a problem generates 
superior returns than does an established (observed) behaviour” (Laland, 2004, p.10, 
parentheses added). It is not, therefore, technically independent of any social 
influence. This leads us to our proposition that innovation is not wholly asocial (nor, 
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indeed, is all asocial learning innovation). Thus it is advantageous to assign beneath 
the ‘innovation’ umbrella the terms of independent invention when novel behaviour 
results from asocial learning, and modification when social influences are directly 
implicated (as in cumulative culture). There are two main reasons why we believe 
this distinction to be advantageous, both of which are revisited later in this section. 
First, the two forms may have different cognitive underpinnings and different 
developmental profiles, meaning inferences or generalisations about children’s 
abilities cannot be made on the basis of the assessment of only one form. Second, 
they likely contribute differently to processes of cumulative culture and cultural 
transmission, partially as a result of the primary source of information from which 
they draw. 
Note that in the case of independent invention, we do not refute that 
individuals will be equipped with some social information acquired from prior 
interactions and experiences with the world (e.g., in inventing a novel tool, the 
components that make up the tool may not themselves be novel), including products 
of others’ behaviour. Rather, what we aim to distinguish is whether asocial learning 
is the predominant learning mechanism involved in producing the innovation (there 
is no immediate social learning from which the impetus for the innovation directly 
emerges, as with innovation by modification). Making this distinction will not 
always be straightforward, and indeed becomes blurred when ‘goal emulation’, 
where the means of achieving a socially-observed goal is arrived at through a 
different means, may be considered innovation by invention or modification (see 
point v). Nevertheless, the idea that independent invention should be regarded as one 
form of innovation, i.e., a clear derivative of asocial/individual learning, has 
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theoretical support (e.g., Kandler & Laland, 2009; Lewis & Laland, 2012; Slater & 
Lachlan, 2003).  
 Human tool use is, in its frequency, flexibility and complexity, unique within 
the animal kingdom (Kacelnik, 2009). Tool-use learning has been extensively 
investigated in social learning paradigms, designed to understand the age at which 
children become proficient tool users, the factors that enable it, and the cognitive 
systems that differentiate humans from non-humans. Tool-use learning has similar 
potential to inform and direct investigations of children’s innovation. Although few 
in number, examinations of tool-use innovation in children have revealed one 
consistent finding: children are poor innovators. Hanus, Mendes, Tennie and Call 
(2011) compared apes and human children in a ‘floating peanut’ task in which water 
had to be used as a tool to retrieve a peanut from the bottom of a narrow tube. The 
developmental progression in children’s success was marked, with only 8% of 4-
year-olds but 58% of 8-year-olds succeeding. The authors attributed this to the 
greater cognitive flexibility of the older children, facilitating their abandonment of 
ineffective methods, together with their enhanced exploration, insight and attention 
to alternative task components. Nielsen (2013) replicated the finding that 4-year-olds 
experience great difficulty producing the necessary innovative behaviour in the 
floating object task, yet acquire the solution immediately following the 
demonstration of a knowledgeable adult. Hence the problem is not one of 
performance, but identification and generation of the required response. 
In a similar reflection on comparative literature, Beck, Apperly, Chappell, 
Guthrie, and Cutting (2011) presented 3 to 11 year old children with a task originally 
used with New Caledonian crows. The task required manufacturing a novel tool (a 
hook from a pipe-cleaner) to extract a bucket from a tube. As in Nielsen’s study, tool 
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innovation was difficult for the youngest children and success increased with age. 
Task variations including tool preference selection and prior object manipulation did 
not impact upon performance. A social demonstration, however, permitted nearly all 
children to succeed. The ‘ill-structured’ nature of tool innovation problems was 
offered as an account for the findings, with the absence of clearly defined strategies 
for moving between the starting conditions and goal states theorised to impede 
progress. A recent study employing the same task to compare Western and Bushman 
children, aged between 3 and 5 years, further suggests that cognitive limitations 
underlie innovation difficulties (Nielsen, Tomaselli, Mushin, & Whiten, 2014). 
Somewhat surprisingly, despite vast differences in cultural environments and 
exposure to pre-made artifacts, both groups evidenced similarly poor tool innovation. 
Further research into how the capacity for innovation emerges (precisely which 
cognitive factors are implicated) will only be possible by continuing developmental 
investigations of this kind.  
According to our delineation, these studies examine innovation by 
independent invention but not innovation by modification. Their importance cannot 
be disputed: novel problem-solving tasks offer a highly suitable means to reflect 
upon children’s capacity for novel invention. Asocial control participants of social 
learning studies offer similar insight. The invention-modification distinction may not 
be universally accepted as a necessary one, but we nonetheless believe it has utility. 
There are reasons to believe that the two forms of innovation will have different 
primary difficulties associated with them, potentially altering their developmental 
profile. Whereas the ill-structured nature of problems proves challenging for novel 
invention tasks, an ontogenetic imitation bias induced by social information (e.g., 
Horner & Whiten, 2005) is highly likely to prove equally challenging for 
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modification tasks by impacting the generation of alternate asocial output (Wood, 
Kendal, & Flynn, 2013). 
With regard to capacities for cumulative culture, tasks must permit 
opportunities for modification, refinement and/or recombination of established 
behaviour in order to mirror the ratcheting process. One serendipitous, but 
influential, invention may outweigh iterative alterations when it comes to cultural 
diversity (Kandler & Laland, 2009), but novel invention is of lesser consequence for 
cumulative culture (Lewis & Laland, 2012). These theoretical findings support the 
deconstruction of innovation (for both definition and study), owing to the wider 
cultural implications of innovation’s various forms.  
 Irrespective of the form it takes, the concept of innovation is tied to that of 
novelty (Reader & Laland, 2003). Given that we already have opposing views of 
population- and individual-level novelty in the animal literature, how is novelty to be 
judged? In experimental research, by introducing novel tasks we are able to say that 
any behaviour exhibited, that has not previously been socially observed (in its full 
form), is indeed new to that individual. Where tasks are posed in group contexts, the 
first ‘solver’ meets the population-level definition of an innovator (producing 
behaviour not previously found in the ‘population’), along with any individual who 
introduces a new solution (whether completely new or a combination or modification 
of observed behaviour: Flynn & Whiten, 2012; Whiten & Flynn, 2010). Since almost 
every new behaviour resembles, if not contains, existing behavioural constituents, a 
strict definition of novelty would be unwise. In the animal literature (following 
Kummer & Goodall, 1985), innovation is additionally assessed in the light of the 
context in which the behaviour is performed. Thus either the innovation-inducing 
problem (necessitating use of novel or existing behaviour patterns) or the solution to 
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an existing problem may be novel (again, without the basic behavioural and motor 
elements necessarily being so).  
 
ii. There are a number of hypothesised contributors or precursors to the 
innovation process. These include, but are not limited to, causal 
understanding, insight, curiosity, exploration (discovery learning), divergent 
thinking, and creativity. They do not equate to innovation, and alone are not 
sufficient to produce it.  
 
 Just as imitation, emulation, mimicry and enhancement learning possess 
commonalities, requiring specific experimental designs to delineate them, so 
innovation shares elements of its process and product with other related constructs. 
Particularly in their combination, these constructs facilitate higher-level cognition 
thereby promoting the cognitive maturation plausibly conducive to innovation.  
 Causal understanding denotes an appreciation of the causal relation 
underpinning a covariance. Knowing what causes something means knowing how it 
may be changed, and this is central to humanity’s technological achievements 
(Vaesen, 2012). Deducing causal understanding from the production of an 
innovation is met with caution by some animal researchers, particularly when 
innovative problem solving ‘may be more parsimoniously explained by simple, 
conserved associative processes’ (Thornton & Samson, 2012, p.1466). Causal 
knowledge does, however, play an important role in human ontogeny, and 
specifically cognitive development. Within the first two years of life, causal learning 
is evident in children’s interpretations of events (Walker & Gopnik, 2014) and by the 
fifth year, causal-based inductions direct children’s category-based reasoning (Hayes 
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& Thompson, 2007). While simple causal understanding does not require high-level 
reasoning abilities, it may be that the latter better facilitates the innovation process. It 
is also necessary to consider the relation between task difficulty and causal 
understanding development: younger children may have sufficient causal knowledge 
to innovate on simpler tasks, but not more complex ones. Flexible inductive 
reasoning, wherein a variety of inferences may be made about a single item that fits 
multiple categories, develops throughout childhood (e.g., Bright & Feeney, 2014). 
Such sophisticated reasoning, involving the consideration of multiple possible 
outcomes, may allow children to better evaluate the employment of social and/or 
asocial information, and consequently utilise innovation when it is most appropriate.  
Insight, defined as “the sudden production of new adaptive responses not 
arrived at by trial behavior… or the solution to a problem by the sudden adaptive 
reorganization of experience” (Thorpe, 1964, p.110), may also play a role in the 
innovation process. We note, however, that if one accepts innovations need not 
possess intentionality (point vii) and may arise accidentally, insight need not be 
implicated. For Kacelnik (2009, p.10072), “Even in humans, the causal use of the 
term insight is ridden with difficulties, and it can hardly be claimed to explain 
much”. We remain uncertain regarding how much emphasis should be placed upon 
insight; it clearly has some role in certain forms of novel behaviour, but does not 
encapsulate all instances of novel problem-solving and, further, is very difficult to 
determine.  
 Outwardly, curiosity appears a more neutral and less contested term to 
impart. It captures an individual’s motivation to discover and learn more about the 
environment. Being curious acts to prompt exploration. Yet, as with insight, there is 
also the implication of foresight (Hauser, 2003): a reason to be curious in the first 
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place (‘what does this do, and why?’). There obviously exist objects which promote 
curiosity, a prime example of which are artificial fruit tasks, widely used by 
developmental psychologists and in animal behaviour research (e.g., Horner & 
Whiten, 2005). They contain the motivation (food reward) for animals to interact 
with and explore artifacts.  
 A concept closely tied to curiosity is exploration; clearly, trying to work out 
ways in which to do something differently requires exploratory testing of ideas, 
paving the way for innovation (Sol, Griffin, Bartomeus, & Boyce, 2011). 
Remarkable advances have been made in understanding how children’s exploratory 
play allows them to formulate theories of, and learn about, the world. In using play 
to test hypotheses and generate causal knowledge, they may be viewed as ‘like’ 
scientists (Gopnik, 2012). Importantly, play provides children with information 
about the functionality of objects that, if not immediately relevant, may have future 
use. Animals also play, but the key difference for our own species is pretense. 
Pretense as a specific form of play, wherein individuals generate and reason with 
imagined (often novel) scenarios and objects, has been touted as a springboard for 
innovation through its promotion of creativity (Nielsen, 2012; Picciuto & Carruthers, 
2012). The evolutionary function of pretend play is, indeed, considered to be the 
practice of creative thought (Carruthers, 2002).   
Exploration, whether inside or outside of an imagined setting, can promote 
new learning, contributing to an appreciation of how behaving in a novel manner 
may yield different, perhaps more efficient outcomes. The significance of age in a 
discussion of innovative tendencies is tied to the question of how much an individual 
may benefit from greater, and more diverse, exploration. That is, recognising that a 
new response is required and physically producing one may require the competence 
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and experience of adulthood (Kendal, Coe, & Laland, 2005). Though certainly 
related, exploration is qualitatively distinct to innovation (Reader & Laland, 2003): 
you may explore, but you may not always innovate.  
A number of predictions may be made regarding the interplay between 
exploration and familiarity (or expertise) in a given domain. Exploration is certainly 
likely to increase familiarity, but what of the reverse effect? Simonton (2000) notes, 
when considering creative achievement, that domain-relevant experiences are of 
importance. Though there is variability and a number of factors that feed into the 
relation, it appears that cumulative experience within a domain enhances creative 
impact. There is, therefore, an argument to be made that familiarity will prompt more 
directed exploration and increase the likelihood of innovation production. However, 
the nature of prior experience in a domain will viably make it more or less likely that 
an individual is motivated to explore. They may be less willing to consider 
alternative behaviour if their prior experiences are associated with some negative 
consequence. Moreover, familiarity can also heighten functional fixedness and 
conservatism (point iii). 
Exploration is particularly potent in its combination with divergent thinking 
(essentially the opposite of functional fixedness). Divergent thinking denotes the 
ability to search for new ideas (Guildford, 1959, as cited in Bijvoet-van den Berg & 
Hoicka, 2014), and is thus implicated not only in problem solving but in creative 
potential and productivity (Runco & Acar, 2012). Even at 2 years of age, children 
demonstrate individual differences in divergent thinking, with evidence to suggest 
that greater exploration (producing a variety of actions on a novel object) is linked 
with originality (Bijvoet-van den Berg & Hoicka, 2014). Whilst originality links 
divergent thinking and creativity (and innovation), they are not synonymous; one can 
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demonstrate good divergent thinking without demonstrating creativity (Runco & 
Acar, 2012). Conceiving multiple potential solutions to a puzzle does not imply they 
will be good, useful or workable (Runco & Acar, 2012). In contrast, typical 
definitions of creativity require that creative ideas, behaviour and problem solving 
be both original and valuable (Picciuto & Carruthers, 2012). One’s perspective 
regarding to whom these must be valuable inevitably alters the goalposts of 
creativity.  
Many relevant ideas regarding the innovation-creativity distinction are 
offered by Levitt (1963). Principally, creative thoughts are regarded as a 
precipitating factor for innovation but must undergo conversion to qualify as such. It 
is the difference between generating ideas and implementing them: the abstract 
versus the concrete. This is a common distinction made in business, but one that is 
consistent with Simonton’s (2003, p.311) conceptualisation of innovation as “the end 
product of a creative process”.  
From this discussion, we have formulated a hypothetical pathway to 
innovation (Figure 2.1). We tentatively offer this pathway as a starting point, with 
the hope it will stimulate debate and be improved upon by subsequent research. By 
presenting the precursors to innovation, we also hope it may serve as a useful 
theoretical framework for educators, and individuals in various sectors, who wish to 
consider ways to promote the innovation process.  
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Figure 2.1. A hypothetical individual-level pathway to innovation. Arrows denote which construct leads to another construct. From left 
to right, any of the processes within the first block can lead to those within the second block. The constructs in italic text within the 
second block play more contested, or less direct, roles in this pathway (see point ii). Neophilia, and its opposing construct neophobia, 
are discussed in point iii. Context and prior learning (social and/or asocial) are acknowledged to potentially contribute to each construct 
portrayed and to differentially promote behavioural change. Innovation is generally regarded as a component of behavioural flexibility, 
by allowing “individuals to react to environmental changes… [by] changing established behavior” (Toelch et al., 2011, p.1). It should be 
noted that, rather than necessarily prompting divergent thinking and creativity, exploration may allow an individual to stumble upon an 
innovation by chance, captured by the connecting arrow.
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iii. Functional fixedness (conservatism), low motivation, pedagogy, and 
neophobia restrict innovation. 
 
 Functional fixedness, or behavioural conservatism, is a likely inhibitory 
factor in innovation. It denotes fixation upon the demonstrated or learned design 
function of an object as the proper, conventional or normative way to use it. Children 
attain such a concept of artifact function at around 6 or 7 years of age (Defeyter & 
German, 2003), prior to which time they ostensibly possess greater flexibility in 
artifact use. The development of functional fixedness impacts innovation: 
categorising an object as ‘for’ a particular function means using it in a way not 
initially intended by its design, as is often required in tool innovation and novel 
problem solving, is difficult and serves to compound the imitation bias. Younger 
children may be more ‘immune’ to functional fixedness (it affects 7-year-olds to a 
greater extent than 5-year-olds; Defeyter, Avons, & German, 2007), but 
disadvantaged by more general cognitive immaturity. Discovering ways to reduce its 
effects will plausibly enhance children’s developing capacity for innovation. Due to 
its combination with artifacts, functional fixedness is a unique problem when 
studying innovation within the context of tool use. Investigations outside of this 
domain will only prove complementary and extend our understanding of when and 
why children experience difficulties.  
As expected, motivation is closely tied to innovation propensity (Reader & 
Laland, 2003). Whether arising from factors in the environment, such as a food 
reward, or from a stable individual motivational component to discover more (Sol, 
Griffin, & Bartomeus, 2012), it can be viewed as a necessary starting constituent of 
the innovation process, prompting exploration. The understanding and knowledge 
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that can be ascertained through exploring the environment makes pedagogy
1
 
(explicit direction or teaching) a ‘double-edged sword’: in the same way as 
observation (Wood et al., 2013), it leads to efficient, but restricted, exploration and 
learning in preschoolers (Bonawitz et al., 2011). 
Open diffusion studies, involving the introduction of a model and task to a 
group of freely interacting novices, have provided opportunities to reflect upon 
biographic, social, cognitive, and temperament predictors of social learning (Flynn & 
Whiten, 2012). Specifically, increasing age, popularity, dominance and impulsivity 
have been seen to promote children’s successful interactions with a foraging 
apparatus. Animal studies have found the predictors of innovation (here, successful 
novel problem solving or foraging) to include exploration, neophilia - being novelty-
inclined or unafraid to approach or interact with new objects - and persistence (e.g., 
Benson-Amram & Holekamp, 2012; Thornton & Samson, 2012). Neophobia, the 
fear of novelty, conversely acts to restrict exploration intensity (Sol et al., 2012) and 
thereby plausibly innovation. Certain social factors, such as the presence of 
conspecifics (Griffin, Lermite, Perea, & Guez, 2013), appear to similarly deter 
innovative foraging in animals. This latter research demonstrates the need to 
consider extrinsic, as well as intrinsic, influences on the expression of innovation. 
Given the heightened social motivations of children, and humans more generally, 
social and contextual factors will have a large role to play in an individual’s decision 
to deviate from established behaviour.   
 
                                                          
1
 Pedagogy is used throughout this thesis in line with Csibra and Gergely’s (2009, p.148) 
conception of natural pedagogy (“the specific aspects of human communication that allow 
and facilitate the transfer of generic knowledge to novices”). Ostensive demonstrations, 
which feature in the experimental work throughout, are a component of natural pedagogy by 
virtue of the signals or cues (including eye contact and directed speech) that are suggestive 
of intentional communication or teaching. 
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iv. Innovations, being of multiple origins, may be cognitively distinguished.  
 
 A number of potential sources of innovation have been identified, all of 
which are deemed capable of introducing new cultural variation into a population. 
These include, as listed by Mesoudi et al. (2013), chance factors (i.e., accidents and 
copying errors), novel invention (be it through trial-and-error, insight, or 
exploration), refinement (modification and improvement), recombination (of 
behavioural variants), and exaptation (the application of behaviour to a new 
function). The implication is that innovations are not equal: although the end 
products may look remarkably similar, the processes from which they have arisen 
may differ. What is important for innovation classification is that, in each case, 
independent of source, the behavioural outcome is recognised as viable and useful. 
These judgments will not be free of subjectivity. 
 Recognition of innovation sources has led to the categorisation of ‘types’ of 
innovation, potentially impacting upon their study and measurement. In accordance 
with Ramsey et al. (2007) who endorse a ‘cognitively simple’ and ‘cognitively 
complex’ innovation distinction, Rendell, Hoppitt, and Kendal (2007) refer to 
‘passive’ and ‘active’ innovations with the former in both cases involving chance 
factors. In a study examining the social learning and innovative propensities of 
common marmosets, Burkart, Strasser and Foglia (2009) offered a similar 
operationalisation; Type I innovations correspond closely to common conceptions of 
innovation involving goal-directed and problem-induced behaviour, and Type II 
innovations, in contrast, are characterised as more incidental, and plausibly 
accidental, arising not due to the need for a solution to a problem but as a result of 
situations offering chance, and scope for, novel behaviours. Thus authors include an 
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idea of weak and strong innovations, the latter denoting active ‘thinking up’ of novel 
behaviour and resonating with typical definitions of fluid intelligence (including the 
ability to solve novel problems). The developmental trajectories of these two types 
of innovations may be distinct. One could hypothesise that Type I (‘active’ 
innovations) will be more prevalent in late rather than early childhood, when 
individuals are equipped with greater experience and cognitive maturity. However, 
as we discuss in relation to intentionality (see point vii, and Section 2.4), we believe 
the emphasis should be more upon subsequent learning.  
 For some, there is no value in identifying the origin of an innovation; the 
“ecological and evolutionary consequences of innovation need not depend on the 
cognitive sophistication of the innovative process” (Laland & Reader, 2010, p.41). It 
may not be so much genius that underpins innovation as chance (Lewis & Laland, 
2012). However, where an innovation occurs by chance, it may not be learned, thus 
not repeated and consequently neither useful nor influential in terms of cultural 
transmission and traditions (Reader & Laland, 2003).  
 
v. Goal emulation can represent a weak form of innovation. 
 
 Emulation involves learning about object properties, affordances and causal 
relations (Want & Harris, 2002). Affordance learning, one form of emulation, may 
be observed in ghost control experiments wherein the movements of an apparatus are 
demonstrated via hidden mechanisms, in the absence of a live model or agent. By 
matching the ghost demonstration, individuals evidence learning about the 
affordances of the action(s) and the properties of an object (beyond simple object 
movement re-enactment). In goal emulation, the observer reproduces the model’s 
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goal but uses their own method (e.g., selecting a different tool). But what if, in this 
instance, the individual opts for an individually-discovered novel method, involving 
the use of a novel tool for example? It may not be novel problem solving, but it is 
finding ‘a new solution to an old problem’. Whether this new solution is discovered 
by way of asocial learning, or a combination of asocial and social learning, dictates 
its designation as innovation by invention or innovation by modification (point i). In 
Cutting, Apperly, Chappell and Beck (2014), children were shown a ready-made 
pipecleaner hook if they failed to solve the hook-making task (described in point i). 
This may be regarded as both innovation by invention (despite having social 
information in the form of a pre-made hook, the social information itself is not being 
directly modified; rather, children are still required to invent the means by which to 
create the hook) and goal emulation (the socially observed goal is reproduced via the 
individual’s own means).  
The matter becomes more convoluted in the event that the goal being 
reproduced is one which does not solve the problem at hand, as ‘good’ innovations 
should work (Hauser, 2003). Behaviour that would otherwise be labelled ‘goal 
emulation’ crosses into the boundary of ‘innovation’ only when the novel 
modification of the pre-existing behaviour is useful and successful. When these 
criteria are not fulfilled, goal emulation indicates exploration and curiosity; an 
appreciation of alternative behavioural potentials when the cognitive capacity, 
motivation, or any factor reviewed above is not yet sufficient to enable the 
innovation process. In this way, goal emulation may be seen as a precursor to 
innovation in childhood (or a weak form of; see Whiten & Flynn, 2010, whose 
‘innovate-minor’ category for children has the properties of emulation).  
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 It is similarly pertinent to ask when the omission of actions within a 
behavioural sequence becomes an innovation, i.e., a new modification. Goal 
emulation can involve such omissions, as in Horner and Whiten’s (2005) 
comparative study. Whereas 3- to 4-year-old children imitated both causally relevant 
and irrelevant actions in a tool-use task, irrespective of the availability of causal 
information (a transparent, but not opaque, puzzle box allowed the irrelevance of the 
actions to be seen), chimpanzees disregarded the irrelevant actions “in favor of a 
more efficient, emulative technique” (p.164) when the box was transparent. Thus, 
the chimpanzee behaviour became more efficient but the goal itself, retrieval of a 
food reward, was not altered. Though apes emulate to a higher degree than children, 
their lack of faithful transmission mechanisms means more efficient behaviours are 
rarely acquired by others, resulting in an absence of cumulative culture (Dean et al., 
2013). In summary, emulation and innovation by modification are differentiated by a 
change in goal: with innovation the outcome of the behaviour must be better or more 
efficient (e.g., retrieval of more food), whereas with emulation the details of the 
behaviour involved in order to reach that outcome increase in efficiency (e.g., fewer 
steps in the behavioural sequence).  
 
vi. An innovation should be useful and/or transmitted.  
 
 Although controversial, we believe many innovations are likely to be 
beneficial and adaptive for the individual and the population in the event of their 
successful social transmission. This complies with the human literature wherein 
there is the implication that innovations should represent an improvement upon 
current behaviour (Caldwell & Millen, 2010) and allow us to formulate not only 
66 
 
solutions to problems but increasingly effective and efficient ones, enabling culture 
to evolve (Dean et al., 2013; Tennie et al., 2009). A caveat to the view of ‘useful’ 
innovations has emerged from studies of bird song, wherein innovations may be 
simply neutral in their fitness consequences as opposed to specifically adaptive or 
maladaptive (Slater & Lachlan, 2003). We can speculate that the same will be true of 
children’s innovations, particularly if they arise in the context of play. What children 
define as useful may be very different to what we adults define as useful; it may be 
enjoyable, for example, as opposed to serving a practical purpose. Open diffusion 
studies (see point iii), wherein deviation from established behaviour is seen (Flynn & 
Whiten, 2012), are well placed to infer what children regard as useful and, in turn, 
what is transmitted. 
 Maladaptive behaviour (inducing detrimental fitness consequences), 
however, also thrives within cultures. This may be because of indiscriminate 
copying, informational cascades, indirect transmission biases, copying errors and the 
transfer of outdated information (Rendell et al., 2011), as opposed to the spread of 
‘bad’ innovations. The imitation of causally irrelevant actions and transmission of 
maladaptive information (by adults, Flynn & Smith, 2012; children, Horner & 
Whiten, 2005; guppies, Laland & Williams, 1998) demonstrates that a behaviour 
pattern may be functionally ineffectual and yet still succeed in spreading to other 
individuals. Is this to suggest that, regardless of outward utility, novel behavioural 
displays be considered innovations if they are reproduced by other individuals? The 
answer is probably yes. By their act of transmission, the implication is that they are 
of some use. The guppies in Laland and William’s (1998) study may take a longer 
and energetically more costly route to a feeder when a shorter route is available, but 
in doing so they are able to remain within the safety of the shoal. Therefore 
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‘usefulness’ of behaviour may not be immediately apparent, and additional 
motivations to learn ostensibly maladaptive information must be considered. 
Mechanisms such as ‘adaptive filtering’ (Enquist & Ghirlanda, 2007) provide a 
possible resolution to maladaptive cultural traits, contingent upon an individual’s 
capacity to perceive and correctly identify behavioural consequences and make 
innovative modifications accordingly.  
 
vii. An innovation need not reflect intentionality, but it should lead to learning. 
 
 Views surrounding the intentionality of an innovation feed into discussions 
of innovation sources and types (see point iv). Without the intention to act in a novel 
manner, we can assume subsequent production of innovative behaviour results from 
chance factors. We believe the inclusion of intentionality as an innovation criterion 
for children is unrealistic and unnecessary. Our argument is three-fold. First, the 
ability to plan behaviour develops gradually throughout childhood. This is especially 
true of the more cognitively complex and flexible advance planning, requiring one to 
anticipate action outcomes, in which children do not show higher levels of 
proficiency until aged 9-10 years or above (Tecwyn et al., 2014). This notion of 
forward projection of outcomes bears resemblance to intentionality. Complex 
planning is not, of course, a facet of all innovative behaviour, but it is a worthy 
consideration for more complex innovations nonetheless. Second, like insight, 
intentionality is difficult to determine. It is often indicated verbally when an 
intention is broken, but arguably less so when it is met. Third, whether arising from 
accidental occurrence or intentionality, novelty impacts upon an individual’s future 
behaviour (and, by extension, in cumulative culture) when it is learned and repeated, 
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both individually and more widely. We posit that an innovation technically remains 
an innovation but loses its value in the absence of its repetition and transmission.  
For Ramsey et al. (2007) and Reader and Laland (2003), amongst others, an 
innovation can only be considered as such if it is accompanied by learning: if it 
becomes an established feature of behaviour, or if affordance learning is evident 
prior to the discovery of the innovative act itself. With regard to experimental tasks, 
we cannot be sure that children have demonstrated a novel learned behaviour in the 
absence of repeated trials with the same apparatus, nor is there opportunity to infer 
its origin or source: is it a purposeful behaviour executed with prior intentionality, 
the result of a trial-and-error approach or a one-off accident? It may also not be truly 
reflective of human culture to prescribe short time spans in which an innovation can 
occur. It should, however, be noted that learning is not universally considered to be 
essential to the innovation process, and a number of definitions do not require it. The 
matter of determining repetitions of innovative behaviour in the wild is a particularly 
tricky one, as animals are not observed continuously. Yet, whilst “trivial and 
idiosyncratic one-off” behaviour (Reader & Laland, 2003, p.11) is unlikely to be 
scientifically published (as an “interesting departure from established behavior”), 
actually observing an individual repeat a novel behaviour is explicitly suggestive of 
its effectiveness and significance. In addition to repetition, further measures of 
learning include iterative reductions in latency to solve a task using the innovation 
and verbal self-report. Ascribing intentionality to an innovation is therefore a minor 
issue compared to the more ultimate contribution that it may make to cultural 
evolution should it be learned.  
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2.4 Theoretical Contributions 
 
2.4.1 Proposed Definition 
 
The following operational definition is offered, drawing from the analysis 
undertaken in this review:  
 
In the physical realm, a behavioural innovation is a new, useful and potentially 
transmitted learned behaviour, arising from asocial learning (innovation by 
independent invention) or a combination of asocial and social learning (innovation 
by modification), that is produced so as to successfully solve a novel problem or an 
existing problem in a novel manner. 
 
We wish to note that, whilst verifying the occurrence of learning is the ideal, 
it is not at this stage essential. This criterion has the potential to inhibit research due 
to innovation’s rarity in early to middle childhood (Beck et al., 2011). Attempts to 
assess learning, whether via behaviour repetition, task latency or verbal self-report, 
would nevertheless be both valuable and revealing, potentially uncovering age and 
individual differences in the extent to which it is evidenced by children. 
 
2.4.2 Classifying Innovations 
  
Rather than assigning innovation ‘types’ (Section 2.3.1, point iv), we propose 
a classification system based upon levels (see Table 2.1). The aim is to remove some 
of the focus from the source of the innovation, and allocate it instead to the outcome. 
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Learning, here, becomes the key component, and not whether the initial novel 
behaviour is accidental or insightful. In both instances, with learning, the outcome 
may well be the same. Should an innovation ultimately become a cultural trait, by 
way of its successful transmission and acquisition by others, we may regard it as of a 
higher level than an innovation that remains in the repertoire of only one individual. 
By thinking about innovations in terms of their larger cultural contribution and 
population-level consequences, we may achieve clearer discussion of their nature 
and avoid inconsistent use of terminology.  
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Table 2.1 
Classifying Innovation 
Levels 
Criteria  
(whether Innovation by Invention or Modification) 
1 : LOW Unlearned ‘chance’ innovation not repeated by the individual 
2 : MID Individually learned innovation repeated by the individual 
3 : HIGH Individually learned innovation that is acquired by others 
Types (from animal behaviour)  
Cognitively Simple/Complex 
(Whiten & van Schaik, 2007) 
Simple: An innovation which could arise by individual discovery. 
Complex: An innovation which requires causal inference and deliberate action; not likely to arise by 
accident. 
Weak Innovation/Invention 
(Ramsey et al., 2007) 
Weak Innovation: An innovation in which social learning or environmental induction is implicated 
Invention: An innovation which is rarer, more novel, and involves more cognition. 
Passive/Active 
(Rendell et al., 2007) 
Passive: An innovation which is more likely to rely on chance events. 
Active: An innovation which is more likely to reflect cognitive abilities of the innovator. 
Type I/Type II 
(Burkart et al., 2009) 
Type I: An innovation which is goal-directed and problem-induced. 
Type II: An innovation which is more incidental. 
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Note. By presenting our ‘levels’ and earlier literature’s ‘types’, this table intends to 
highlight the increased clarity afforded by the former classification. Transition from 
mid to high level innovation does not necessarily directly link to the ‘usefulness’ of 
the innovation but may be a function of other social and contextual factors, such as 
the dependency of transmission on the identity of the innovator, due to directed 
social learning or transmission biases. Owing to its cultural transmission 
ramifications, learning is a key, and ideal, component of our levels criteria. 
However, it is not at this stage essential to demonstrate in child research given the 
difficulties of observing repetitions of innovative behavior.  
 
2.5 Conclusion and Future Directions 
 
 The pivotal role of innovation in behavioural change and cultural evolution 
has prompted much research interest from a wide variety of disciplines, but thus far 
has been met with comparatively little attention from developmental psychologists. 
Its cognitive and cultural ramifications, and relevance to numerous contemporary 
contexts, including business enterprises, medical practices, education reforms, and 
climate change, underscores the imperative need to better understand the process and 
development of innovation. Throughout this article we have attempted to convey 
how emulating the advances of animal behavior research, and establishing a clear 
and consistent terminology, will be a crucial first step towards addressing this need 
and placing developmental psychology firmly on the stage of innovation research. In 
presenting a theoretical pathway to innovation and a new classification system, we 
also hope to stimulate interdisciplinary conversation and debate, encourage 
evidence-based conceptual frameworks, and prompt further experimental work. 
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Our provision of innovation criteria is intended to promote and support future 
research in this domain. We note, however, that whether a criteria consensus is 
gained or not, criteria of any sort will be of no value should researchers not be 
explicit in their own decisions regarding what will and will not be accepted as 
instances of the phenomenon, and take steps to create tasks, and task contexts, 
reflective of these aims. If, for example, we contend that innovations should 
represent better or more efficient ways of achieving goals, then an arbitrary 
alteration of a task solution (i.e., turning a manipulandi left versus right) reveals very 
little in this regard. Similarly, one task trial (that is, attempts with a novel task) 
discloses little about an innovation’s origin and cannot verify the occurrence of 
learning. Examining task solution alternation, only possible with the implementation 
of a number of response trials (Wood et al., 2013), is a promising way of 
comprehending imitative or innovative strategy use over time and, through the 
manipulation of other variables of interest, what is viably responsible for 
conservatism and flexibility in children’s learning. The implementation of multiple 
experimental trials, and multiple ‘generations’ of learners, will establish confidence 
in the findings of innovation (and innovation-related) research.  
As we face a host of environmental, social and economic issues at a global 
level, taking steps to promote innovation will be key. Studies examining the 
ontogeny of tool innovation and the factors affecting age-related competence are 
needed to uncover consistencies in how and when this capacity emerges, as well as 
research examining consistencies in the innovative tendencies of individuals, 
populations (i.e., cross-cultural comparisons) and species. Such studies would allow 
for the identification of factors reliably implicated in observations of learning 
strategy variance, and their systematic promotion. An appreciation of how 
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competence interacts with motivational state, reward value, and social context will 
aid in the critical disentanglement of individual differences in innovative 
propensities. Without a better understanding of the innovation phenomenon we 
cannot hope to truly understand humanity’s uniqueness, cultural complexity, and 
future ability to adapt – nor our capacity to nurture and cultivate it.  
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Chapter 3  
Imitate or innovate? Children’s innovation is influenced by the efficacy of 
observed behaviour 
 
Abstract 
 
This study investigated the age at which children judge it futile to imitate unreliable 
information, in the form of a visibly ineffective demonstrated solution, and deviate to 
produce novel solutions (‘innovations’). Children aged 4 to 9 years were presented 
with a novel puzzle box, the Multiple-Methods Box (MMB), which offered multiple 
innovation opportunities to extract a reward using different tools, access points and 
exits. 209 children were assigned to conditions in which eight social demonstrations 
of a reward retrieval method were provided; each condition differed incrementally in 
terms of the method’s efficacy (0%, 25%, 75%, and 100% success at extracting the 
reward). An additional 47 children were assigned to a no-demonstration control 
condition. Innovative reward extractions from the MMB increased with decreasing 
efficacy of the demonstrated method. However, imitation remained a widely used 
strategy irrespective of the efficacy of the method being reproduced (90% of children 
produced at least one imitative attempt, and imitated on an average of 4.9 out of 8 
attempt trials). Children were more likely to innovate in relation to the tool than exit, 
even though the latter would have been more effective. Overall, innovation was rare: 
only 12.4% of children innovated by discovering at least one novel reward exit. 
Children’s prioritisation of social information is consistent with theories of cultural 
evolution indicating imitation is a prepotent response following observation of 
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behaviour, and that innovation is a rarity; so much so, that even maladaptive 
behaviour is copied.  
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3.1 Introduction 
 
Social learning provides the foundation for culture. Acquiring information 
through observation is a rapid, cheap and largely efficient way to learn. Yet, on 
occasion, social information is outdated or inappropriate, especially in changing 
environments; thus its use must be modulated to support accurate and reliable 
information acquisition (Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Kameda & Nakanishi, 2002). 
Accordingly, personal sampling of the environment, even if costly, is a necessity 
(Laland, 2004). Theoretical models have suggested many learning heuristics 
(cultural transmission biases; Boyd & Richerson, 1985 and social learning strategies; 
Laland, 2004) which enable selectivity in social learning. These heuristics help direct 
whom, when and what we copy by inducing accuracy-cost evaluations of observed 
and personal information and, in turn, adaptive trade-offs in reliance on social and 
asocial (individual) learning (Kendal, Coolen, & Laland, 2009; Kendal, Coolen, van 
Bergen, & Laland, 2005).  
Adaptive informational trade-offs have been shown in a variety of non-
human animals (including species of fish, rats, monkeys and birds; see Galef & 
Laland, 2005; Kendal et al., 2009). By pitting social and personal information 
against one another, it appears that, “animals use social information primarily as plan 
B, or a backup when personal information is too costly to obtain, unreliable or 
outdated” (Rieucau & Giraldeau, 2011, p.950). In van Bergen, Coolen and Laland 
(2004), three groups of nine-spined stickleback fish were provided with personal 
information that varied in its level of reliability (56%, 78% or 100% reliable). This 
information related to the profitability of food patches within the experimental tank, 
and was determined by the number of trials in which ‘rich’ and ‘poor’ feeders could 
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be accessed. A social (‘public’) demonstration then provided conflicting information 
as to the location of the rich feeder. In spite of this demonstration, a significant 
number of sticklebacks within the 100% group (19 of 23) continued to visit the 
feeder they had personally experienced as rich, thus negating the conflicting social 
information. As with van Bergen et al. (2004), in the current study we manipulated 
information reliability with the aim of observing adaptive trade-offs in learning. 
However, given children’s proclivity for imitation, and apparent tendency to collect 
social information despite possessing adequate personal information (Wood, Kendal, 
& Flynn, 2013a), we did so by manipulating the reliability of social information. 
 Children are exceptional imitators from a young age, reproducing behaviour 
with high levels of fidelity across contexts (Matheson, Moore, & Akhtar, 2013) and 
in the absence of causal knowledge of its relevancy (Lyons, Young, & Keil, 2007). 
Indeed, they are deemed ‘cultural magnets’ (Flynn, 2008) in their ability to both 
rapidly acquire and transmit information socially (Flynn & Whiten, 2008; Hopper, 
Flynn, Wood, & Whiten, 2010). However, children are not blind to the quality of 
information they observe. By altering the frequency and fidelity with which they 
imitate, in line with the perceived goal of a demonstration (Bekkering, 
Wohlschläger, & Gattis, 2000; Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello, 2005), model 
reliability and intentionality (Birch, Vauthier, & Bloom, 2008; Carpenter, Akhtar, & 
Tomasello, 1998), task difficulty and prior experience (Gardiner, Bjorklund, Greif, 
& Gray, 2012; Pinkham & Jaswal, 2011; Williamson & Meltzoff, 2011; Wood et al., 
2013a), children display rationality and flexibility in their social learning (Koenig & 
Sabbagh, 2013; Mills, 2013; Over & Carpenter, 2012).  
 A variety of factors, including context, model characteristics and information 
content, affect the use of social information (Rendell et al., 2011; Wood, Kendal, & 
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Flynn, 2013b); here, our focus is on the efficacy of the information content. Action 
efficacy should arguably be a foremost determinant of what (and if) we choose to 
copy. By 3 years of age children distinguish correct from incorrect actions in their 
imitative behaviour, only reproducing those that have a desired causal effect (Want 
& Harris, 2001). Further, prior personal difficulty with a task does not induce 3-year-
olds to have a copy-all approach when non-efficacious acts are demonstrated 
(Williamson, Meltzoff, & Markman, 2008). If a causal relationship is unknown, 
faithful imitation may result. However, if action sequences are repeatedly poor at 
producing desired outcomes, their efficacy should be questioned and imitation less 
likely to occur. Thus, logically, in circumstances under which a sequence of 
behaviour is never or rarely effective at achieving a goal, individuals should try new 
methods. 
 Few studies have attempted to examine how evaluations of efficacy affect 
selective imitation, and subsequent novel action production (or innovation). Schulz, 
Hoopell and Jenkins (2008) tested 18-month-olds and 4-year-olds in conditions that 
differed in an action’s efficacy: deterministic, in which the actions activated the toy 
on all trials and stochastic, in which actions activated the toy on 50% of trials. 
Children of both age groups imitated with significantly lower fidelity in the 
stochastic condition than the deterministic condition, irrespective of whether the 
action satisfied the explicitly stated goal of the model. Thus, in the stochastic 
condition, efficacy overrides pedagogy. However, as Schulz et al. (2008) 
acknowledge, the potential for alternative responses on the task, and the opportunity 
to observe behavioural innovation, was limited.  
 In recent years, interest in childhood innovation has grown, and studies 
suggest that, in the tool-use domain, innovation is a relatively late-developing 
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capacity (Beck, Apperly, Chappell, Guthrie, & Cutting, 2011; Hanus, Mendes, 
Tennie, & Call, 2011; Nielsen, 2013) and a rare response for children (Whiten & 
Flynn, 2010). Factors such as functional fixedness (German & Defeyter, 2000), 
explicit instruction (Bonawitz et al., 2011), prior social information (Wood et al., 
2013a), and task structure (Cutting, Apperly, Chappell, & Beck, 2014) likely 
constrain it. Innovation can be delineated in terms of arising from asocial learning 
(innovation by independent invention) or a combination of asocial and social 
learning (innovation by modification: Carr, Kendal, & Flynn, accepted: Chapter 2). 
Most research investigating children’s innovation has examined novel tool invention 
as opposed to novel modification. Yet, examination of the latter is critical as it is of 
great importance for cumulative culture (Lewis & Laland, 2012), where, over 
generations, humans build upon and improve pre-existing knowledge (Dean, Kendal, 
Schapiro, Thierry, & Laland, 2012). Currently we do not know whether innovation 
by modification has the same late developmental trajectory as independent invention. 
The current study addresses this issue through the provision of social demonstrations 
to individual children, across the age range of 4 to 9 years, followed by multiple 
response trials, thus providing many opportunities for innovation as well as multiple 
tools with which to innovate. 
 We ask, when evaluating efficacy of observed actions, at which point do 
children judge it futile to imitate? Do we see different assessments of redundancy at 
different ages? And does varying action efficacy make children more likely to 
innovate (produce novel behaviour) when given sufficient opportunity and means to 
do so? Even if children do not know of a behavioural alternative, they should 
nevertheless explore novel actions (Schulz et al., 2008) - trading-off social 
information for potentially more reliable personal information.  
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Our study used a novel artificial fruit (Whiten, Custance, Gomez, Teixidor, & 
Bard, 1996), the Multiple-Methods Box (MMB), a puzzle-box offering scope for 
exploration and innovation (we distinguish exploration and innovation here as they 
are regarded as qualitatively distinct (Reader & Laland, 2003): you may explore, but 
you may not always innovate). Drawing from van Bergen et al. (2004), children were 
provided with social demonstrations that differed in solution efficacy: the proportion 
of trials (0, 25, 75, 100%) that a reward could be extracted from the exit door of the 
MMB. Multiple demonstration and attempt trials were provided to reduce the 
likelihood that the novel task and experimental context would incite a copy-when-
uncertain bias (Laland, 2004) and to monitor if, and how, participants changed their 
reliance on social and/or personal information over trials (Flynn & Smith, 2012; 
Wood et al., 2013a). With increasing experience with the MMB, both through 
observation and personal use, participants could establish the demonstrated method’s 
efficacy and, in the lower efficacy conditions, appreciate the redundancy of repeating 
a method that simply did not work.  
Children aged 4 to 9 years were selected so as to capture developmental 
change and is in keeping with that of previous innovation research (Beck et al., 
2011). Moreover, children are adept at assessing efficacy by 4 years (Want & Harris, 
2001; Williamson et al., 2008) and able to differentiate information that is reliable 
75% of the time from information that is reliable 25% of the time (Pasquini, 
Corriveau, Koenig, & Harris, 2007). We predicted, in line with Want and Harris 
(2001) and Schulz et al. (2008), that lower levels of solution efficacy would be 
associated with reduced imitation (lowered fidelity to the socially demonstrated 
method), and, further, increased innovation (specifically, innovations that altered the 
reward exit and thus allowed for extraction). Moreover, we anticipated that older 
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children would be better equipped to both evaluate levels of solution efficacy 
(resulting in a stronger negative relationship between efficacy and innovation with 
increasing age) and reach effective innovative solutions (with the greatest rates of 
successful innovation being seen in the oldest age group). In turn, we predicted that, 
overall, the oldest children would be the least faithful to the socially demonstrated 
method. Finally, given the range of novel behaviours that could be produced with the 
MMB, we explore how participants deviated from the socially demonstrated method 
(if and when they did) with regard to whether they changed the tool, access point or, 
most effectively, the exit. We assessed the children’s performance against the 
performance of adults, whom we predicted should innovate, particularly in the 
lowest efficacy condition.  
 
3.2 Method 
 
3.2.1 Participants 
 
 Two hundred and fifty-six children (128 males) from three primary schools 
in the North East of England participated. Three age groups were created: 4-5 years 
(N = 73, M = 5 years 4 months (5;4), range 4;8-5;11), 6-7 years (N = 96, M = 7;0, 
range 6;0-7;10), and 8-9 years (N = 87, M = 8;10, range 8;0-9;9). Forty-five Durham 
University students also participated (23 male, M = 20 years 7 months (20;7), range 
18;6-27;7).  
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3.2.2 Materials 
 
 A novel puzzle box task, the ‘Multiple-Methods Box’ (MMB; see Figure 
3.1), was used. The MMB contains two levels separated by an opaque platform. The 
upper transparent level featured: an entry chute for a reward (a capsule containing a 
sticker which was inserted by the experimenter); four entrances, one of which 
required the rotation of a dial for access and three of which could also function as 
reward extraction points; and a small circular hole in the platform floor. If the 
capsule was manipulated to fall through this hole (as in the social demonstrations) it 
dropped to a lower opaque level of the MMB via a concealed slope to rest behind a 
blue exit door. A small independent remote control device was used to discretely 
lock and unlock the exit door in line with predetermined levels of solution efficacy. 
When unlocked the door could be lifted to acquire the capsule from behind.  
 Three tools were available: a fork, a hook and a sweep tool (Figure 3.1b). 
The varying dimensions of both the MMB and the tools introduced an additional 
problem solving component to the task by limiting random application of the tools; 
that is, not all tools fitted into all access points or were long enough to manipulate 
the capsule to all exit holes. Further, the fork and sweep tool could be joined and 
used in combination to extract the reward across a longer distance than the other 
single tools. The social demonstration involved inserting the fork tool into the 
smaller inverted T-shaped entrance (labelled 1 in Figure 3.1), the reward was caught 
in the ‘U’ of the fork and manoeuvred so that it fell through the hole in the platform 
floor. 
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Figure 3.1. The Multiple-Methods Box (MMB) and associated tools.  (a) Access 
points labelled 1-5: (1) ‘Social’, small inverted T-shape, used in social 
demonstrations, (2) ‘End’, large inverted T-shape, opposite ‘Social’, (3) ‘Dial’, 
circular hole, revealed by aligning the circle of a dial with a circle in the side of the 
box, (4) ‘Dial Opposite’, and (5) ‘Entry Chute’, a circular hole into which the reward 
was dropped. (b) Three tools were available, from right to left: fork, hook and sweep. 
The position of the capsule in relation to each tool demonstrates the main method of 
manoeuvre. The fork and sweep tool could be joined and used in combination to 
extract the reward, with the extra length affording extraction across the full length of 
the MMB, and can be seen in the reflection at the base of the box (a).  
 
3.2.3 Design 
 
 Children from each age group were randomly allocated to one of four social 
experimental conditions, differing incrementally in the efficacy of the demonstrated 
method of reward extraction. The method itself was consistent across all 
Hole in platform floor, 
leading to exit door 
(circled, below left) 
  
2 1 
4 
3 
5 
(a) (b) 
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demonstrations and conditions. Method efficacy was operationalised as the number 
of demonstration trials, out of eight, in which the capsule could be removed from the 
exit door. The method was efficacious on either 0 of 8 trials (0% condition, N = 60), 
2 of 8 trials (25% condition, N = 48), 6 of 8 trials (75% condition, N = 50) or 8 of 8 
trials (100% condition, N = 51). Importantly, the level of method efficacy observed 
during the experimenter’s demonstrations was mirrored in participants’ own 
subsequent attempts with the task, such that their personal experience with the MMB 
matched their observational experience (if they chose to reproduce the demonstrated 
behaviour). A further 47 children were assigned to a no-demonstration control 
condition in which they witnessed no social demonstrations (see Table 3.1 for the 
distribution of participants across groups). This condition provided a baseline 
measure of performance on the task, specifically the level of performance of the 
actions presented within the social demonstration and the level of new method 
generation without prior method demonstration. The adult participants were 
allocated to either the 0% or 75% efficacy condition as it was here that major 
differences were seen in the child sample.  
 
Table 3.1 
Distribution of Participants Across the Experimental Conditions and Age Groups 
 Baseline 0% 25% 75% 100% Total 
 
4-5 yrs 
 
14(8) 
 
17(9) 
 
14(7) 
 
15(9) 
 
13(8) 
 
73(41) 
6-7 yrs 18(9) 20(11) 18(10) 19(9) 21(11) 96(50) 
8-9 yrs 15(8) 23(10) 16(7) 16(6) 17(6) 87(37) 
Total 47(25) 60(30) 48(24) 50(24) 51(25) 256(128) 
Note. Number of males given in parentheses.  
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3.2.4 Procedure 
 
 Children were tested individually in a quiet area of their school. First, they 
were familiarised with the MMB during a short warm-up phase. To attempt to reduce 
assumed experimenter expertise and potential model-based biases (Wood, Kendal, & 
Flynn, 2012), the box was proclaimed as belonging to a friend, “This is actually my 
friend’s box, and my friend told me that when this egg [the capsule] goes into the 
box you have to try and get it out. Inside this egg is a sticker. If you get it out of the 
box, we can start a sticker pile for you and we’ll see how many you can get”. 
Anecdotally, many children appeared to accept this premise by enquiring into the 
name of the friend. The tools were presented alongside the box: “Can you see these 
tools here? My friend also told me that some of these tools can be joined together”.  
Children in the no-demonstration control condition received a prompt to 
begin interacting with the MMB immediately following this familiarisation: “You 
can have some turns at seeing if you can get the egg out of the box. You can do 
anything you like.” The exit door was unlocked throughout for control participants. 
Children in the social conditions were informed: “I’m going to have eight turns at 
trying to get the egg out of the box. Let’s see if it works”. The experimenter 
proceeded to demonstrate the same method of reward retrieval (fork tool through 
‘Social’ access point, capsule to exit door via hole in floor) eight times with only the 
outcome differing between the four experimental groups. Neutral comments, “I got it 
out of the box/I didn’t get it out of the box”, were made after each demonstration. As 
the concealed exit chute connecting the circular hole in the upper platform floor and 
the lower exit door was capable of holding eight capsules, it was not necessary to 
remove ‘locked’ capsules in between experimenter demonstrations. However, for 
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those conditions in which locked capsules had to be removed prior to participants’ 
attempts (0-75% conditions), children were distracted with a non-cognitively 
demanding task (organising sheets of stickers) for the very short time (<10 seconds) 
it took to remove these capsules.  
Participants were given a maximum of eight attempt trials, over a period of 
five minutes (if the eight trials were not completed within this time, which was rare, 
testing ceased). Participants who had received social demonstrations were told, 
“Now it’s your turn to see if you can get the egg out of the box. You can do anything 
you like”. Each trial constituted one participant’s attempt, for which strict criteria 
were applied. An attempt was defined as the insertion of a tool into the box with the 
purposeful intention, or realisation, of making contact with the capsule prior to the 
tool’s extraction. ‘Purposeful’ denotes engagement with the task as indicated by head 
and gaze orientation and ‘intention’ evidenced when a tool was fully inserted but too 
short to reach the capsule. An attempt was complete when a tool was fully extracted 
(even if then replaced into the same access point). Some innovative methods of 
reward retrieval involved performing more than one action – for example, pushing 
the capsule with the fork tool towards the ‘End’ of the MMB before using the hook 
tool to extract it. In the event that a child displayed continued purposeful 
intentionality and interaction with the MMB, therefore, this was considered part of 
the same attempt. The apparatus was re-baited upon commencing each trial, unless 
full contact with the capsule was not previously made or the capsule was moved only 
a very small distance. The removal of the lid of the box, concealed by a large fabric 
sheet, allowed capsules to be quickly retrieved in the event of their unsuccessful 
extraction. As with demonstrations, neutral comments were made following each 
attempt trial (“You got it out of the box/You didn’t get it out of the box”). 
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 For comparability, and to control for primacy and recency effects, the 
demonstration sequence of the two conditions involving uncertainty (25% and 75%) 
began and ended with a success (S, door unlocked) followed by an unsuccess (U, 
door locked). The full demonstration sequence for the 25% condition was thus: S, U, 
U, U, U, U, S, U, and for the 75% condition: S, U, S, S, S, S, S, U. The same 
sequences were implemented for participants’ subsequent attempts with the MMB. 
In this attempts phase, the experimenter ensured only one capsule was extracted on 
those occasions in which the exit door was unlocked and additional capsules had 
accumulated in the exit chute. Whilst recognising that it would not always be 
feasible to fully mirror the efficacy of demonstrated social information in 
participants’ attempts, given that different numbers of the socially demonstrated 
method could be attempted prior to the enactment of alternative methods, at the very 
least participants were given some experience of efficacy variability in their first two 
trials (i.e., success followed by unsuccess) for these two conditions. It should be 
noted that enactment of alternative methods that utilised the exit door (alternative by 
way of a novel tool and/or access point) resulted in the same experience of efficacy 
as that of the socially demonstrated method.  
At the end of testing all children were praised for their performance and 
rewarded with a sticker irrespective of their level of success (small stickers collected 
during testing were traded for one larger and more desirable sticker). The above 
protocol was followed for adult participants in a University laboratory, within either 
the 0% or 75% conditions. They received departmental credits for their participation 
or a £5 Amazon voucher, irrespective of their performance.  
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3.2.5 Coding and Inter-Rater Reliability 
 
 The performance of each participant was scored for a number of variables in 
each response trial: (a) tool selected, (b) access point used, (c) exit location (if any), 
(d) outcome (no outcome, capsule to exit door but no extraction, and extraction), and 
(e) learning strategy. Full rationales for the different strategies are presented in the 
Results section but, in short, the strategy was determined by the aforementioned (a)-
(c), such that: 
 Imitation = same tool, same access point, and same exit as used in social 
demonstrations  
 Tool/access point innovation = different tool and/or access point, but same 
exit as used in social demonstrations
1
  
 Exit innovation = different or same tool/access point, and different exit as 
used in social demonstrations (unlike alterations to the tool or access point, 
discovering a new exit has the potential to change the outcome of the task) 
 Unsuccessful action = abandoned attempt prior to removal of capsule or it 
reaching the exit door.  
 From these individual response trial variables, several additional variables 
were created to capture overall task behaviour (Table 3.2). The experimenter, KC, 
coded 100% of the sample from video tape. An independent observer, blind to the 
hypotheses of the study, coded 20% of the sample. All Cohen’s Kappa scores and 
correlation values were 0.85 or above, showing an excellent level of inter-rater 
reliability.  
                                                          
1
 This is in essence ‘end-state emulation’ (Whiten, McGuigan, Marshall-Pescini, & Hopper, 
2009). However, as the end state was manipulated to produce method efficacy, it was not 
possible to investigate the development of end-state emulation in and of itself.  
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Table 3.2 
Attempt Trial Variables Subject to Statistical Analysis 
Variable 
 
Description 
 
Copying Fidelity 
 
Score of 1-4 was given for each trial: 1 for no new 
components (tool/access/exit), 2 for one new component, 3 for 
two new components, and 4 for three new components. These 
were summed across the eight attempt trials (max. 32). 
 
Tool/Access/Exit 
Innovations 
 
Total number of novel (to the child) tools/access points/exits 
used across attempt trials. 
 
Imitation Attempts 
 
 
Total number of attempts in line with strict imitation 
definition (same tool, access and exit; max. 8). 
 
Tool/Access 
Innovation 
Attempts 
 
Total number of attempts in line with tool/access point 
innovation definition (new tool and/or access, but same exit; 
max. 8). 
 
Exit Innovation 
Attempts 
 
Total number of attempts in line with exit innovation 
definition (same or different tool and/or access, and different 
exit; max. 8). 
Alternative 
Methods 
 
Total number of different methods (new combinations of tool, 
access and exit) enacted, excluding socially demonstrated 
method and irrespective of success (max. 8). 
 
Extractions 
Total number of successful capsule extractions, irrespective of 
extraction method (max. 8). 
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Note. Attempts at retrieving the capsule were deemed more revealing than successful 
extractions, as, according to the experimental design of the study, on some trials the 
capsule reached the exit door but it was locked and so could not be extracted. Here, 
participants’ persistence with an unsuccessful method was evident.  
 
3.2.6 Statistical Methods 
 
 As the data were not normally distributed, non-parametric tests were used. 
Although we were selective with follow-up tests (Mann-Whitney and Wilcoxon 
rank-sum), to avoid inflating the Type I error rate a Bonferroni correction was 
applied by dividing the critical significance level of .05 by the total number of tests 
conducted. Probability values reported with an asterisk indicate the significance level 
required to reject the null hypothesis following this correction.  
 
3.3 Results 
 
 The results are presented in four sections. First, we explore how control 
participant’s success and method use compared to that of 100% efficacy social 
demonstration participants. The 100% condition is the most valid comparison as the 
door remained unlocked for all trials, as it did in the no-demonstration control 
condition. The second section considers copying fidelity, broadly defined and then in 
relation to typical definitions of imitation, followed in the third section by a 
consideration of deviations from demonstrated behaviour. Finally, innovation, along 
with its various manifestations, and its role in low efficacy social conditions is 
investigated. As the sex of participants was not found to significantly affect our 
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outcome measures, it was excluded from all reported analyses. All tests are two-
tailed unless otherwise stated.   
 
3.3.1 What Were the Level of Success and Methods Used by Children in the No-
Demonstration Condition? 
 
 Of the 47 controls, nine (19.2%, six males, four 4-5 years and five 6-7 years) 
failed to produce one attempt; instead, they touched and explored the MMB with 
their hands but never made contact with the capsule (despite having the tools 
introduced at the beginning of their turn). In comparison, all 209 children from the 
social conditions attempted the task (whether successful or unsuccessful in terms of 
extraction). 36 of the 47 controls succeeded in making at least one capsule 
extraction. However, control participants achieved significantly fewer extractions 
(Mdn = 5, SD = 2.56) than those in the 100% condition across the attempt trials 
(Mdn = 7, SD = 2.09; Mann-Whitney U = 588.50, z = -4.42, p < .001).  
The main point of concern which the control condition allowed us to address 
was whether the socially demonstrated method was a naturally salient response to the 
task. Of the 38 control participants who produced at least one attempt, only two 
produced the method of social demonstrations on more attempt trials than any other 
method. Controls (Mdn = 0, SD = 0.81) also performed the method of social 
demonstrations on significantly fewer attempt trials than participants in the 100% 
condition (Mdn = 6, SD = 2.63; U = 131.00, z = -8.01, p < .001), whilst attempting a 
significantly greater number of alternative methods (control: Mdn = 2.5, SD = 1.61; 
100%: Mdn = 1, SD = 1.08; U = 361.00, z = -5.17, p < .001). Control participants 
produced a median of 2.5 alternative methods, thus they did not simply discover one 
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means of solving the task and adhere to it. Nevertheless, the majority of children 
repeated successful methods (N = 30, Mdn = 2, SD = 2.42). Within the control group, 
the 8- to 9-year-olds produced a greater median number of successful alternative 
methods (Mdn = 3, SD = 1.55) than 6- to 7-year-olds (Mdn = 2, SD = 1.61) and 4- to 
5-year-olds (Mdn = 1, SD = 1.70).  
Whilst any successful method discovered in the no-demonstration control 
condition would technically constitute an innovation, because it is a different kind of 
innovation to that required in the social conditions (invention versus modification) it 
is not possible to compare them like-for-like. Hence, the focus above is on 
alternative methods.  
 
3.3.2 Did Children Imitate the Socially Demonstrated Method? 
 
 Children received a score according to the number of new components each 
attempt contained (explained in Table 3.2). A score of 1 indicated faithful 
reproduction of the socially demonstrated method, whilst 4 indicated complete 
deviation from this method. The attempts that had no outcome (they were 
abandoned, by extracting the tool from the box before an outcome was produced) 
could receive a maximum score of 3 only due to the unknown exit. A total of 122 
participants (58%) produced at least one such abandoned attempt and they accounted 
for 15.6% of all attempts. The following analyses were run with the abandoned 
attempts (unsuccessful actions) both included and excluded, with the same effects 
found. We report the former. 
Analysis of total scores, summed across the eight attempt trials, revealed no 
significant differences between efficacy conditions (Kruskal-Wallis H(3) = 2.82, p = 
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.42). Children’s mean scores in all conditions ranged from 11 to 12.5 (for adults, the 
overall mean score was larger at 17.42; range of 22). Given that the minimum 
possible score was 8, denoting complete fidelity throughout attempts, and the 
maximum 32, children showed little (though some) deviation from demonstrated 
behaviour, irrespective of condition. Age differences were found in copying fidelity 
(H(2) = 12.32, p = .002). Specifically, 4- to 5-year-olds showed significantly higher 
copying fidelity (Mdn = 9, SD = 3.98) than 6- to 7-year-olds (Mdn = 11, SD = 4.02, 
U =1732.5, z = -2.53, p = .01) and 8- to 9-year-olds (Mdn = 11.5, SD = 4.32, U = 
1397, z = -3.43, p = .001).  
 Definitions of imitation usually require that both the goal, and the specific 
actions used to achieve it, are recognised and reproduced (Tomasello, 1990). Such 
‘pure’ imitation, involving use of the fork tool, through the ‘social’ access point, and 
extraction (or attempted extraction) from the exit door, was the dominant strategy 
used on the MMB task. This was seen in participants’ first attempt trial (68% of 
which met the criteria for ‘pure’ imitation) and overall (most common strategy 
across attempt trials for 67% of children). As the exit door was unlocked for all 
participants on the first trial, excepting those in the 0% condition for whom it was 
always locked, the first enactment of the socially demonstrated method allowed for 
successful extraction.  
In spite of the dominance of this imitation response, it was mediated by age 
(H(2) = 8.86, p = .012). The number of imitation attempts was significantly higher 
for the youngest age group (4-5 years, N = 59) when compared with 6- to 7-year-olds 
(Mann Whitney, N = 78, U = 1758.50, z = -2.41, p = .016) and 8- to 9-year-olds (N = 
72, U = 1518.00, z = -2.85, p = .004; see Figure 3.2). The latter two groups did not 
significantly differ (U = 2752.50, z = -0.21, p = .83), nor did the experimental 
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conditions (H(3) = 2.54, p = .47). However, an effect of condition was found for 
adults, who produced significantly more imitation attempts in the highest (75%) 
efficacy condition (Mdn = 4, SD = 2.88) compared with the 0% efficacy condition 
(Mdn = 0, SD = 0.65): U = 41.50, z = -5.01, p < .001).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2. Median number of ‘pure’ imitation attempts by age group. The asterisks 
above the adult bar denote that these participants were significantly different to all 
other age groups. *p < .05, **p < .005, ***p < .001 
 
 
 
** * 
*** 
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3.3.3 How did the Children’s Behaviour Deviate From the Demonstrated 
Behaviour? 
 
 To establish which component of the method (tool, access, exit) was most 
likely to be modified, separate scores were created for the number of novel tools 
(maximum 5; hook, sweep, combined fork, combined sweep, tool end), novel access 
points (maximum 4; end, dial, dial opposite, entry chute) and novel exits (maximum 
3; end, dial, dial opposite) used across the attempt trials (‘novel’ denoting ‘not seen’ 
in demonstrations, and excluding repetitions).  
A significant difference was found in method component modification or the 
‘type’ of innovation (Friedman’s ANOVA χ2(2) = 114.94, p < .001). Specifically, 
participants used significantly more novel tools throughout their attempt trials (Mdn 
= 1, SD = 0.97) than access points (Mdn = 0, SD = 0.93; Wilcoxon signed-ranks z = -
6.35, p < .001) or exits (Mdn = 0, SD = 0.61; z = -9.21, p < .001). Participants also 
used significantly more novel access points than novel exits (z = -5.96, p < .001). 
These findings are further reflected in the total number of children (out of 209) who 
produced at least one of the different innovation types: tool innovation (N = 132), 
access innovation (N = 86) and exit innovation (N = 26).  
 In contrast, adult participants (χ2(2) = 13.34, p = .001) used significantly 
more novel exits (Mdn = 2, SD = 1.14) than novel tools (Mdn = 2, SD = 0.85; z = -
2.75, p = .006). There was no significant difference in the use of novel tools and 
novel access points (z = -0.18, p = .86), and the difference between novel exits and 
novel access points neared significance (Mdn = 1, SD = 1.18; z = -2.22, p = .027, p* 
= .016). Examining age differences in children’s novel exit use, the oldest children 
(Mdn = 1, SD = 0.86) were the most proficient (6-7 years: Mdn = 1, SD = 0.47; 4-5 
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years: Mdn = 1, SD = 0.28), although the effect is only nearing significance (H(2) = 
5.79, p = .055).  
 
3.3.4 Improving Behaviour Efficacy: The Importance of Exit Innovation 
 
 The experimental task was designed such that exit innovations were the only 
way in which behaviour could be made more efficacious. Whilst modifications of the 
tool and access point are innovative departures from demonstrated behaviour, 
without modification of the exit they are of no more ‘use’ than the modelled method. 
Innovations should solve the problem at hand (Carr et al., accepted). Unlike the exit 
door, the top access points of the box are always open and thus can guarantee 
extraction success when used as exits. It is for this reason that only rates of exit 
innovation were included in the following analyses, and not rates of tool or access 
innovation. 
 Of the 209 child participants within the four social experimental conditions, 
only 26 individuals (12.4%) produced at least one exit innovation (age group 
differences are reported at the end of this section). Thus, whilst 10% of children 
never imitated, 87.6% of children never innovated. This is in contrast to the 33 of 45 
adult participants (73.3%) who did produce at least one exit innovation. The 
disparity between ‘pure’ imitation and exit innovation as adopted task strategies, 
across ages, can be seen in Figure 3.3. Correlational analyses, using actual ages and 
mean number of attempts, indicated a significant negative correlation between 
imitation and age (rs (254) = -0.35, p < .001) and a significant positive correlation 
between exit innovation and age (rs (254) = 0.47, p < .001).  
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Figure 3.3. Median number of ‘pure’ imitation and exit innovation attempts by age 
group. The asterisks above the adult bar denote that these participants were 
significantly different to all other age groups. *p < .05, **p < .005, ***p < .001 
 
Children’s exit innovations typically appeared around the fourth attempt trial 
out of eight (see Table 3.3), suggesting that innovative problem solving was a 
cumulative process, with each trial or interaction with the MMB revealing more 
about its affordances, or that participants opted to explore once they had gained 
personal experience of the demonstrated method’s efficacy. A clear trend of 
increasing exit innovation with decreasing efficacy of the demonstrated method was 
seen. While 23% of children in the 0% condition (where the exit door never yielded 
to allow extraction) produced at least one exit innovation, this was true of only 13% 
*** 
* ** 
*** 
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of children in the 25% condition and 6% of children in the 75% and 100% 
conditions.  
 Each innovation of the 26 individuals was ‘graded’ according to its 
complexity, thereby taking into consideration the tool and access point that 
accompanied the new exit. Scores were as follows: (1) new exit only, (2) new exit 
and new tool or access point, (3) new exit, new tool and new access point. In 
addition to grades, innovations were also categorised by their level. Higher-level 
innovations were determined by their repetition (and presumed learned status), 
deemed to be of cultural significance given the increased likelihood of their 
successful transmission and acquisition by others (as opposed to an innovation that is 
accidental or remains in the repertoire of only one individual: see Carr et al., 
accepted). A low-level innovation is defined as an ‘unlearned chance innovation not 
repeated by the individual’, to be contrasted with a mid-level ‘individually learned 
innovation repeated by the individual’ (the high-level category, ‘individually learned 
innovation that is acquired by others’, does not apply as this study did not allow for 
transmission of innovations to other individuals). The occurrence and number of 
repetitions, used to determine the level of the innovation, can be seen in the right-
hand column of Table 3.3.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
110 
 
Table 3.3 
Exit Innovations: Participant and Innovation Characteristics 
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Participant Characteristics 
 
First Exit 
Innovation 
Trial 
 
No. of 
New Exit 
Innovations 
 
Grade 
 
Repetitions 
of Exit 
Innovations 
Age 
(Years) 
Sex Condition 
 
4-5 
 
F 
 
0% 1 1 
 
1 4 
 M 0% 8 1 1 0 
 M 0% 2 1 3 0 
 M 25% 6 1 1 0 
 M 25% 5 1 3,1 1 
6-7 F 75% 2 1 2 0 
 M 0% 2 3 2,3,2,3 1 
 M 0% 3 1 3 0 
 M 0% 1 2 3,2 2 
 M 0% 2 1 1 0 
 M 25% 6 1 2 0 
 M 25% 5 1 1 2 
8-9 F 0% 3 2 1,2 0 
 F 0% 3 2 1 1 
 F 0% 8 1 1 0 
 F 0% 4 1 1 2 
 F 25% 4 2 1 1 
 F 25% 7 1 2 0 
 F 75% 3 3 3 0 
 F 100% 6 1 2 0 
 F 100% 4 1 1 2 
 M 0% 1 2 3 2 
 M 0% 4 3 3,2,3 0 
 M 0% 2 3 1,2,3,1 2 
 M 75% 5 2 2,1 0 
 M 100% 2 3 3,3,2 1 
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Note. ‘Grade’ reflects the complexity (3 = most complex) of the novel behaviour as a 
whole (tool, access and exit), and are written in the order in which they were 
displayed. ‘Repetitions of exit innovations’ is a count of the number of times a newly 
discovered exit (i.e., not the exit door) was used again. It does not denote how many 
different exit innovations were repeated. The ‘new’ in ‘Number of new exit 
innovations’ relates to the child, and excludes the exit door used in social 
demonstrations. It does not denote how many capsules were extracted, only how 
many of the access points were discovered as exits.  
 
There were no significant differences in the number of exit innovation 
extractions by age group (H(2) = 5.39, p = .07). However, as Table 3.3 indicates, 
there were age differences when considering exit innovations more closely. Of the 
five exit innovators in the 4-5 age group, no one individual discovered more than one 
novel exit. The number of individuals doing so increased in the 6-7 group (M = 
1.43), and again in the oldest group (M = 2.00). Moreover, although overall there 
were very few repetitions of exit innovations (M = 0.81), adult participants displayed 
a higher mean number of exit innovation repetitions (M = 3.21) than children (M = 
0.81), including those of the eldest children (M = 0.79), thus evidencing more 
innovations of mid-level status. A variety of ‘grades’ of innovation complexity were 
seen within each age group, and, while the innovations of some participants 
increased in complexity (progressing from a lower to higher grade during attempt 
trials), this trend was reversed for others.  
 Examining the number of exit innovations more widely across the four 
experimental groups (children only; Figure 3.4), a significant effect of condition was 
found (Kruskal-Wallis H(3) = 10.82, p = .01). As it was predicted that those 
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participants in the lowest efficacy conditions would innovate more than those in the 
higher efficacy conditions, a number of follow-up analyses were conducted. The 
results of these supported our predictions: participants in the 0% efficacy condition 
(N = 60, Mdn = 0, SD = 1.40) attained a significantly greater number of innovative 
extractions than participants in the 75% (N = 50, Mdn = 0, SD = 0.52; Mann Whitney 
U = 1234.00, z = -2.54, p = .01) and 100% conditions (N = 51, Mdn = 0, SD = 0.70; 
U = 1261.50, z = -2.54, p = .01), but not 25% (N = 48, Mdn = 0, SD = 0.69; U = 
1269.00, z = -1.56, p = .12). The 25% condition did not significantly differ from the 
two higher efficacy conditions.  
Of the 33 adults who produced one or more exit innovations, 23 belonged to 
the 0% efficacy condition and 10 to the 75% efficacy condition. Complementing the 
effect of condition found for children, adult participants in the 0% condition (Mdn = 
6.5, SD = 1.83) attained a significantly greater number of innovative extractions than 
those in the 75% condition (Mdn = 0, SD = 2.62): U = 63.00, z = -4.38, p < .001).  
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Figure 3.4. Mean number of exit innovation extractions across child experimental 
groups. Although non-parametric statistics were conducted, the means are displayed 
here given that the median score for each group was 0. *p < .05 
 
In addition to group differences in the performance of exit innovations 
(including their repetition), we find differences in the production of exit innovations 
(new exit innovations only). Considering only new (to the child) exit innovations, 
the effect of condition was again significant (Kruskal-Wallis H(3) = 10.63, p = .01). 
Participants in the 0% condition produced significantly more new exit innovations 
across their eight attempt trials (Mdn = 0, SD = 0.85) than 75% (Mdn = 0, SD = 0.52; 
U = 1243.00, z = -2.45, p = .014) and 100% participants (Mdn = 0, SD = 0.46; U = 
1260.5, z = -2.54, p = .011). The effect of age was nearing significance (H(2) = 5.79, 
* 
* 
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p = .055) with the older age groups producing more exit innovations than the 
youngest group (as also suggested by Table 3.3).  
 
3.4 Discussion 
 
Here we addressed the question of how children of different ages trade-off 
social versus asocial learning based on the efficacy of an observed solution. We also 
considered how innovation, through modification in tool use, develops. Lower levels 
of observed solution efficacy were associated with increased (exit) innovation in 
children, with older children being more likely to innovate than younger children. 
Between 6-7 years and adulthood, imitation of the socially demonstrated method 
decreased and innovation increased. Contrary to expectation, reduced imitation in 
response to lower levels of solution efficacy was not found for children. It was, 
however, seen in adults.  
 
3.4.1 Fidelity to, and Deviations From, the Socially Demonstrated Method 
 
Children reproduced modelled behaviour with high levels of fidelity across 
the different efficacy conditions, supporting previous research indicating imitation is 
one of the major learning mechanisms used by children (Hopper et al., 2010; Horner 
& Whiten, 2005; Whiten & Flynn, 2010). The pervasiveness of imitation occurred in 
spite of permission to deviate (“try anything you like”) and repetition of the goal 
(“see if you can get the egg out of the box”), alongside explicit linguistic cues as to 
whether or not the goal had been achieved. Faithful reproduction of modelled 
behaviour cannot be ascribed to task difficulty (known to increase imitation in 
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children: Williamson & Meltzoff, 2011; Williamson et al., 2008), as the majority of 
no-demonstration control participants were able to solve the task asocially. Three 
possible interpretations remain.  
First, children are poor at evaluating efficacy of observed information (and 
indeed personal information when they reproduce the socially demonstrated 
method). Although the exit innovation findings in the current study stem from a 
small number of children, meaning this interpretation cannot be completely ruled 
out, the significant effect of experimental condition between the 0% and 75/100% 
groups does not appear to support the notion that children are poor at evaluating 
efficacy, nor do findings of prior research (Pasquini et al., 2007). Second, 
contradicting the actions of an adult demonstrator, by opting not to reproduce 
demonstrated behaviour, is an unfavourable option for children (due to adults’ 
general level of perceived competence, Wood et al., 2012, or their modelling of 
normative behaviour). Yet previous evidence suggests that when there is sufficient 
reason to do so (i.e., the model is unreliable, actions are accidental, and behaviour is 
inefficacious), children will deviate (Birch et al., 2008; Carpenter et al., 1998; 
Williamson et al., 2008; Zmyj, Buttelmann, Carpenter, & Daum, 2010). Moreover, 
children were seen to deviate from the adult demonstrator, principally by trying out 
different tools (but less so the crucial exits). The third and final interpretation is that 
generating novel behaviour (as an alternative to imitation), capable of successfully 
altering the outcome of the task, was cognitively demanding following social 
demonstrations and that either the capacity or motivation to do so was lacking. 
Whilst not mutually exclusive, we propose that the competence interpretation (solely 
or in combination with a normative explanation given below) best explains the 
current findings - especially as the ability to use (innovate) a new exit increased from 
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8-9 years into adulthood - and aligns with previous research (children: Beck et al., 
2011; callitrichids: Kendal, Coe, & Laland, 2005).  
A number of important developmental progressions were uncovered in the 
present study, and suggest that reliance on social learning mechanisms is in part 
determined by age. In spite of the dominant imitation response, age effects were 
found regarding fidelity: 4- to 5-year-olds demonstrated more faithful imitation 
(enacting this strategy across more attempt trials) than older children. Imitation 
fidelity continued to decrease into adulthood. In the context of children’s novel 
puzzle box interactions, wherein there is an explicit goal (tasks are not causally 
opaque), imitation thus appears to increase between the ages of 3 and 5 years (Flynn 
& Whiten, 2008; McGuigan, Whiten, Flynn, & Horner, 2007) before plateauing 
around the age of 6 years (present study). Consistent with Rakoczy, Hamann, 
Warneken, and Tomasello’s (2010) observation of children deeming adults’ 
demonstrated behaviour to be normatively correct, several children remarked, 
following demonstrations, ‘so that’s how you play the game’. This indication of rule 
learning or convention acquisition, together with children’s general reluctance to 
depart from demonstrated behaviour, suggests normativity had a part to play in the 
findings. The age-driven decline in imitation could be facilitated by an age-driven 
decline in normativity and, relatedly, conformity (Walker & Andrade, 1996). 
Conformity also appears to be reduced for children, from the age of four years, when 
making judgements in more objective and less socially arbitrary domains (judging 
object functions as opposed to object labels; Schillaci & Kelemen, 2014).  
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3.4.2 Exit Innovation: The Rate and Influence of Observed Behaviour Efficacy 
 
In line with cultural evolution theory (Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Richerson & 
Boyd, 2005) and previous experimental studies (Whiten & Flynn, 2010), in the 
current study a small minority of innovators emerged from a large population of 
‘followers’. Exit innovations were produced by only 26 of 209 children following 
social demonstrations. The majority of children failed to recognise that exit 
innovations represented the sole way in which behaviour could be made more 
efficacious, such that a focus on behavioural means (tools used) as opposed to 
behavioural outcome prevailed (it could also be that the tools were highly salient to 
the children, by being the first object that was selected by the demonstrator, but less 
so to the more experienced adults). Those who continued with the socially 
demonstrated method when it was never efficacious (0% condition) or rarely 
efficacious (25% condition) may have found the social affiliation function of 
imitation (Over & Carpenter, 2012) rewarding. In future, it would be interesting to 
introduce a competition element whereby children would be encouraged to gain 
more stickers than the demonstrator.  
Functional fixedness is a unique challenge for artefact tasks, and may account 
for the rarity of innovation. It describes a phenomenon whereby an object’s known 
conventional function prevents an appreciation of its alternative uses (German & 
Defeyter, 2000); in the case of the MMB, the top access points conventionally 
function as tool entrances, not capsule exits. The somewhat counter-intuitive 
developmental trend of functional fixedness (affecting 7-year-olds to a greater extent 
than 5-year-olds; Defeyter, Avons, & German, 2007) likely impedes the emergence 
of innovation; hampering its production just at the time that increasing cognitive 
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flexibility may better enable it. Although innovation increased with age, exit 
innovators were nevertheless very rare amongst even the oldest child age group. 
Executive functions may have a similar limiting effect. Inhibitory control skills 
develop significantly in the preschool years, but children do not show mature or 
advanced levels of performance in some executive abilities until aged 9-10 years or 
above (e.g., action inhibition: Simpson, Cooper, Gillmeister, & Riggs, 2013; 
planning; Tecwyn, Thorpe, & Chappell, 2014). Together with the late-developing 
inductive reasoning, permitting a variety of inferences to be made about a single item 
that fits multiple categories (Bright & Feeney, 2014), inhibiting prepotent responses 
and considering multiple possible outcomes prior to action will surely better enable 
innovation. With age, our participants became less restricted in their exit innovation 
capabilities – perhaps indicating the requirement for mature executive functions and 
more general cognitive maturity and flexibility to overcome the functional fixedness 
obstacle.  
Rates of exit innovation increased from 8-9 years and were influenced by 
observed behaviour efficacy. Participants who experienced the lowest level of 
solution efficacy (the exit door was always locked) produced a greater number of 
innovative extractions than participants with a 75% or 100% level of observed 
solution efficacy. These latter two conditions were arguably the least conducive to 
innovation since they provided participants with a solution that always, or nearly 
always, worked. Yet, innovation is not just about solving a problem but exploring 
the world also. Indeed, Wood et al. (2013a) discovered that children are motivated to 
acquire multiple solutions to a problem even without the potential of a greater 
reward. In the current study, the 75% and 100% participants could plausibly afford 
to explore more than the 25% or 0% participants in the knowledge that they already 
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have a functional method in their repertoire, meaning potentially better ways of 
accomplishing the goal could be sought. It may be that children’s performance was 
influenced by an adult model-based bias (a puppet was used for demonstrations in 
Wood et al.), but an alternative interpretation is suggested by the adult findings. Of 
the 12 adult participants who did not produce an exit innovation, 11 belonged to the 
75% condition. Given that adults are not cognitively constrained in the same manner 
as children, it appears that they deduced no necessity in deviating from the socially 
demonstrated method when it was largely functional. Therefore, our results show it 
was likely necessity, not opportunity (implicated in the innovative tool use of various 
non-human primate species; Koops, Visalberghi, & van Schaik, 2014), that drove 
participants to innovate.  
Individual learning from performing (exit) innovations was evidenced in two 
ways: repetition of an innovation, and/or production of more than one innovation. 
According to the former criteria, 10 of the 26 child exit innovators produced low-
level innovations where there was no evidence of learning (note, however, that two 
of these individuals produced an exit innovation on the eighth trial, preventing 
subsequent assessment of learning). The greater propensity for innovation repetitions 
in adults (only 2 out of 33 producing low-level innovations) hints at the operation of 
more sophisticated learning and executive processes, but also at a potential disparity 
in approach to the MMB task. It is possible that adults were more goal-directed, 
prioritising the extraction of the capsule over the attempt trials, whereas children, 
when they chose to deviate from the social method and explore, did so in a more 
playful and ‘random’ manner. This is supported also by the varying complexities, or 
‘grades’, of innovations when they were produced by the children. As an aside, in 
the context of the MMB task we cannot necessarily ascribe greater theoretical 
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significance to exit innovations that were accompanied by a novel tool and/or access 
point: the latter do not improve behaviour efficacy. However, in other contexts, 
innovation across all elements may be regarded as more insightful. Returning to the 
exit innovation findings, given children’s capacity to incorporate newly presented 
task solutions into their behavioural repertoires (Wood et al., 2013a) we propose that 
it was the generation of alternative solutions, as opposed to the switching between 
them, which created difficulties with the current task.  
 
3.4.3 Implications 
 
Comparing our findings with those of Beck et al. (2011), where children 
succeeded at a novel hook invention task around 8 years of age, we provisionally 
suggest that innovation by modification and innovation by novel invention have 
somewhat distinct developmental trajectories. However, this can only be confirmed 
with further research including a variety of tasks. We also posit that, whilst 
innovation of any form is made challenging by a lack of certain cognitive abilities 
(particularly higher-level executive functions), individuals attempting innovation by 
modification are especially vulnerable to a canalisation or conservatism effect of 
prior social demonstrations. This is manifest in functional fixedness in tool-use tasks. 
Whilst the indication is that the task was more difficult in the absence of prior social 
demonstrations (fewer capsules were extracted in the no-demonstration than 100% 
condition), without these prior demonstrations participants were more exploratory 
and attempted a greater number of alternative task methods. Wood et al. (2013a) and 
Bonawitz et al. (2011) have similarly found observation and pedagogy to lead to 
restricted exploration and learning. The cost of quick and 'cheap' social information 
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acquisition is ultimately behavioural canalisation: becoming stuck on a particular 
method, and in turn blind to potential alternatives. Reducing the social context in 
experiments, to ascertain the extent to which innovation is inhibited by pedagogy, 
remains an imperative objective. 
Laland (2004, p.11) speculated that, “If innovation is risky and associated 
with costs, then it is likely to be employed as a last resort… when socially learned 
strategies have proven unproductive”. Though there was no indication that 
innovation would be risky or costly for those in the low efficacy conditions of the 
current study (when the socially demonstrated method was unsuccessful and the 
reward could not be retrieved), our findings of rare and limited innovation, even in 
older and more competent individuals, do indeed suggest that children employ 
innovation as a last resort.  
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Chapter 4   
Behavioural innovation: State or trait? 
 
Abstract 
 
In order to gain a greater understanding of the evolution of human behaviour, we 
must better understand one of the mechanisms responsible for its variation: 
innovation. We address the hypothesis of whether individuals who innovate show 
consistency in this behaviour over time and over tasks. Twenty-three children, 
distinguished earlier by their innovative behaviour on a novel task (Multiple-
Methods Box, MMB), were compared to twenty-three children who conversely 
demonstrated high levels of imitation fidelity (matched across age, sex, school, and 
condition in original study). A battery of tasks administered to the two groups to 
assess constructs related to innovation (social and asocial learning, inhibitory 
control, tool invention, cumulative problem solving, divergent thinking, verbal 
intelligence, and neophobia) revealed some consistency in innovation on puzzle 
boxes, with ‘innovators’ scoring higher on efficiency criteria than ‘imitators’. No 
other differences between the groups were found. In a second experiment, adults 
failed to exhibit a link between greater innovation, as measured also by performance 
on the MMB task, and the selected related constructs. Whilst certain child findings 
are suggestive of a ‘trait’ interpretation (i.e., consistent individual differences), the 
selectivity of the effect suggests innovativeness, of the type explored in this study, 
may be domain-specific. To the extent that the findings of this study are 
representative of innovation in general, we propose that, together with the adult 
findings and those of the original study, innovation appears more state- than trait-
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based. Further investigation of the role of contextual and motivational factors in 
human behavioural innovation production is needed. 
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4.1 Introduction 
 
Innovation is a complex phenomenon. Understanding more about its 
development, alongside its behavioural and cognitive correlates, will allow a deeper 
understanding of how it varies among individuals. Innovation is of critical 
importance to our survival as, together with high-fidelity transmission of 
information, it underpins our species-unique capacity for cumulative culture (Dean, 
Vale, Laland, Flynn, & Kendal, 2013). It is this mechanism to which we owe our 
remarkable technical and cultural sophistication, as well as our ability to adapt to 
environmental challenges. In this paper we focus on behavioural innovation (as 
opposed to cognitive innovation) which occurs in different forms. Innovations can 
appear as modifications of pre-existing behaviour, arising from a combination of 
social and asocial learning, or novel inventions, arising largely from asocial learning 
(Carr, Kendal, & Flynn, accepted: Chapter 2). These two forms of innovation are 
likely distinct in ways other than their input, for example their developmental 
trajectories, cognitive mechanisms, and primary barriers to their production, but 
what unifies them, certainly in childhood, is their apparent rarity (Beck, Apperly, 
Chappell, Guthrie, & Cutting, 2011; Carr, Kendal, & Flynn, 2015: Chapter 3). 
The apparent rarity of innovation in childhood, when observed in 
experimental settings and compared with other learning strategies (such as 
imitation), can be attributed to a number of causes, including: developing cognitive 
capability or flexibility (Beck et al., 2011; Hanus, Mendes, Tennie, & Call, 2011), 
the ill-structured nature of innovation tasks (Cutting, Apperly, Chappell, & Beck, 
2014), becoming canalised by existing behaviour (Flynn & Whiten, 2008; though see 
Wood, Kendal, & Flynn, 2013, 2015), an inability or disinclination to look beyond 
134 
 
known functions of objects (functional fixedness: German & Defeyter, 2000), 
adherence to perceived normativity of observed acts (Kenward, 2012; Keupp, Behne, 
& Rakoczy, 2013), and, plausibly, insufficient motivation. In apparent contrast to 
non-humans (Kendal, Coolen, van Bergen, & Laland, 2005), children also have a 
preference for acquiring information socially (Flynn, Turner, & Giraldeau, 
submitted; Wood et al., 2013) - potentially driven by a desire to affiliate with those 
who model such information (Over & Carpenter, 2013). Previously, for example, it 
has been observed that 3- to 5-year-old children do not attempt to innovate a novel 
solution to a tool-use task when they can acquire a suitable technique via observation 
(Flynn & Whiten, 2008). Even when children are not engaged in dyadic interactions, 
with their traditional learning expectations, and can explore a tool-use apparatus in 
free play for a substantial period of time, very few 3- to 5-year-olds innovate by 
producing alternative actions (Whiten & Flynn, 2010). It is not until later in 
childhood, around the age of 8 to 9 years, that innovations are more reliably 
produced (Beck et al., 2011; Carr et al., 2015; Hanus et al., 2011).  
 There is still much to understand about where and why children have 
difficulties with innovation. Research into children’s imitation, including the 
extreme of the reproduction of causally irrelevant actions (Lyons, Young, & Keil, 
2007), will prove helpful in this regard, as what viably supports imitation hinders 
innovation and vice versa. By understanding the barriers or psychological limits to 
innovation, as in the animal innovation field (Brosnan & Hopper, 2014), it will be 
possible to formulate appropriate interventions to assist children in overcoming 
them. The current study aimed to identify such enabling, or disabling, factors, 
through the examination of a number of potential correlates of innovation.  
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There are several reasons why innovation is both important and advantageous 
to assess in children. Not only are the cognitive and motivational systems that 
underpin innovation in childhood likely to be simpler than those that underpin 
innovation in adulthood (meaning the connections between innovation and its 
facilitators may be easier to explore), but it is probable that children are also less 
bound by social conventions and norms that can serve to increase imitative fidelity. 
Furthermore, examining innovation in childhood allows us to compare children’s 
abilities with those of non-human animals (as in Hanus et al., 2011), addressing the 
evolutionary foundations of innovation in addition to its ontological foundations. 
This is imperative in the wider context and consideration of culture. The recent 
proliferation of innovation research with non-human species (see Hopper et al., 
2014, and references therein) provides much insight and inspiration for analogous 
child research.  
Although ostensibly rare in childhood, at least when compared with the rates 
at which children are seen to imitate, could it be that some children are naturally 
more innovative than others? Experiments with adults have been fundamental in 
establishing that, despite flexibility in humans’ reliance upon social information, 
there are clear and consistent individual differences in how we use and value it 
(Molleman, van den Berg, & Weissing, 2014; Toelch, Bruce, Newson, Richerson, & 
Reader, 2014). Intuitively, those that use and value social information less, use and 
value individual information more, and in turn expose themselves to greater 
innovation opportunities. In the animal field, observations of individual variation in 
innovative behaviour have raised the possibility of an innovative heritable 
personality trait (e.g., Marchetti & Drent, 2000). Here, personality denotes consistent 
differences between individuals in their behaviour across time and contexts (Réale, 
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Reader, Sol, McDougall, & Dingemanse, 2007; Dingemanse, Kazem, Réale, & 
Wright, 2010). Crucially, the link between personality and innovation has been 
indicated both directly, due to consistency in an animal’s own innovative ability 
(passerines: Morand-Ferron, Cole, Rawles, & Quinn, 2011), and indirectly, where 
individual differences in traits that contribute to innovation are related to individual 
differences in cognitive performance (learning speed of wild Cavies: Guenther, 
Brust, Dersen, & Trillmich, 2014, and feral guppies: Kendal & Brown, submitted; 
chimpanzee problem solving: Hopper et al., 2014). Furthermore, age (Massen, 
Antonides, Arnold, Bionda, & Koski, 2013), sex (Hopper et al., 2014) and social 
rank (Reader & Laland, 2001; Thornton & Samson, 2012) interact with innovative 
propensities, along with various other state-dependent traits (Sol, Griffin, & 
Bartomeus, 2012).  
Determining whether a phenomenon is trait-driven, as the aforementioned 
research would suggest, is not a straightforward pursuit. Interactions between traits 
and ‘states’ (those factors that may drive innovation, such as hunger; Laland & 
Reader, 1999) must be considered, and even typically designated state-dependent 
factors, such as motivation, may actually contain a small stable individual trait 
component (Sol et al., 2012). Accurately partitioning states and traits may not be as 
imperative an objective as identifying what enables or inhibits the innovation 
process, but it has important ramifications for how we choose to subsequently assess 
innovation. Moreover, should innovation be found to be more of a ‘trait’ than ‘state’, 
this is arguably of greater evolutionary significance given that consistent phenotypic 
variation in non-humans has fitness consequences (Cole & Quinn, 2012; Dall, 
Houston, & McNamara, 2004) and may have an additive genetic basis (Morand-
Ferron et al., 2011). Currently, it is unknown to what extent innovation is a trait in 
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humans. Certainly, innovators appear distinct in some biographic and personality 
characteristics (Rogers, 1995), and creativity, a precursor to innovation, is reliably 
and strongly predicted by, and correlated with, the personality trait of openness to 
experience (Feist, 1998; Kerr & McKay, 2013). It is plausible, therefore, that in the 
same manner in which research has deduced a correlation between individual 
differences in specific traits and creative output (Simonton, 2014), that similar 
outcomes may hold for innovation.  
The current study is one of the first attempts to identify and assess the factors 
that underpin individual differences in children’s behavioural innovation. We 
adopted a similar methodology to that of Overington, Cauchard, Côté, & Lefebvre 
(2011), who used a novel problem-solving task to distinguish ‘innovator’ and ‘non-
innovator’ birds and subsequently compared them to investigate innovative 
characteristics. In a previous study (Carr et al., 2015), 26 out of 209 children were 
identified as ‘innovators’ by producing at least one novel and successful solution on 
a tool-use task following the social demonstration of a method. Here, we matched 
these ‘innovators’ with children who had demonstrated high levels of imitation 
fidelity (‘imitators’), to investigate whether the groups were clearly distinguished on 
tasks conceptually related to innovation, in line with a ‘trait’ interpretation of 
innovation, or whether there would be little consistency within the groups, indicative 
of a ‘state’ interpretation. To answer such questions, it was necessary to administer a 
wide range of tasks, each with a theoretical and/or empirical rationale as to why the 
assessed construct might relate to innovation, or make an individual more or less 
innovative. The constructs are overviewed in Table 4.1.  
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Table 4.1 
Constructs Examined in the Current Study, Their Rationale for Inclusion, and Research Questions Investigated 
Construct Rationale for Inclusion Research Questions 
Social Learning Social and asocial learning co-vary in some animal species (e.g., pigeons: 
Bouchard et al., 2007; primates: Reader & Laland, 2002). Whilst non-human 
animals typically show a preference for asocial learning (Rieucau & Giraldeau, 
2011), humans appear to individually differ in their preference for, or use of, 
social information (Molleman et al., 2014; Rogers, 1995; Toelch et al., 2014).   
Do innovators have a consistent 
preference for innovation (and 
imitators for imitation), or 
flexibly switch between the two 
learning strategies? 
Asocial  
Problem Solving 
Asocial learning performance on novel foraging tasks can predict the 
likelihood of an individual being an innovator (first to solve a task; starlings: 
Boogert et al. 2008). Moreover, greater and more diverse exploratory 
behaviours, as well as exploration persistence, allows for more successful 
problem solving (Benson-Amram & Holekamp, 2012; Huebner & Fichtel, 
2015; Overington et al., 2011; Thornton & Samson, 2012).  
As asocial learning leads to 
innovation, do innovators 
achieve significantly higher 
asocial problem-solving scores 
than imitators? 
Inhibitory  
Control 
Inhibitory control is linked to innovation in wild meerkats (Thornton & 
Samson, 2012): those most successful on novel food extraction tasks were able 
to inhibit ineffective and prepotent responses across trials. By doing so, 
alternative effective solutions can be generated. Children have difficulties with 
inhibition, particularly action inhibition, throughout childhood (Simpson et al., 
2013).  
If inhibition is a key component 
of innovation, do innovators 
show superior abilities in this 
regard? 
Invention Innovation by modification (of a behaviour previously observed/already in an 
individual’s repertoire), and innovation by novel invention are theoretically 
distinct forms of innovation (Carr et al., accepted). Are they distinct in 
practice? 
Do children perform similarly 
on modification and invention 
tasks? 
Cumulative  
Problem Solving 
Cumulative culture is typified by the increasing complexity or efficiency of 
behaviour/knowledge/technology from one generation to the next (Boyd & 
Richerson, 1996), with innovators introducing new behavioural modifications. 
On an individual level, the ability to build upon one’s knowledge permits 
innovative solutions to be reached.  
Do innovators show an 
enhanced ability to build upon 
their existing knowledge? 
Divergent Thinking Divergent thinking involves generating many possible ideas or solutions to a Are innovators distinguished by 
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problem (Guilford, 1959), without the requirement they are good, useful or 
workable (Runco & Acar, 2012). However, amongst many ideas, there may be 
one that is both original and valuable (‘creative’: Picciuto & Carruthers, 2012), 
potentially leading to an innovative behavioural outcome. 
their generation of more ideas? 
Verbal Intelligence Intelligence is recognised as a correlate of creativity (Rogers, 1995), though it 
is unclear whether this is an effect of general intelligence or more specific 
expertise in the domain creativity is assessed. 
Do innovators and imitators 
differ in their verbal intelligence 
(as a proxy for general 
intelligence)? 
Neophobia Neophobia, the fear of novel objects (Greenberg, 2003), will intuitively 
impede, or slow, the production of novel behaviour utilising them. It is 
identified as a major inhibitor of innovation in non-humans (Brosnan & 
Hopper, 2014; Day et al., 2003). 
Are innovators less neophobic 
than imitators? 
Social Status Social rank may serve to enhance the appearance of neophobia (e.g., through 
low-ranking individuals’ fear of aggression from higher-ranking individuals) 
or diminish it (e.g., those of higher competitive rank contacting and solving 
tasks first; Boogert et al., 2008). In chimpanzees, those of low social rank are 
more frequently reported as innovators (Reader & Laland, 2001) presumably 
due to increased necessity of doing so. 
Are innovators of a higher or 
lower social status than 
imitators? 
Boldness-
Exploration  
Traits 
In a similar manner to neophobia, boldness and exploration may facilitate 
innovation. Assessments of these, and other, traits correlate highly between 
knowledgeable observers of individuals (chimpanzee keepers/staff: Freeman et 
al., 2013; teachers and parents of children: Flynn & Whiten, 2012), making the 
use of such ratings valid. 
Are innovators rated higher than 
imitators in boldness and 
exploration (and related traits) 
by a knowledgeable observer? 
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Here we assess whether a group of pre-defined innovators and imitators show 
significant differences across our critical measures. Between-group consistency in 
performance differences on tasks related to the constructs would support a ‘trait’ of 
innovation, whilst a lack of between-group consistency would support a ‘state’ of 
innovative behaviour.  
 
4.2 Experiment 1 
 
4.2.1 Method 
 
4.2.1.1 Participants & design. 
 
 Forty-six children (24 males) from three primary schools in the North East of 
England participated. All children had, approximately six months earlier, taken part 
in a study using a novel tool-use task (the Multiple-Methods Box, MMB; Carr et al., 
2015) and were selected for the current study on the basis of their behaviour with the 
MMB. Children were coded as innovating on the MMB task if they removed a 
reward from inside it using a different exit to that observed during social 
demonstrations. Although the use of a novel tool and/or access point for the tool also 
technically constituted an innovation, we focused on exit innovations as it was the 
exit that was variable in its effectiveness and required altering to reliably retrieve the 
reward. The 26 children who innovated in this way were compared to 26 children 
who displayed full, or high, levels of imitation fidelity on the MMB (never produced 
an exit innovation and imitated the socially demonstrated method on at least five of 
the eight attempt trials; mean number of trials on which imitation occurred = 6.48, 
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compared to a mean number of 2.22 imitation trials for those who innovated). 
Matched pairs, containing an innovator and imitator, were created according to 
similarity in age, sex (two pairs were mixed sex owing to unsuitable alternative 
matches), condition (to which they were assigned in Carr et al., 2015) and school. 
Group allocation was known only to the experimenter (KC). Both groups received 
identical experimental tasks and procedures. Three pairs of children were not 
included in the final sample due to an absence of follow-up parental consent, leaving 
23 ‘innovators’ (13 male, M age = 8 years 4 months (8;4), SD = 19 months) and 23 
‘imitators’ (11 male, M age= 8;5, SD = 18.5 months). There were no significant 
differences in age (t(44) = -0.07, p = .94) across the two groups. 
 
4.2.1.2 Materials & procedure. 
 
 To examine group differences in performance on constructs hypothesised to 
relate to, or facilitate, innovation, a battery of tasks was administered (see Table 4.2). 
All tool-use tasks were placed on a table directly in front of participants, and any 
demonstrations provided were from the child’s perspective of the task. The first five 
tasks were run in a morning session and the following three tasks in an afternoon 
session, to reduce boredom and fatigue. Whilst the majority of morning and 
afternoon sessions took place on the same day, on occasion there was a delay of one 
or two days between sessions owing to lesson conflicts or child absence. Tasks were 
administered in the same order for each participant, and are shown in Table 4.2 
alongside the outcome measures recorded (see Supplementary Material (Appendix 
Item 2) for further task details, individual procedures, and puzzle-box Figures). Upon 
completion of all tasks, children’s favourite lessons and after-school activities were 
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noted. All children were rewarded with a large sticker irrespective of their 
performance. 
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Table 4.2 
Tasks Administered for Assessed Constructs and Their Outcome Measures 
Task Description Outcome Measures 
Social Learning 
Transparent glass-ceiling box 
(Horner & Whiten, 2005) 
Two glass-ceiling box demonstrations featuring 
causally irrelevant and relevant actions, followed by 
five attempts 
Total irrelevant actions copied, summed 
across five attempt trials (max. possible = 
55) 
Asocial Problem Solving 
Pan-pipes 
(Whiten, Horner, & de Waal, 
2005) 
Tool-use task in which the goal is to retrieve a capsule 
by moving an obstruction (cube-shaped block) behind 
which the capsule rests in upper of two pipes; no 
demonstrations, maximum of 15 attempts or 5 minutes 
Number of methods discovered* (max. = 3) 
Latency to first reward retrieval, timed from 
first apparatus interaction 
Inhibitory Control 
Luria hand game 
(Luria, 1973) 
Sixteen trials requiring production of opposite action to 
that of the experimenter (fist or finger gesture) 
Total correct first responses (max. = 16) 
Invention 
Hook task 
(Beck et al., 2011) 
Materials provided (pipecleaner, piece of string, two 
wooden sticks) with the aim of retrieving a bucket from 
a narrow Perspex tube; three minute time limit applied 
Hook score (0: unsuccessful; 0.5: hook or T-
shaped tool attempted; 1: hook or T-shaped 
tool successfully 
manufactured/implemented) 
Cumulative Problem Solving 
Cumulative box 
(Dean et al., 2012) 
Rewards of increasing desirability to be gained by 
solving three task stages, with success on highest (and 
more difficult) stage only achieved through success at 
lower (and easier) stages; same actions could be 
performed on identical left and right sides of box; three 
minutes allowed per stage 
Cumulative score (1 for each stage; max. = 
3) 
Latency to first solution, timed from first 
box interaction (left or right side of box) 
Latency to task completion* (left and right 
side of box 
Divergent Thinking 
Alternate uses task 
(Guilford, 1967) 
Alternate uses to be generated for two common objects 
(paper cup and paperclip); items provided as visual 
aids; verbal responses noted by experimenter 
 
Scores for fluency (number of responses), 
flexibility (categories), elaboration (amount 
of detail) and originality (rarity of 
responses), summed across two items 
Originality score corrected for fluency* 
Verbal Intelligence 
British Picture Vocabulary 
Instructed to point to one picture, from a choice of four, 
which corresponded to a word spoken by experimenter 
Standardised score 
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Scale 
(Second edition; Dunn, Dunn, 
Whetton, & Burley, 1997) 
Neophobia 
Sticker disc 
(Wood et al., 2015) 
Presented opportunity to play with ‘new toy’; maximum 
of 5 minutes to retrieve a sticker by aligning holes in 
circular panel on top of box with circular holes of 
compartments, and utilising plastic tweezers attached to 
box 
Spontaneous prior reference and/or touch 
Latency to first touch, timed from end of 
experimenter instructions* 
Mean task latency  
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Notes. *Where multiple measures were recorded for a task, an asterisk denotes the 
measure selected as the critical representation of the construct. As not all participants 
were successful with the Pan-pipes, cumulative box and sticker disc task, ceiling 
values of 300s, 540s and 300s, respectively, were applied (analyses with and without 
pairs containing ceiling values produced qualitatively similar results). The alternate 
uses originality score was calculated by comparing each response with those made 
by all participants. Responses that were given by 2-5% of participants were 
considered unusual and allocated one point, whilst responses given by 1% of 
participants were considered rare and allocated two points. Responses had to be 
considered appropriate uses to be scored (e.g., a response of ‘bending’ a paperclip 
was not accepted, unless qualified by further description of what it could be bent 
into). Although participants were matched as closely as possible for age, this was not 
exact and so the standardised BPVS score was calculated as opposed to the raw 
score.  
 
 Two additional measures were collected from children’s class teachers. First, 
to gain insight into children’s social status, teachers were asked to rank participating 
children (out of their total class size) in line with four statements of popularity and 
dominance. These statements were as follows: ‘is friends with a significant number 
of other individuals’, ‘is friends with a smaller number of more influential 
individuals’, ‘often initiates conflicts with other children and dominates resources’, 
and ‘is able to acquire and monopolise resources over other individuals without 
using aggression’. Second, teachers were asked to complete the Child Behaviour 
Questionnaire (CBQ). Although the CBQ, which measures children’s temperament, 
was originally designed as a parental measure, the responses of parents and teachers 
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have been shown to correlate (Flynn & Whiten, 2012). Only theoretically-relevant 
subscales were included (activity level, attentional focusing, attentional shifting, 
impulsivity, inhibitory control, and shyness), and individual statements removed if 
not relevant to a classroom context. Our final version of the CBQ contained 65 
items. The return of ratings and questionnaire information from teachers was 
approximately 50% (corresponding to a roughly equal number of innovators and 
imitators).  
 
   4.2.1.3 Scoring and inter-rater reliability. 
 
 The experimenter, KC, coded 100% of the sample from video tape. The 
outcome measures, and how they were scored, are detailed in Table 4.2. An 
independent observer, blind to the specific hypotheses of the study, coded 20% of 
the sample (observational measures). Cohen’s Kappa scores of all measures, 
excepting that of the Luria hand game, were 0.89 or above, showing an excellent 
level of agreement. Inter-rater reliability for the Luria hand game was low and, 
though several discrepancies were resolved between coders, it was determined on the 
basis of errors in the administration of the task (due to the complex nature of the 
pseudo-random protocol) combined with clear subjectivity in children’s responses 
(most children did not assume a neutral hand position inbetween fist and finger 
gestures, thus making small adjustments to gestures difficult to categorise) that the 
task be excluded from the analyses.  
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4.2.1.4 Statistical methods. 
 
 Where data were found to be non-normally distributed, non-parametric tests 
were used. To avoid inflating the Type I error rate as a result of multiple 
comparisons, a Bonferroni correction was applied by dividing the critical 
significance level of .05 by the total number of tests conducted per task (as opposed 
to across tasks, given that the tasks were examining theoretically different 
behavioural constructs). Probability values reported with an asterisk indicate the 
significance level required to reject the null hypothesis following this correction. All 
analyses reported are two-tailed.  
 
4.2.2 Results 
 
 The results are presented in five sections. First, we explore between-group 
(innovators vs. imitators) differences on the task measures. This is followed in the 
second section by a comparison of performances within matched pairs across tasks, 
and in the third section by an exploration of predictor variables. We then consider 
consistency in innovators’ and imitators’ overall behaviour, and finally the additional 
measures obtained from teachers (popularity/dominance ratings and CBQ) and 
children (preferred lessons and after-school activities).  
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4.2.2.1 Do innovators and imitators significantly differ in their task 
performance? 
  
 A series of analyses were undertaken that compared the performance of 
innovators and imitators on each of the task measures reported in Table 4.2 
(excluding the Luria hand game). The outcome of these analyses, specifically the 
probability values obtained, can be seen in Table 4.3. Only two significant group 
differences were revealed, which remained significant following the Bonferroni 
correction. Innovators discovered significantly more methods with the Pan-pipes task 
(Mdn = 2, SD = 0.79) than imitators (Mdn = 1, SD = 0.77; Mann-Whitney U = 167, z 
= -2.30, p = .02, p* = .025), and innovators reached the first solution of the 
cumulative box (left or right side) in a significantly shorter period of time (Mdn = 2, 
SD = 13.50) than imitators (Mdn = 11, SD = 40.12; U = 156, z = -2.42, p = .016, p* = 
.02).
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Table 4.3 
Comparing the Performance of Innovators and Imitators on Task Measures, with Mann-Whitney U Tests 
*p < .05. N = 46 for all measures excluding BPVS standardised score (N = 44, exclusion of two innovators due to lack of task 
engagement). Full statistical information is provided in the text for significant tests.   
 Innovators Imitators  
 Mean (SD) Median Mean (SD) Median p 
Social Learning: Glass-Ceiling Box 
Irrelevant action score 
 
37.74 (17.49) 
 
40 
 
43.30 (15.67) 
 
52 
 
.22 
Asocial Problem Solving: Panpipes 
Methods discovered 
Latency to first retrieval 
 
1.57 (0.79) 
87.87 (88.03) 
 
2 
50 
 
1.04 (0.77) 
121.17 (113.01) 
 
1 
75 
 
.02* 
.45 
Tool Invention: Hook Task 
Hook score 
 
0.39 (0.48) 
 
0 
 
0.48 (0.44) 
 
0.5 
 
.47 
Cumulative Problem Solving:  
Cumulative Box 
Cumulative score 
Latency to first solution (L or R) 
Latency to task completion (L&R) 
 
 
2.70 (0.70) 
8.61 (13.50) 
220.30 (181.83) 
 
 
3 
2 
150 
 
 
2.61 (0.84) 
27.13 (40.12) 
269.30 (211.35) 
 
 
3 
11 
130 
 
 
.72 
.016* 
.65 
Divergent Thinking: Alternate Uses 
Fluency score 
Flexibility score 
Elaboration score 
Originality score 
Corrected originality score 
 
8.17 (4.56) 
5.57 (2.13) 
2.26 (3.52) 
2.48 (2.45) 
0.28 (0.22) 
 
8 
6 
1 
2 
0.3 
 
7.52 (4.82) 
5.09 (2.04) 
1.74 (2.56) 
2.70 (2.77) 
0.31 (0.26) 
 
6 
5 
1 
2 
0.27 
 
.50 
.38 
.82 
.90 
.83 
Verbal Intelligence: BPVS 
Standardised score 
 
104.76 (13.24) 
 
104 
 
100.61 (10.96) 
 
100 
 
.26 
Neophobia: Sticker Disc 
Latency to first touch 
Average task latency 
 
1.65 (2.12) 
76.00 (45.01) 
 
1 
65 
 
1.39 (1.90) 
87.59 (57.89) 
 
1 
101 
 
.73 
.89 
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It is interesting to note a number of further findings that arose. There was a 
significant negative correlation between the number of methods discovered in the 
Pan-pipes task and latency to first reward retrieval (𝜏 = -.40, p = .001), such that 
those who discovered the most methods were the quickest to achieve their first 
asocial solution to the task. This was mirrored in the cumulative task, with a 
significant negative correlation between cumulative score (number of stages solved) 
and the latency to solution of the first stage (left or right side of box): 𝜏 = -.26, p = 
.04. Furthermore, a cross-over between these tasks was demonstrated with a 
significant negative correlation evidenced between Pan-pipes methods and latency to 
first solution with the cumulative box: 𝜏 = -.36, p = .003. With regard to the 
spontaneous prior reference and/or touch of the sticker disc (Table 4.2), a roughly 
equal number of innovators and imitators referenced the sticker disc (five and seven, 
respectively) and touched the sticker disc (two and three, respectively) prior to its 
formal introduction.  
 
4.2.2.2 Across tasks, do innovators or imitators score more highly? 
 
 Looking exclusively at the single measures identified as the most critical 
representations of constructs (Table 4.2), we investigated whether further group 
differences would be revealed by comparing the number of occasions innovators 
outperformed imitators or vice versa, across tasks, using exact binomial tests. We 
operationalised more efficient performance (as referenced in Table 4.4) as: lowest 
irrelevant action score with the glass-ceiling box, most methods with the Pan-pipes 
task, highest score with the hook task, shortest latency to task completion with the 
cumulative box, highest originality score (corrected for fluency) with the alternate 
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uses task, highest standardised BPVS score, and shortest latency to first touch with 
the sticker disc.  
 
Table 4.4 
Comparing Matched Pairs of Innovators and Imitators Across Tasks, Using Exact 
Binomial Tests 
Task Frequency p 
 
Innovator More 
Efficient 
Imitator More 
Efficient 
 
Glass-ceiling box 15 4 .02 
Pan-pipes 11 3 .057 
Hook task  5 7 .77 
Cumulative box 12 10 .83 
Alternate uses 10 13 .68 
BPVS 10 8 .82 
Sticker disc 8 7 1 
 
Note. Pairs that achieved equivalent scores are excluded, thus accounting for the 
discrepancy in total frequencies across tasks. Two pairs of children were excluded 
from the BPVS analysis owing to two children’s lack of engagement with the task.  
 
 As a group, innovators outperformed imitators in producing fewer causally 
irrelevant actions with the glass-ceiling box (p = .02). Although only approaching 
significance (p = .057), overall innovators also discovered a greater number of 
methods with the Pan-pipes task.  
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4.2.2.3 Which, if any, variables predicted innovator-imitator group 
membership? 
 
  In order to discover whether any of the variables identified as critical 
representations of the constructs were able to predict innovator-imitator group 
membership, binomial generalized linear mixed models (GLMM) with a logit link 
function were used to analyse our data. As the analysis excluded two of the 
innovators, owing to their missing BPVS data, it was necessary to also exclude their 
matched pairs. Thus, data from 21 pairs of children were entered. The seven critical 
representations of constructs were entered as fixed effects (explanatory/predictor 
variables), and children’s predetermined group (innovator/imitator) as the target 
dependent variable. As children were matched according to age, sex and school, 
these were not entered as random effects. The resultant model indicated innovator or 
imitator group membership could not be significantly predicted by any of the 
explanatory variables (see Supplementary Material (Appendix Item 2) for additional 
details regarding the statistical model).  
 
4.2.2.4 Are innovators and imitators consistent in their overall 
behaviour? 
 
 To examine consistency in how innovators and imitators performed between 
tasks, participants were ranked on the three task measures that revealed significant 
group differences: irrelevant action score with the glass-ceiling box, methods 
discovered with the Pan-pipes, and latency to the first solution with the cumulative 
box. A higher rank denoted greater efficiency on the task (i.e., lower irrelevant 
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action score, higher number of methods, and lower latency). A Kendall’s W test did 
not reveal significant agreement between participants’ ranks on these measures (W = 
.009, χ2(2) = .84, p = .66), and indeed, separating by group, innovators and imitators 
demonstrated the same (low) level of agreement; that is, they did not consistently 
achieve similar ranks on tasks.  
 
4.2.2.5 Are innovators and imitators distinguished by biographic and 
child- or teacher-report measures? 
 
 No significant differences were found between innovators and imitators on 
the following measures: sex, sibling number, selected CBQ subscales, teacher-rated 
popularity and dominance, preferred lessons and extracurricular activities. The rate 
of return of teacher measures (CBQ and popularity/dominance ratings) was, 
however, only around 50%, meaning these particular findings should be interpreted 
with caution.  
 
4.2.3 Discussion 
 
 The results reported throughout this section do not support the notion of 
distinct innovator and imitator groups within our sample and thus of an innovation 
trait. Overall, there was very little to distinguish the two groups. Interestingly it was 
the puzzle-box tasks (glass-ceiling box, Pan-pipes, and cumulative box), that is those 
resembling the original MMB task, which did elicit performance differences. Whilst 
this suggests domain-specificity in innovativeness, it remains to be seen whether the 
constructs that are associated with innovation change or become more evident with 
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age. Could it be that individuals more strongly resemble innovators and imitators 
later in life?  The next experiment investigates this possibility with adult participants.  
 
4.3 Experiment 2 
 
4.3.1 Method 
 
4.3.1.1. Participants & design. 
 
 Thirty-one Durham University students participated (15 male, M = 20 years 9 
months (20;9),  range 18;6-27;7), all of whom had previously completed the MMB 
task (Carr et al., 2015). Given that the majority of these adults (20 out of 31) 
produced at least one exit innovation in the MMB task, it was not possible to group 
participants in the same manner as Experiment 1. Therefore analyses were conducted 
within the adult group as a whole, following a correlational design. As no effects of 
sex or age were found, these were not investigated further.  
 
4.3.1.2 Materials & procedure. 
 
 In an effort to reduce ceiling effects owing to adults’ significantly enhanced 
cognitive abilities, it was necessary to replace some of the tasks listed in Table 4.2. 
The replacements were as follows (as before, Figures of puzzle boxes and additional 
task/procedural details are provided in Supplementary Material (Appendix Item 2)). 
Asocial problem solving: Sweep-drawer-lever box. The sweep-drawer-lever 
box (SDLB: Wood et al., 2013) was selected in place of the pan-pipes to allow for a 
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greater diversity of exploratory behaviours (methods can be combined and order of 
actions varied). Like the pan-pipes, it is a puzzle box into which a capsule 
(containing a sticker) is inserted and held in place by defences. Three box 
mechanisms can be used to release the reward. The following outcome measures 
were recorded: number of methods discovered (selected as the critical representation 
of this construct), latency to first retrieval (timed from first box touch), and number 
of method repetitions (relating to the specific combinations of actions).  
 Inhibitory control: Stop-it. The Luria hand game was replaced with a 
computer-administered stop-signal task (Logan & Cowan, 1984; Stop-It: 
Verbruggen, Logan, & Stevens, 2008). An overall stop-signal reaction time was 
calculated for each participant, capturing latency of the stop process and hence 
inhibitory ability.  
 Invention: Candle problem. The candle problem was developed as a test of 
problem solving (Duncker, 1945, as cited in German & Defeyter, 2000), requiring 
participants to attach a candle to a vertical board with only a box of tacks and a book 
of matches whilst ensuring that the candle does not drip wax onto the surface below. 
Though not directly analogous to the hook task administered to children, it similarly 
requires the innovative use of materials to reach a solution. A score of 0 was given if 
unsuccessful, 0.5 if the participant achieved partial success (attaching the candle 
directly to the board but allowing dripping of wax, counter to task instructions), and 
1 if the optimal solution of a candle shelf was produced. Participants had a maximum 
of three minutes with this task.  
 The BPVS and sticker disc task, measuring verbal intelligence and 
neophobia, were excluded and not replaced.  
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4.3.2 Results 
 
 Generalized linear mixed models (GLMM, Poisson distribution with Log 
link) were applied to the data to investigate whether greater innovation with the 
MMB could be predicted by performance with our other task measures. Critical 
representations of constructs were entered as fixed effects. Given that adults did not 
undergo the same matching procedure as children, the condition to which adult 
participants were originally assigned with the MMB task (0% efficacy of social 
information vs. 75% efficacy of social information; Carr et al., 2015) was also 
entered as a fixed effect. The two measures of innovation with the MMB (exit 
innovation attempts including, and excluding, repetitions) were entered into separate 
models. The latter target variable (exit innovations excluding repetitions) produced 
the model with the best fit, as determined by the Corrected Akaike Information 
Criterion (104.79 versus 161.85), yet the model and all fixed effects were found to 
be non-significant (the fixed effect of Condition was approaching significance; p = 
.075). Entering exit innovations including repetitions as the target variable also 
produced a non-significant model, but the fixed effect of Condition was found to be 
significant: p = .03 (see Supplementary Material (Appendix Item 2) for further 
information relating to both models). Specifically, participants in the 0% condition 
(for whom the exit door was always locked, preventing reward extraction via the 
socially demonstrated method) were 3.58 times more likely to produce exit 
innovations than participants in the 75% condition (for whom the exit door was 
unlocked on 75% of trials; exp. coefficient = 3.58, t = 2.31, p = .03). This result 
reaffirms that reported in Carr et al., 2015 (Chapter 3).  
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4.3.3 Discussion 
 
 The results indicated that greater innovation on the MMB task could not be 
predicted by any of our other task measures (examining the constructs of social 
learning, asocial problem solving, inhibitory control, invention, cumulative problem 
solving, and divergent thinking). Rather, participants’ allocated condition in the 
MMB task generated the only significant effect. It thus appears that, for our study, a 
context or state-based interpretation of adults’ innovation is more appropriate than a 
trait-based one. 
 
4.4. General Discussion  
 
 We investigated whether individual differences in behavioural innovation, as 
measured by performance with a novel puzzle-box task (the MMB), were 
underpinned by or related to individual differences in a number of constructs of 
theoretical and/or empirical relevance to innovation. This was achieved in a child 
sample (Experiment 1) by comparing matched groups of pre-established innovators 
and imitators (from Carr et al., 2015) on a battery of tasks. Findings from 
Experiment 1 suggested behavioural consistency in puzzle-box contexts, both across 
alternative tasks and over time (MMB and alternative task administration separated 
by six months). Whilst perhaps indicative of a stable innovative personality trait, the 
selectivity of the effect suggests innovativeness, of the type explored in this study, 
may be domain-specific. No other discernible differences between the groups were 
uncovered. Experiment 2 found no relation between innovation with the MMB task 
and other theoretically and conceptually-related measures in adult participants, 
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casting doubt on the possibility of innovation-as-trait and raising important questions 
about the role of context and motivation in innovation production (to which we 
return later in the Discussion).   
 The division of individuals into one of two groups based on their propensity 
to learn socially or individually is not new. Studies using computer-based tasks for 
example, such as that of Kameda and Nakanishi (2002), have distinguished 
‘information scroungers’ (social learners) and ‘information producers’ (individual 
learners). However, how far these categorisations generalise and extend beyond 
single studies, in terms of their longer-term applicability to the individuals, remains 
to be seen. Non-human animal research has complemented this line of enquiry by 
uncovering apparent animal personality types, some of which are implicated in 
innovatory propensities. The emerging impression here is that an individual may fall 
under the category of producer or scrounger, or conformist or maverick (Efferson, 
Lalive, Richerson, McElreath, & Lubell, 2008), based on their preference for a 
particular learning strategy in a given study. Yet we also know that, in theory and via 
mathematical simulations, the most adaptive learner is one who selectively uses 
social and asocial information (Hoppitt & Laland, 2013), trading off one for the 
other dependent upon the environment, situation and context (Kendal et al., 2005). 
We set out to investigate whether children and adults: (i) display a consistent 
preference for an innovative learning strategy in line with a ‘trait’ interpretation, and 
are thus more likely to exhibit the associated innovation constructs overviewed 
earlier; or (ii) display more fluid preferences, in which case motivation and context 
(‘states’) will be key. Taken overall, and in combination with findings from our first 
study (Carr et al., 2015), the results are in favour of the latter proposal. Only a few of 
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our measures were able to marginally hint at some stability in individual behavioural 
differences, and only within our child sample. 
 Innovators within our child sample were distinguished from imitators in three 
ways. First, they appeared to display reduced adherence to social information and, 
with this, an ability and/or desire to increase efficacy of behaviour. This was 
demonstrated initially with the MMB by deviating from the often-unreliable 
observed exit, and again with the glass-ceiling box by imitating fewer irrelevant 
actions than their matched pairs. Second, greater aspects of exploration and problem 
solving were evident on both the MMB (in terms of the discovery of one or more 
alternative exits) and the Pan-pipes task (wherein more methods were produced). 
Third and finally, these individuals appeared to be faster explorers in reaching the 
first stage of the cumulative box, though not all stages, in a shorter period of time. 
Thus we have provided partial evidence for a propensity of our innovator children to 
engage in greater, and faster, individual learning, mirroring the same relation found 
in the animal innovation field (e.g., Boogert, Reader, Hoppitt, & Laland, 2008; 
Kendal & Brown, submitted) and consistent with evidence that human individuals 
vary in their use of social information (Rogers, 1995; Molleman et al., 2014; Toelch 
et al., 2014). With regard to exploration and problem solving, the two are strongly 
linked to innovation. Indeed, in the physical tool-use domain, novel problem solving 
is its hallmark. Exploration is qualitatively distinct, but integral, to innovation 
(Reader & Laland, 2003): the more you explore, the more likely you are to discover 
or chance upon novel behaviours and information. To date, research has provided 
much insight into the effect of exploration versus direct instruction on children’s 
learning (e.g., Bonawitz et al., 2011; Wood et al., 2013), yet there is further potential 
for the exploration-innovation relation, specifically, to be addressed.   
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Interestingly, there was nothing to distinguish innovators on two of our 
additional tool-use tasks: the hook invention task, and the sticker disc (neophobia is 
discussed in a subsequent section). Failure to find differences between our groups 
using the hook invention task (innovators were no more likely to solve it than 
imitators) suggests that innovation by modification (as measured with the MMB) and 
innovation by novel invention (as measured with the hook task) are two distinct 
forms of the phenomenon, with different difficulties associated with each. This will, 
however, require replication with further tasks for a more definitive conclusion to be 
drawn. The other task measures which showed no effect were those pertaining to 
divergent thinking and verbal intelligence. In the light of individual differences in 
divergent thinking from the age of 2 years (Bijvoet-van den Berg & Hoicka, 2014), 
and its conceptual similarity to innovation, it was surprising that our groups did not 
differ in this measure. Critically, however, its assessment in the verbal rather than 
physical domain may be responsible; effects may not translate. We, likewise, found 
no difference between our groups on our proxy measure for general intelligence, 
suggesting it is domain-relevant expertise that is important for creativity and 
innovation (Simonton, 2000), something the BPVS task fails to capture. 
Additionally, having greater verbal proficiency may facilitate the verbal generation 
of ideas (the correlation between divergent thinking and BPVS performance was 
approaching significance) without necessarily facilitating their physical generation 
and implementation.  
Before proceeding to discuss the adult findings, the domain-specificity and 
non-generality of the findings necessitate emphasis. Whilst puzzle-box tasks bear 
basic resemblances, there are an increasing number used in the social learning field 
that address highly similar empirical questions. It is, therefore, a reassuring finding 
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to discover some consistency in the way in which they are approached by children, a 
consistency which extends over time (a six-month testing gap for child participants). 
Nonetheless, the measures within our puzzle boxes were evidently very specific, and 
did not correlate across puzzle boxes as might have been expected. For example, 
innovators appeared to be faster explorers in reaching the first stage of the 
cumulative box in a shorter space of time, but were no quicker than imitators at 
discovering their first method on the Pan-pipes task or retrieving a sticker from the 
sticker disc. The exploration of alternative interpretations for our non-significant 
findings is imperative given it would be unwise to dismiss the various constructs’ 
relevance to innovation on the basis of specific, and singular, measures (in which we 
include that of the MMB). Multiple methods and measures are vital to rule out 
chance performances and the operation of other extraneous factors (Thornton, Isden, 
& Madden, 2014). We note, however, that the lack of significant findings do not 
appear to be due to floor or ceiling effects in children’s task performance (see Table 
1 in Supplementary Material (Appendix Item 2).  
 Adults’ performance on the MMB could not be predicted by any of our task 
measures, only by the condition to which they were assigned with the MMB. This is 
a strong indication that adult participants were driven to innovate not by inherent 
personality differences, but by necessity (Reader & Laland, 2003); a ‘state’ induced 
by uncertainty in the reliability of social information. Unlike children, all adults may 
possess the capacity to innovate but whether they do so is context-dependent. This 
could still produce the producer-scrounger dynamics we know underlie stable 
populations, along with reliably ‘innovative’ individuals: they may better discern 
need and have the appropriate expertise to act upon it. Our small and homogenous 
adult sample (all being young adults, and University students) prevents the 
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extrapolation of our findings to adults as a whole. Individual differences in 
innovatory propensities may be more evident in older adults and adults with more 
diverse backgrounds.  
 It is important that we acknowledge a number of limitations in our current 
study; most pertinently, that of the size of our child sample. While our small sample 
was necessitated, given only 26 innovators emerged from our original sample of 256 
children, the pattern of findings requires replication in a larger sample. It is possible 
that further, and a greater variety of, effects would have been seen with a larger 
number of participants. Moreover, owing to time constraints and potential boredom 
for our participants, we were limited in the number of tasks that could be 
administered, meaning the constructs we selected were not comprehensive. 
Nevertheless, to our knowledge this study is one of the first to follow up children 
who appeared to differ in their propensities for innovation and imitation and 
investigate potential explanatory factors. In future research, it will be essential to 
establish the factors that facilitate innovation at varying developmental stages, 
beyond the relatively small age range studied here, and conduct vital longitudinal 
studies.  
Extending research beyond solitary settings into social ones will also better 
allow situational and dispositional effects to be discerned (Massen et al., 2013; 
Morand-Ferron et al., 2011), including those of social dominance, rank, competition, 
persistence and neophobia. Though we attempted to incorporate these into the 
current study, administering tasks in groups introduces free choice into the procedure 
(such as when to approach a new task, if at all). Prior research indicates that more 
popular and dominant children have more success at solving tool-use tasks in these 
contexts (Flynn & Whiten, 2012), and hence may be the first to innovate. With the 
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existing set-up, the effects of rank and/or neophobia could have been largely masked 
by perceived pressure to act upon presented objects. Similarly, it was not possible to 
truly measure persistence (or lack of) unless participants opted to finish a task early 
which was a rare occurrence. Both neophilia and persistence are implicated in 
appearances of innovation in non-human animals. The social dynamics of innovation 
that operate in the ‘real’ world are likely to be far more complex than we presently 
understand. Group settings are imperative for capturing the range and diversity of 
children’s natural innovation along with its context-dependency, as are more 
informal learning environments such as museums and ‘makerspaces’ (e.g., 
Halverson & Sheridan, 2014).  
Finally, in noting limitations, we echo concern arising from the non-human 
field regarding the way in which individual differences are measured and cognitive 
variability interpreted (Rowe & Healy, 2014; Thornton et al., 2014). Not only must 
we remain vigilant to subjectivity in interpretations of ‘better’ performance (slower 
performance, though typically less valued, may reflect deeper learning and the 
consolidation of experiences; Marchetti & Drent, 2000; Rowe & Healy, 2014), we 
must be consistently mindful of alternative and simpler explanations for variability 
in performance such as motor diversity (Griffin, Diquelou, & Perea, 2014), memory 
or motivation. We are not able to rule out the possibility that our innovators and 
imitators were initially distinguished by these factors, as opposed to those individual 
differences we measured.  
Ultimately, our results do not support a trait-based interpretation of 
innovation (of the type explored in this study), given we did not find our groups to 
be distinguished by the majority of constructs we assessed, but they do hint at some 
consistency in children’s behaviour on domain-related tasks. Variation in children’s 
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use of social versus individual learning demonstrated here, and children and adults’ 
sensitivity to context (as in Carr et al., 2015), are identified as two potential major 
factors in innovation production. With increasing insight into such factors, we move 
closer towards a more comprehensive understanding of the innovation phenomenon 
and, thus, how human behaviour evolves. 
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Chapter 5  
Can children’s innovation be facilitated by normative information? 
 
Abstract 
 
This study tested the hypothesis that normative language can be used to cue 
innovative behaviour in a similar manner to imitative behaviour. Children aged 8-9 
years (N = 84) were presented with the Multiple-Methods Box (MMB), a novel 
puzzle box from which a reward can be extracted using different tools, access points 
and exits. Prior to attempts with the task, children received one of three verbal 
frames. Two of the three frames were designed to promote behavioural normativity, 
by providing ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ information regarding the conventional 
performance of peers (specifically, the number of different ways other children had 
purportedly found to extract rewards from the MMB). The third frame simply 
informed children that others’ had played with the box, acting as a control. No 
significant effect of verbal frame (condition) upon children’s performance was 
found; only the positive and negative normative conditions were distinguished by 
children’s latency to first reward extraction, with those in the positive condition seen 
to be significantly faster than the negative. Unanticipated sex differences emerged, 
which appeared specifically related to male participants’ enhanced approach and 
interaction behaviour (as evidenced in a greater number of attempts and extractions, 
and speed of first extraction). Nonetheless, female participants’ poorer performance 
in this regard was not to the detriment of their innovative performance. A 
competency question administered at the end of testing established that the lack of 
significant differences was not owing to children’s failure to recognise the 
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referenced performance of their peers. Results are discussed in light of requirements 
for conformity to behavioural norms, and the likely propensity for older children to 
override normative information in favour of individual achievement goals.  
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5.1 Introduction 
 
A minority of children below the age of 8 years innovate, whether by novel 
invention or modification, in experimental settings. Even at this age, innovation is 
not universal (Beck, Apperly, Chappell, Guthrie, & Cutting, 2011; Carr, Kendal, & 
Flynn, 2015: Chapter 3). Whilst a number of factors may be responsible, including 
inability or disinclination, there is one factor that appears to be increasingly 
implicated in children’s tendency to imitate, and consequently affects innovation: the 
degree to which they interpret observed behaviour as conventional or normative.  
Described by Schmidt and Tomasello (2012, page 232) as the “glue of human 
societies”, social norms engender cooperation by encouraging behaviour in line with 
that of the social group. Norms prescribe correctness and appropriateness of 
behaviour (Rakoczy & Schmidt, 2013), acting as guides in social situations. 
Conventional norms, such as hand shaking at formal introductions, are distinguished 
from moral norms in that the former do not directly harm an individual if violated 
and are generally more arbitrary in nature (Turiel, 1983). Conventional norms are 
maintained, nevertheless, by fear of disapproval if they are violated, and a desire to 
conform to the ‘right’ way of doing things (Schmidt & Tomasello, 2012). These 
motivations evidence and sustain strong group identification, prompting conformity 
and, subsequently, contributing to the cultural ratchet (Schmidt, Rakoczy, & 
Tomasello, 2011).  
Humanitys’ ‘norm psychology’, which enables reasoning about 
conventionality, develops early (Chudek & Henrich, 2011). From two years, children 
display early signs of adherence to normativity by preferentially copying an action 
performed by three individuals as opposed to an action performed by one individual 
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three times (Haun, Rekers, & Tomasello, 2012). One year later, children not only 
infer intentional actions as socially normative in the absence of explicit verbal or 
pedagogical cues (Schmidt, Rakoczy, & Tomasello, 2011), but they enforce 
normative rules upon others (Schmidt et al., 2011), protest when individuals violate 
established convention (Rakoczy, Brosche, Warneken, & Tomasello, 2009), and 
reliably use normative language in game contexts (Rakoczy, Warneken, & 
Tomasello, 2008). At four years, children are attuned to the behaviour and opinions 
of peers, such that they overlook obvious inaccuracies of their peers and align their 
own judgements with that of a group consensus (Haun & Tomasello, 2011). This 
echoes the behaviour of adults in Asch’s (1956) classic social psychology 
experiment (though see Wilks, Collier-Baker, & Nielsen, 2015, for an important 
proficiency caveat to this finding). These effects are not confined to the action 
domain. Children acquire, from a similarly early age, an understanding of the 
conventional nature of artifact function (Casler & Kelemen, 2005; Casler, Terziyan, 
& Greene, 2009), demonstrated by protests when artifacts are used in ways contrary 
to their ‘design’. Believing that there are normatively ‘right’ ways to use objects 
induces functional fixedness (Duncker, 1945; German & Defeyter, 2000): a 
phenomenon characterised by difficulty or inability to look beyond an object’s 
conventional function and formulate novel alternative ways of using it. Indeed, 
functional fixedness is seen to be enhanced, along with imitation fidelity, when 
behavioural conventionality is primed (Clegg & Legare, 2015). Inferring 
conventionality of behaviour thus serves to heighten expectations for conformity to it 
(Legare, Wen, Herrmann, & Whitehouse, 2015), limiting potential innovation.  
Though children’s understanding and use of social norms becomes 
increasingly flexible throughout childhood (e.g., greater appreciation of their 
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context-specificity: Conry-Murray & Turiel, 2012; Köymen, Lieven, Engemann, 
Rakoczy, Warneken, & Tomasello, 2014), one domain in which perceived 
normativity appears to exert a particularly strong and sustained influence is that of 
action imitation. So called ‘over-imitation’ (Lyons, Young, & Keil, 2007), the 
reproduction of causally irrelevant actions, has received extensive empirical support. 
Various explanations have been offered for its occurrence (see Keupp, Behne, & 
Rakoczy, 2013, for a recent overview), including normativity. This theory supposes 
that children copy irrelevant actions not because they are considered causally 
important, but rather because they are deemed conventionally necessary (Kenward, 
Karlsson, & Persson, 2011; Keupp et al., 2013). Unlike other explanations for over-
imitation (such as affiliation; Over & Carpenter, 2013), the normative account 
successfully predicts greater imitative flexibility outside the context in which the 
initial demonstration of irrelevant actions occurred (Keupp, Behne, Zachow, 
Kasbohm, & Rakoczy, 2015).  
Conventionality is not only communicated by multiple individuals 
performing the same actions (i.e., synchronicity), but by the verbal frame that 
precedes behavioural demonstrations. Indeed, normative language is one of the main 
channels through which social norms are communicated (Rakoczy & Schmidt, 
2013). Presenting an action sequence as a social convention has been achieved by 
stating that an actor “always does it this way” (Herrmann, Legare, Harris, & 
Whitehouse, 2013). This convention-oriented frame is contrasted with an outcome-
oriented frame that emphasises the instrumental goal of an action sequence. The 
former increases children’s imitative fidelity (Herrmann et al., 2013). In 
corroboration, Legare et al. (2015) report that children imitate with highest fidelity 
when a conventional, rather than instrumental, verbal frame prefaces a novel action 
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sequence (see also Clegg & Legare, 2015, who report the same results with a non-
instrumental, necklace-making, task). Legare et al. (2015) additionally examined 
children’s innovative behaviour by manipulating the start- and end-states of a 
causally opaque action sequence. When the start- and end-states were equivalent this 
served to prime a conventional goal, and, when different, an instrumental goal. 
Observations of innovation (novel modifications of observed behaviour and/or novel 
behaviour not previously observed) were lower in the conventional than instrumental 
condition.   
It is evident that cues to conventionality, whether behavioural or verbal, serve 
to promote imitation and reduce innovation. This is of great importance, both in 
terms of aiding understanding of children’s difficulties with (or resistance to) 
innovation and in formulating interventions to facilitate the innovation process. In a 
previous study (Carr et al., 2015), we investigated children’s imitative and 
innovative behaviour following social demonstrations with a novel puzzle box (the 
Multiple-Methods Box, MMB). Despite stating an explicit instrumental goal (“see if 
you can get the egg [containing a reward] out of the box”), instances of innovation 
(involving the discovery of a novel, and more reliable, exit to that observed) were 
very rare compared with imitation. Notably, several children remarked, after 
demonstrations, “So that’s how you play the game”. Consistent with Schmidt et al. 
(2011), inferring the social conventionality of actions can thus appear to occur even 
in the absence of any cues towards it (other than the repetition of a social method by 
a single individual). Building on our work and that of Legare et al. (2015), we 
examine the effect of language on children’s innovative behaviour, asking: if 
perceived normativity typically acts to promote action imitation (by encouraging 
conformity), and conventional and instrumental language is able to reliably cue 
180 
 
specific behavioural outcomes, can verbally framing innovation as the normative 
behaviour foster its occurrence?  
In order to allow for the production of a range of novel behaviours, we 
employed our MMB task (Carr et al., 2015); not only can the accompanying tools 
and box access points be used in different combinations, but there are four 
capsule/egg (reward) exits. Given our previous observation of children’s infrequent 
innovation following social demonstrations, we opted to examine behaviour when 
children were simply presented with the box. Furthermore, to maximise appearances 
of novel behaviour, we selected an older sample of children (8-9 years, as seen in 
Beck et al., 2011; Carr et al., 2015) compared with that of Herrmann et al. (2013; 3-
6-year-olds) and Legare et al. (2015; 4-6-year-olds). 
We created three groups differing only in the verbal frame that preceded 
presentation of the MMB, to test the hypothesis that conventional language can be 
used to cue innovative behaviour in a similar manner to imitative behaviour. In a 
‘positive’ normative condition, children were provided with peer-performance 
information that emphasised others’ success in finding lots of ways (innovations) to 
retrieve the reward. The ‘negative’ normative condition conversely emphasised 
others’ lack of success in finding lots of ways (innovations). The control condition 
provided no peer-performance information, simply that other children had played 
with the box. We investigated whether children interpreted the referenced 
performance of their peers as the conventional task response, and thus opted to 
‘conform’1 or act in accordance with the group’s established behaviour (i.e., 
discovering multiple ways of retrieving the reward in the positive condition, but only 
                                                          
1
 We note that while our study is asking whether children ‘conform’ to a stated behavioural 
norm, we are not examining conformity in the traditional sense. This is principally owing to 
our alluding to the behaviour (that is most frequent in others) rather than children physically 
observing it.  
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one way in the negative condition). However, it may be that children, particularly at 
an older age, possess more individualistic motives to pursue their own varied 
attempts at the task. We were also interested in whether children’s conceptions of 
task difficulty and competence varied according to the verbal frame they received, 
and thus incorporated a number of questions at the end of testing. Though sex 
differences in children’s imitation and normative behaviour have not been reported, 
they have been documented with regard to perceptions (self-evaluations) of ability 
and competence in certain domains (e.g., Cole, Martin, Peeke, Seroczynski, & Fier, 
1999; Ehrlinger & Dunning, 2003; Goetz, Bieg, Lüdtke, Pekrun, & Hall, 2013; von 
Stumm, Chamorro-Premuzic, & Furnham, 2009). Sex was therefore examined as a 
component of perceived difficulty and competence.  
 
5.2 Method 
 
5.2.1 Participants 
 
Eighty-four children from two primary schools in the North East of England 
participated. Children were aged between 8 and 9 years (37 males, M = 8 years 11 
months (8;11), range 8;0-9;8). There were no significant differences in sex [χ2(2) = 
0.13, p = .94] or age [Kruskal-Wallis H(2) = .99, p = .61] distribution across the 
three conditions, and no significant differences between 8-year-olds and 9-year-olds 
in any of the outcome variables.  
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5.2.2 Materials 
 
A puzzle box offering multiple innovation opportunities, the ‘Multiple-
Methods Box’ (MMB, see Figure 5.1), was used. The MMB contains two levels 
separated by a platform. The upper transparent level features: an entry chute for the 
reward (a capsule containing a sticker which was inserted by the experimenter); four 
entrances, one of which required the rotation of a dial for access and three of which 
could also function as reward extraction points; and a small circular hole in the 
platform floor. If the capsule fell through this hole, it dropped to a lower opaque 
level of the box, via a concealed slope, to rest behind a blue exit door which could be 
opened to retrieve it. Three tools were available: a fork, a hook, and a sweep tool 
(Figure 5.1b). The fork and sweep tool could be joined and used in combination to 
extract the reward across a longer distance than the other single tools. Notably, not 
all tools fitted into all access points or were long enough to manipulate the capsule to 
all exit holes thus limiting their random application.  
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Figure 5.1. The Multiple-Methods Box (MMB) and associated tools. (a) Access 
points labelled 1-5: (1) ‘Small T’, small inverted T-shape, (2) ‘End’, large inverted 
T-shape, opposite ‘Small T’, (3) ‘Dial’, circular hole, revealed by aligning the circle 
of a dial with a circle in the side of the box, (4) ‘Dial Opposite’, and (5) ‘Entry 
Chute’, a circular hole into which the reward was dropped. (b) Three tools were 
available, from right to left: fork, hook and sweep. The position of the capsule in 
relation to each tool demonstrates the main method of manoeuvre. The fork and 
sweep tool could be joined and used in combination to extract the reward, with the 
extra length affording extraction across the full length of the MMB, and can be seen 
in the reflection at the base of the box (a).  
 
5.2.3 Design & Procedure 
 
 Children were age-ranked prior to their random allocation to one of three 
conditions, to ensure an even distribution of ages. These conditions differed in the 
verbal frame that preceded children’s attempts with the task. First, however, the 
experimenter presented the MMB and initiated a short warm-up phase designed to 
Hole in platform floor, 
leading to exit door 
(circled, below left) 
  
2 1 
4 
3 
5 
(a) (b) 
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familiarise the child with its features. This phase consisted of pointing out the access 
points (“holes”, given they could also serve as exits) around the box, as well as the 
tools positioned alongside. As in Carr et al. (2015), the box was proclaimed as 
belonging to a friend: “This is actually my friend’s box, and my friend told me that 
when this egg [the capsule] goes into the box you have to try and get it out. Inside 
this egg is a sticker. If you get it out of the box, we can start a sticker pile for you 
and we’ll see how many you can get.” Whilst this reference aimed to reduce 
assumed experimenter expertise and model-based biases in our previous study, with 
no provision of social demonstrations in the current study this was less essential. 
However, it may nonetheless have served to reduce any inhibition arising from 
otherwise perceived experimenter ownership of the apparatus/materials (Sheridan, 
Konopasky, Kirkwood, & Defeyter, in press).  
 The verbal frames of two of the three conditions were designed to provide 
children with information about the supposed performance of their peers. Children in 
the ‘positive’ experimental condition (N = 30) were informed that, “Lots of children 
have had a go with the box. Everyone who has a go has found lots of different ways 
to get the egg out.” The verbal frame for the ‘negative’ experimental condition (N = 
28) similarly indicated that “Lots of children have had a go with the box”, but this 
time that “Everyone who has a go has only found one way to get the egg out.” 
Children in the third condition, the control condition (N = 26), were simply told: 
“Lots of children have had a go with the box. Let’s see how you do.”  
 Following the critical verbal frame, children were instructed to begin their 
attempts with the task. Neutral prompts were provided following each attempt 
(“Have another go”), except on the fourth trial when participants were reminded: 
“You can try anything you like.” Rather than encouraging children to explore, we 
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wished to observe their natural response to the task. Participants were given a 
maximum of eight attempt trials, over a period of five minutes; if the eight trials 
were not completed within this time, testing ceased. To limit continued unproductive 
behaviour, tool insertions were capped for children at five per attempt and a new 
attempt signified by the re-baiting of the box. Thus the MMB was re-baited at the 
end of five successive and unsuccessful tool insertions, or after each successful 
extraction. Upon completion of the task, children were asked their thoughts when 
initially informed about the performance of other children: “When I told you that… 
[repetition of specific verbal frame], what did that make you think?” If participants 
did not provide an answer, they were prompted: “Did you think it was going to be 
easy or hard?” and “Did you think you would find lots of ways to get the egg out or 
you wouldn’t find lots of ways?” The order of the options was counterbalanced 
between participants. These questions were asked in order to gain a greater insight 
into how children responded to the framing of the task (e.g., whether the 
‘performance’ of peers was deemed the conventional or normative response; whether 
the positive condition decreased perceived difficulty of the task and the negative 
condition increased it, impacting upon the number of innovations produced; and 
whether the negative condition prompted a competitive effect).  
 At the end of testing all children were praised for their performance and 
rewarded with a sticker irrespective of their level of success (small stickers collected 
during testing were traded for one larger and more desirable sticker).  
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5.2.4 Coding & Inter-Rater Reliability 
 
 Participants’ overall performance was scored on the following variables: 
number of attempts (maximum = 8); number of reward extractions (capsules 
removed from the MMB; max. = 8); number of tools used (max. = 6; fork, hook, 
sweep, combined fork, combined sweep, tool end), access points used (max. = 5; 
small T, end, dial, dial opposite, entry chute), and exits used (max. = 4; end, dial, 
dial opposite, door); number of methods (specific combinations of tool, access point, 
and exit); number of successful exits used and number of successful methods 
produced (denoting the fact that not all participants who maneuvered the capsule to 
the exit door discovered how to open it and hence achieve extraction); number of 
method repetitions; and latency to first extraction (timed from end of experimenter 
instructions, with a ceiling latency of 300s given if no extraction was achieved 
throughout attempts). With tools and access points, we additionally made a more 
nuanced distinction between those that were discovered (used as part of the five tool 
insertions per attempt but not used together with an exit to bring about an outcome, 
i.e., were abandoned prior to a different tool/access point being selected) and those 
that were used as part of a method (used to manoeuvre the capsule to an exit and 
effect an outcome). Participants’ responses to experimenter questions were coded 
according to the reported perceived difficulty of the task (easy, hard, middle) before 
they had attempted the task, and perceived competency at finding ways to retrieve 
the capsule from the box (again, perceptions prior to attempts).  
 The experimenter, KC, coded 100% of the sample from video tape. An 
independent observer, blind to the hypotheses of the study, coded 20% of the 
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sample. All intra-class correlation values were 0.88 or above, showing an excellent 
level of inter-rater reliability (Cicchetti, 1994).  
 
5.2.5 Statistical Methods 
 
 As the data were not normally distributed, non-parametric tests were used. 
Where multiple tests were conducted with the same outcome variable, a Bonferroni 
correction was applied (by dividing the critical significance level of .05 by the total 
number of tests conducted) to avoid inflating the Type I error rate. Corrections were 
made for tests within, rather than across, variables given that we were interested in 
the nuances of children’s behaviour (that is, how they performed in relation to a 
number of aspects of the MMB task). However, an additional correction was made 
for the three measures of ‘successful’ innovation that were recorded (tools used in a 
method, access points used in a method, and successful exits).  
 
5.3 Results 
 
 The results are presented in three sections. First, we examine between-
condition differences in children’s performance on the MMB task. Second, in 
response to observations during testing, we explore sex differences in performance 
across and within conditions. Finally, we analyse children’s responses concerning 
perceived difficulty and competence in relation to the task. All tests were two-tailed 
unless otherwise stated.   
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5.3.1 Did Children Differ in Their Task Performance Between Conditions? 
 
 Our primary question concerned whether verbal framing differentially 
influenced participants’ performance, and the extent to which they innovated, on the 
MMB task. As the verbal frames were explicit in their emphasis upon capsule 
removal (ways to get the egg out of the box), there was a particular focus upon the 
number of exits used by participants. However, we recognised that children in the 
positive and negative experimental conditions may have interpreted ‘ways’ 
differently (i.e., using the same exit but a different tool and/or access point may be 
considered a different ‘way’) and so we also compared the number of tools and 
access points used between groups (see Table 5.1). A table containing definitions of 
variables is first provided as a reminder of their conceptualisation.  
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Table 5.1 
Variables Subject to Statistical Analysis 
Variable Description 
Attempts Total number of attempts made (max. 8), with each 
attempt comprising up to five tool insertions  
Extractions Total number of successful reward extractions, 
irrespective of extraction method (max. 8) 
Tools/Access Points 
Discovered 
Total number of tools/access points attempted, but not 
used in successful combination with an exit to bring 
about an outcome (were abandoned prior to an 
alternative selection) 
Tools/Access Points 
Used in a Method 
Total number of tools/access points used in successful 
combination with an exit to bring about an outcome 
(reward extraction, or capsule to exit door) 
Exits Total number of exits used, including the exit door 
irrespective of whether its opening mechanism was 
discovered 
Successful Exits Total number of exits used that led to successful reward 
extraction (excluding capsule to exit door if opening 
mechanism was not discovered) 
Methods Total number of methods (combinations of tool, access 
and exit) enacted, irrespective of success 
Successful Methods Total number of methods (combinations of tool, access 
and exit) enacted that led to successful reward 
extraction(s) 
Method Repetitions Total number of repetitions of specific combinations of 
tool, access point and exit 
Extraction Latency Time taken to first reward extraction, from end of 
experimenter instructions (max. 300s) 
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Table 5.2 
Descriptive Statistics of Outcome Variables Across Conditions, Together With the Test Statistics and Probability Values Generated by 
Group Comparisons With the Kruskal-Wallis Test 
Note. (D) = discovered, (M) = used as part of a reward extraction method, Reps = repetitions 
 Experimental Condition  
 Positive Negative Control Kruskal-Wallis 
 Mean (SD) Mdn Mean (SD) Mdn Mean (SD) Mdn H p 
Attempts 5.90 (1.63) 6 5.73 (1.91) 5.5 6.04 (1.72) 6 0.18 .91 
Extractions 5.21 (1.80) 5 4.92 (2.23) 5 5.00 (2.18) 5 0.28 .87 
Tools (D) 2.66 (1.08) 3 2.42 (0.99) 2.5 2.56 (0.87) 3 1.55 .46 
Tools (M) 2.07 (0.91) 2 1.68 (0.77) 1.5 1.88 (0.91) 2 3.24 .20 
Access (D) 2.97 (1.05) 3 3.12 (0.95) 3 2.96 (0.73) 3 0.94 .63 
Access (M) 2.53 (1.01) 3 2.39 (0.99) 2 2.31 (0.97) 2 0.92 .63 
Exits 
Successful 
2.66 (1.01) 
2.28 (1.00) 
3 
2 
2.54 (1.21) 
2.19 (1.23) 
2.5 
2 
2.32 (0.95) 
1.92 (0.81) 
2 
2 
1.50 
0.98 
.47 
.61 
Methods 
Successful 
3.76 (1.46) 
3.17 (1.54) 
4 
3 
3.38 (1.60) 
2.85 (1.74) 
4 
2 
3.36 (1.22) 
2.72 (1.21) 
3 
3 
1.60 
1.46 
.45 
.48 
Method Reps 2.03 (1.94) 1.5 2.23 (2.37) 1.5 2.52 (1.81) 2 1.52 .47 
Extraction 
Latency 
78.03  
(72.59) 
46 
 
119.32 
(82.20) 
100.5 
 
109.50 
(86.90) 
78.5 
 
5.62 
 
.06 
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As can be seen in Table 5.2, only one marginal group difference (extraction 
latency) was found. Investigating this result further, participants in the positive 
condition (Mdn = 46, SD = 72.59) were significantly faster at achieving their first 
extraction than participants in the negative condition (Mdn = 100.5, SD = 82.20; 
Mann-Whitney U = 264, z = -2.43, p = .015, corrected p = .017). There were no 
significant differences between the control and the positive- (U = 305, z = -1.40, p = 
.16), or negative (U = 328.5, z = -0.62, p = .54) conditions.  
 Participants varied widely in how many attempts they enacted (see Table 
5.3), with a mean number of 5.77 attempts found across conditions despite allowing 
for eight. Though there were no significant differences between conditions in the 
number of attempts made (H(2) = .18, p = .91), male participants made significantly 
more attempts (Mdn = 6, SD = 1.78) than female participants (Mdn = 5, SD = 1.87; 
U = 606, z = -2.42, p = .02). In view of the variability and sex differences found, we 
standardised our outcome variables by dividing each participant’s scores by the 
number of attempts they made. Re-running the Kruskal-Wallis analyses on the 
standardised variables revealed no significant differences between conditions. Thus, 
the initial results do not appear to be an artefact of variability in the number of 
attempts made. However, subsequent analyses (Section 5.3.2) incorporating both raw 
and standardised scores are presented for completeness.  
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Table 5.3 
Number of Attempts Made by Participants, Across Conditions 
Number of 
Attempts 
Number of 
Participants 
1 3 
2 2 
3 5 
4 8 
5 18 
6 16 
7 11 
8 21 
 
5.3.2 Did Male and Female Children Differ in Their Task Performance? 
 
 Although we did not initially set out to investigate sex differences, there 
appeared during testing to be some consistent differences in the way in which male 
and female participants approached the task (specifically, in the ease with which they 
contacted and interacted with the apparatus). We thus opted to undertake analyses on 
the male and female groups across and within conditions.   
 Across conditions, male and female participants significantly differed in four 
outcome variables. Male participants not only made significantly more attempts than 
female participants (see Section 5.3.1), but achieved significantly more extractions 
(males: Mdn = 6, SD = 2.29; females: Mdn = 5, SD = 2.19; U = 639, z = -2.10, p = 
.04). However, when controlling for number of attempts, female participants 
produced significantly more methods (Mdn = 0.75, SD = 0.30) than males (Mdn = 
0.60, SD = 0.26; U = 655, z = -1.95, p = .051). Females also enacted significantly 
fewer method repetitions, for raw scores (females: Mdn = 1, SD = 1.98; males: Mdn 
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= 2, SD = 2.03; U = 582.5, z = -1.71, p = .01) and standardised scores (females: Mdn 
= 0.2, SD = 0.26; males: Mdn = 0.4, SD = 0.26; U = 606, z = -2.40, p = .02). Male 
participants had greater task success (evident in reward extractions) as a function of 
their greater number of attempts. However, female participants required fewer 
attempts than males to produce novel combinations of tool, access point, and exit 
(methods), irrespective of the success of these combinations at bringing about reward 
retrieval.  
 To determine the extent to which these results were driven by the verbal 
frame participants’ received, further analyses within conditions were necessary. 
Descriptive and test statistics are presented in Table 5.4. Whilst there was nothing to 
distinguish male and female participants when they believed other children “only 
found one way to get the egg out of the box” (negative normative condition), this 
was not the case for the positive normative condition and control condition. As the 
difference in attempt number between males and females only approached 
significance in the positive normative condition (U = 67, z = -1.90, p = .06), analyses 
within this condition were conducted on raw scores (thus not controlling for attempt 
number). Females were found to make significantly fewer extractions (U = 64, z = -
2.02, p = .047) and method repetitions (U = 54.5, z = -2.47, p = .02) than males when 
informed that everyone “has found lots of different ways to get the egg out of the 
box”. When simply prompted “Let’s see how you do”, as in the control condition, 
female participants again made significantly fewer extractions than males (U = 31.5, 
z = -2.67, p = .01) but also significantly fewer attempts (U = 43.5, z = -2.06, p = .04). 
This thus necessitated consideration of the standardised scores. Differences in only 
one standardised outcome variable were found to approach significance, with males 
performing more method repetitions than females (U = 47, z = -1.86, p = .06) in the 
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control condition. However, significant differences were found in latency to first 
extraction (standardised score not appropriate): male participants achieved their first 
extraction faster than female participants (U = 31, z = -2.67, p = .01), again in the 
control condition. 
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Table 5.4 
Descriptive Statistics (Median and (SD)) of Outcome Variables For Male and Female Participants Across Conditions, Significant 
Effects, and Test Statistics and Probability Values Generated by Mann-Whitney U Tests 
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 Positive (P) Negative (N) Control (C) Sig.  
Effects 
U z p 
 Male Female Male Female Male Female     
Attempts 6.5 (1.70) 5 (1.45) 5.5 (2.27) 5.5 (2.03) 7 (1.08) 5.5 (1.91) C Male > 
C Female 
43.5 -2.06 .04 
Extractions 6 (2.23) 4 (1.63) 5 (2.59) 5 (2.42) 6 (1.27) 3.5 (2.25) P Male >  
P Female 
C Male >  
C Female 
64 
 
31.5 
-2.02 
 
-2.67 
.047 
 
.01 
Tools (D) 
 
2.5 (1.01) 
0.44 (0.26) 
3 (1.09) 
0.6 (0.25) 
2.5 (0.98) 
0.39 (0.33) 
2 (1.02) 
0.41 (0.22) 
3 (0.67) 
0.38 (0.11) 
3 (1.02) 
0.50 (0.40) 
--    
Tools (M) 
 
2 (0.86) 
0.31 (0.25) 
2 (0.93) 
0.5 (0.24) 
1.5 (0.78) 
0.39 (0.27) 
1.5 (0.79) 
0.31 (0.24) 
2 (0.75) 
0.25 (0.13) 
2 (0.92) 
0.41 (0.25) 
--    
Access (D) 
 
3.5 (1.10) 
0.5 (0.25) 
3 (1.02) 
0.67 (0.25) 
3.5 (1.16) 
0.54 (0.26) 
3 (0.89) 
0.60 (0.22) 
3 (0.83) 
0.43 (0.16) 
3 (0.66) 
0.54 (0.28) 
--    
Access (M) 
 
2.5 (1.09) 
0.46 (0.18) 
3 (0.96) 
0.6 (0.22) 
3 (1.09) 
0.40 (0.30) 
2 (0.95) 
0.40 (0.27) 
2 (0.93) 
0.38 (0.15) 
2 (0.83) 
0.41 (0.24) 
--    
Exits 
 
3 (1.15) 
0.39 (0.18) 
3 (0.96) 
0.54 (0.20) 
2.5 (1.24) 
0.54 (0.29) 
2 (1.25) 
0.46 (0.31) 
2 (0.92) 
0.33 (0.17) 
2 (0.99) 
0.41 (0.22) 
--    
S. Exits 
 
2.5 (1.20) 
0.38 (0.20) 
2 (0.96) 
0.41 (0.19) 
1.5 (1.54) 
0.29 (0.32) 
2 (1.18) 
0.40 (0.27) 
2 (0.75) 
0.33 (0.14) 
1.5 (0.83) 
0.27 (0.19) 
--    
Methods 
 
3 (1.51) 
0.61 (0.24) 
4 (1.45) 
0.82 (0.26) 
3.5 (1.31) 
0.59 (0.32) 
3 (1.86) 
0.80 (0.34) 
3 (1.36) 
0.50 (0.24) 
3 (1.15) 
0.65 (0.23) 
--    
S. Methods 
 
3 (1.75) 
0.46 (0.29) 
3 (1.54) 
0.71 (0.26) 
2 (1.76) 
0.35 (0.36) 
2 (1.88) 
0.40 (0.33) 
3 (1.18) 
0.43 (0.20) 
2 (1.22) 
0.46 (0.26) 
--    
Method Reps 
 
2.5 (1.93) 
0.38 (0.23) 
1 (1.66) 
0.18 (0.22) 
2 (2.39) 
0.34 (0.32) 
1 (2.53) 
0.20 (0.33) 
3 (1.85) 
0.50 (0.23) 
2 (1.59) 
0.33 (0.21) 
P Male >  
P Female 
54.5 -2.47 .02 
Ext. Latency 46 (76.26) 55 (71.57) 113 (96.62) 72.5(65.33) 43 (51.66) 149.5(83.50) C Male > 
C Female 
31 -2.67 .01 
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Note. (D) = discovered, (M) = used as part of a reward extraction method, S = 
successful (with regard to reward extraction), Reps = repetitions, Ext. = extraction. 
Descriptive statistics reported in italics are those for the standardised scores. The test 
statistics and probability values are only shown for significant effects due to space 
limitations.  
 
As it was unclear whether the positive and control conditions were eliciting 
different responses from participants or affecting performance in the same way, 
condition and sex were entered as independent variables into a two-way ANOVA, 
and the outcome variables identified above as significantly distinguishing the male 
and female groups (number of attempts, number of extractions, method repetitions 
(raw and standardised), and extraction latency) entered separately as dependent 
variables. We were unable to conduct an equivalent non-parametric test capable of 
incorporating both condition and sex. Thus, whilst analyses of variance are relatively 
robust to violations of normality (Field, 2009), caution is required in the 
interpretation of these results given that our data are not normally distributed.  
A significant main effect of sex was found for all outcome variables 
excepting extraction latency (p = .40). The main effect of condition was non-
significant in all cases (p > .05), and a significant interaction between sex and 
condition found for the number of extractions variable (F (2,78) = 4.59, p = .013) 
and latency to first extraction (F (2,78) = 4.94, p = .01). A subsequent simple effects 
analysis revealed no significant difference in the number of extractions made by 
males and females in the positive condition (F (1,78) = 2.61, p = .11) or negative 
condition (F (1,78) = 1.47, p = .23), but a significantly higher number of extractions 
for males in the control condition relative to females (Figure 5.2; F (1,78) = 8.77, p = 
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.004). The control condition, therefore, appeared to exert the strongest (detrimental) 
effect on female participants’ success at extracting rewards from the MMB. This 
pattern of results was replicated when examining latency to first extraction: no 
significant difference between males and females in the positive (F (1,78) = 0.06, p = 
.81) or negative condition (F (1,78) = 2.65, p = .11), but a significantly shorter 
latency to first extraction for males in the control condition relative to females 
(Figure 5.3; F (1,78) = 7.74, p = .01). Significant differences in the other variables 
(number of attempts and method repetitions) appeared to capture sex differences that 
were not specific to participant condition.  
 
 
Figure 5.2. Mean number of extractions achieved by male and female participants 
across conditions. Means are presented owing to the parametric analysis undertaken. 
*p < .01 
* 
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Figure 5.3. Mean latency to first extraction achieved by male and female participants 
across conditions. Means are presented owing to the parametric analysis undertaken. 
*p < .05 
 
5.3.3 Did Children’s Perceptions of the Task Qualitatively Differ in Line With 
the Verbal Frame They Had Received? 
 
 At the end of testing, the majority of children, across conditions, expressed 
that they initially believed the task would be difficult as opposed to easy (56 ‘hard’ 
responses versus 17 ‘easy’ and 7 ‘middle’). Fisher’s exact tests revealed no 
significant differences in these categorised responses between positive, negative and 
control conditions (N = 80, p = .83) or between male and female participants (N = 
80, p = .21). However, it is possible that any variation in perceived difficulty arising 
* 
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as a result of the verbal frame (the task may have been interpreted as easy when told 
others “find lots of different ways”, but difficult when they “only find one way”) was 
concealed by a general perception for children that any task, that has not been 
attempted before, will be challenging.  
 In addition to difficulty, children were asked to reflect upon how many ways 
they initially believed they would find to get the egg out of the box (‘lots of ways’ 
versus ‘not many ways’). Only unambiguous answers were coded; that is, those that 
clearly expressed a personal belief about the number of ways that could be found. 
On this basis, the answers of 22 participants were excluded. Of the remaining 62 
participants, 33 expressed the belief that they would find lots of ways, compared 
with 29 who believed they would not find many ways. A roughly equal number of 
males and females produced each response. To determine whether children’s beliefs 
were congruent with the normative verbal frame they received, it was necessary to 
exclude control participants. Almost 75% of participant responses (36 of 49) across 
the positive and negative conditions were in line with the verbal frame administered. 
In other words, the majority of participants appeared to use the performance of their 
peers (as communicated by the experimenter) as a guide when judging their own 
competency to complete the task. When the main analyses (Section 5.3.1) were re-
run including only the 36 congruent-participants (N = 17, positive condition; N = 19, 
negative condition), no significant differences in any outcome variables were 
discerned.  
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5.4 Discussion 
 
 Contrary to our hypothesis, the normative verbal frames, intended to convey 
behavioural conventionality and cue conformity, did not serve to differentially 
increase or decrease displays of innovative behaviour. Children in the positive 
normative condition were no more likely than children in the negative normative 
condition to discover and use novel tools, access points and exits of the MMB, or 
produce a greater variety of methods to retrieve the reward. The normative frame 
which emphasised others’ success (to find “lots of different ways to get the egg out 
of the box”) did, however, result in faster first reward extractions than the normative 
frame which emphasised others’ low level of success (“only found one way to get 
the egg out of the box”). Unanticipated sex differences emerged, which appeared 
related to children’s approach and interaction behaviour. Specifically, across 
conditions, male participants succeeded in making significantly more attempts and 
achieving more reward extractions than female participants. Female participants’ 
reduced number of attempts, however, was not at the detriment of the discovery of 
novel methods (of which they produced significantly more than males). Sex 
differences were largely independent of experimental condition, with two exceptions 
(number of reward extractions and latency to first extraction). Qualitative data, 
concerning participants’ perceptions of task competence, indicated that the lack of 
significant differences between normative conditions was not owing to children’s 
failure to recognise the referenced performance of their peers.  
 The general absence of differentiation between the positive and negative 
normative conditions, and indeed the normative and non-normative (control) 
conditions, may be interpreted in a number of ways. First, it could suggest that 
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children do not infer behavioural conventionality from verbally-communicated 
information, such as task instructions. Whilst convention-oriented verbal frames 
have previously been seen to increase children’s imitative fidelity (Herrmann et al., 
2013; Legare et al., 2015), such frames have critically been followed by behavioural 
demonstrations. In the current study, the verbal frames prefaced children’s own 
attempts with the task; no demonstrations were provided. Behavioural 
demonstrations may heighten the influence of task framing by corroborating the 
verbal information. Certainly, normative language is one of the primary means 
through which social norms are communicated (Rakoczy & Schmidt, 2013); yet, 
references to normative behaviour may not be as powerful a cue to conventionality 
and, hence, as powerful a behavioural prime, as references and observations of it (or 
even just observations in the case of intentional action; Schmidt et al., 2011). In 
everyday life, we receive both physical and verbal evidence of the existence of social 
norms, in line with established social convention, and evidence of individuals 
verbally reproaching those who do not adhere.  
We cannot say with certainty whether children in the current study 
interpreted the verbal frames as a cue to others’ performance, rather than a cue to 
social convention (the implications of which are later discussed). The majority of 
participants who provided unambiguous personal competency beliefs appeared to 
use the reported performance of their peers as a guide: believing they would find lots 
of ways when informed that others did, and similarly that they would not find many 
ways when others did not. Nevertheless, peer-performance information was not seen 
to help or hinder actual task performance, only the speed with which participants 
attained their first extraction - the advantage being in favour of participants in the 
positive normative condition. Given it was initial extraction latency and not 
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innovative performance that was affected, we may reasonably speculate that this was 
an induced effect of confidence: believing that ‘if others can do well, then so then 
can I’. Confidence in one’s own proficiency not only promotes personal information 
use but decreases reliance on social information (Morgan, Rendell, Ehn, Hoppitt, & 
Laland, 2012), demonstrating its potentially powerful effect upon behaviour. 
Children may have also acquired greater confidence in the positive normative 
condition as a result of anticipated ease with the task; if children are more likely to 
imitate an adult’s means of achieving a goal following a difficult prior experience 
themselves (Williamson, Meltzoff, & Markman, 2008), it follows that children in the 
present study who believed peers had an easy experience (arguably deduced from 
their discovery of ‘lots of ways’) might have possessed greater confidence in their 
own personal abilities as demonstrated in their significantly faster exploration.  
 A further difference between our own study and that of prior studies 
(Herrmann et al., 2013; Legare et al., 2015) was the older sample of children 
selected. This was in order to increase the theoretical range of novel behaviours that 
would be produced, in view of findings that children become more reliably 
innovative in later childhood (Beck et al., 2011; Carr et al., 2015). However, the 
enhanced cognitive capacity and/or flexibility of older children (e.g., to consider and 
produce behavioural alternatives) inevitably also extends to other abilities. Thus, a 
second interpretation for our findings is that the 8- to 9-year-olds in the current study 
did, in fact, recognise the communicated behavioural norm but, owing to greater 
normative flexibility and lack of pressure to ‘conform’, did not perceive the need or 
possess the desire to alter their behaviour in line with that of peers. Compared with 
3- to 4-year-olds, older children are more selective regarding the contexts in which 
norms apply (Köymen et al., 2014) and more flexible in views regarding their rules 
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and enforcement (Conry-Murray & Turiel, 2012). This ability to comprehend the 
context-specificity and limits of norms is fundamental to reliable assessments of 
their violation, but also to the importance and necessity of their adherence. It is also 
worth acknowledging that the form taken by the convention in the present study may 
have additionally served to reduce ‘conformity’ to it. That is, rather than normativity 
being associated with a specific task solution, it was associated more generally with 
the number of solutions possible. The latter is arguably easier to override given it 
does not directly attest to the specific way a behaviour is normatively enacted (as in 
Clegg & Legare, 2015, Herrmann et al., 2013 and Legare et al., 2015).  
Conventional norms are in part maintained by a fear of disapproval if they 
are violated (Schmidt & Tomasello, 2012; Turiel, 1983). Indeed, fear of ostracism 
and social exclusion, two possible outcomes associated with breaching established 
social conventions of one’s social group, drives high fidelity affiliative imitation 
(Over & Carpenter, 2009; Watson-Jones, Legare, Whitehouse, & Clegg, 2014). In 
the current study the referenced peers were not present to witness any violations 
thereby reducing the possibility of disapproval, ostracism or sanctions (although the 
experimenter was present, there was no indication or mention of subsequent 
normative evaluation; in other words, that comparisons of performance would be 
undertaken). Moreover, unlike in typical conformity studies, the participating 
children did not physically observe the majority behaviour (i.e., peers being more or 
less successful at solving the task). This would theoretically have considerably 
increased the likelihood of its adoption, in line with a ‘copy the majority’ learning 
strategy (Laland, 2004). It is also important to consider that conformity decreases 
with age in childhood (in unambiguous tasks; Walker & Andrade, 1996), is reduced 
with incentives for accuracy (such as stickers to be gained with each successful 
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reward extraction in the current study; dependent on task difficulty: Baron, Vandello, 
& Brunsman, 1996), reduced when a private rather than public response is given 
(Asch, 1956; Haun & Tomasello, 2011), and (at least in preschoolers) superseded by 
a preference for copying a single proficient individual in the event that an observed 
group is unsuccessful at achieving a goal (Wilks et al., 2015). The disparities with 
typical conformity studies, and the mediating factors identified, may have 
contributed to a perception for participants that the behavioural norms in the present 
study were not particularly pertinent in terms of their adherence.  
Our third and final account for the absence of a normative effect, and the one 
we believe also helps best explain the observed sex differences, proposes that 
children’s own motivations to solve the task outweighed any possible effects of 
inferred behavioural conventionality. Without the provision of social demonstrations, 
children were confronted with an individual learning situation involving a novel and 
challenging problem-solving task, and one in which it was possible to gain mastery 
and prove ability. Achievement goals can be “[d]efined normatively (demonstrating 
competence relative to others) or self-referentially (developing competence or 
skills)” (Harackiewicz & Elliot, 1993, p.904), and they arguably had a large role to 
play in the present study. Whilst it is not possible to know for certain which 
achievement goals our participants possessed, we can make some speculations based 
on the findings observed. 
Social comparison information, that which allows individuals to generate an 
understanding of, and self-evaluate, their relative status in relation to others (Klein, 
1997), was present in our two normative conditions. By appearing to align 
competency beliefs with peer-performance information, participants here evidenced 
such social comparison. However, as children’s task performance was not affected, 
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the peer-performance/social comparison information may have simply set a 
performance benchmark; one which, contrary to our hypothesis for the negative 
normative condition, was motivational as opposed to limiting. Interestingly, this is 
still a normative process (specifically of evaluation) but behaving normatively is not 
the intended goal. Rather than conform to the supposed low-level performance of 
peers, participants who received the negative normative frame may have acquired a 
competitive performance goal which motivated them to outperform other children: ‘I 
can do better than that and will try to find lots of ways’. It is equally possible that 
participants in the negative normative condition, and indeed the positive and control 
conditions, held mastery goals. Motivation for mastery denotes the “desire to solve 
cognitively challenging problems for the gratification inherent in discovering the 
solution” (Harter, 1975, p.370). Situations in which mastery goals are pursued, such 
as many tasks in school, are associated with a variety of positive learning and 
achievement outcomes, as well as increased intrinsic motivation (e.g., Bergin, 1995; 
Butler, 2006; DeCaro, DeCaro, & Rittle-Johnson, 2015; Spinath & Steinmayr, 
2012). Here, the performance of others could have been acknowledged (and, again, 
used to establish a benchmark) but deemed of lesser importance than that which 
could be individually learned and achieved.  
Known interactions between achievement goals and an individual’s own 
perception of ability help shed light onto the observed sex differences. When self-
concepts are positive and perceived ability is high, there is an increased chance of 
demonstrating high competence or avoiding demonstrating low competence (Spinath 
& Steinmayr, 2012) - whether motivated by individual mastery or by the 
performance of others (Nicholls, 1989). Those with lower perceived ability, 
however, are more likely to experience performance deficits in response to ego-
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involved (competitive) performance goals (Nicholls, 1989). Critically, there is a long 
history of research that suggests females fare worse than males when it comes to 
accurate estimates of their abilities, and indeed consistently underestimate them 
(both children and adults; e.g., Cole et al., 1999; Ehrlinger & Dunning, 2003; Goetz 
et al., 2013; von Stumm et al., 2009). Though we did not find sex differences in 
response to our question of perceived competence, asking this question after 
participant attempts, when personal experience could have potentially altered initial 
beliefs, may have been responsible.  
In the current study, underestimations of ability, and the lowered confidence 
that necessarily accompanies these evaluations, may have adversely affected female 
participants’ approach and interaction behaviour. Across conditions, females enacted 
fewer attempts and achieved fewer reward extractions than males. However, their 
capacity to discover different ways (to get the egg/capsule out of the box) was not 
hindered. Indeed, when attempt number was controlled for, females enacted more 
methods (specific combinations of tool, access point and exit) than males.  
Within-condition analyses suggested the positive and control conditions were 
distinct from the negative condition in eliciting the sex differences. There was 
nothing to distinguish males and females when negative normative information was 
provided. In this condition, compared with the positive condition, there is a low 
chance of performing worse than peers, thereby reducing performance pressure. 
Thus, if a performance goal was elicited, and females did indeed possess lower 
estimates of their ability than males, negative assessments may have been countered 
by a lowered expectation to perform well and possibly increased confidence to 
succeed in turn. Male participants’ achievement of more extractions is perhaps also 
reflective of their greater competitive orientation (as seen, for example, in their play 
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behaviour: Maccoby & Jacklin, 1987; see also Niederle & Versterlund, 2011), likely 
making performance goals and their achievement especially salient for these 
individuals. A resultant emphasis on speed, as suggested by the greater number of 
attempts and extractions made by males, could account for their greater number of 
method repetitions.  
Performance pressure was arguably considerably heightened in the positive 
condition (when performance could potentially be deemed worse than that of peers) 
and, to a lesser degree, the control condition, where the direction of the social 
comparison is unknown. In the absence of private confidence, of plausibly greater 
concern for female participants, pressure can harm performance (Baumeister, 
Hamilton, & Tice, 1985).The control condition appeared specifically responsible for 
the findings of fewer extractions and longer latency to first reward extraction in 
females than males. It is unknown why this may have been the case, particularly 
given that performance goals would arguably have played less of a role in this 
condition. Given that actual innovative ability (the capacity to discover and use 
novel tools, access points and exits of the MMB, and produce novel methods) was 
not affected by the sex of participants, the findings may rather reflect sex differences 
in approach and continued interaction behaviour – perhaps somewhat akin to 
neophobia (fear of novelty).  
As sex differences have not been found in tool-use studies elsewhere, we 
must be cautious with interpretations and generalisations of our findings. Though 
interesting, and partially consistent with the operation of performance goals, they 
require replication. Nevertheless, emphasis of their potential impact is still 
warranted. Female participants demonstrated what may be regarded as a more 
conservative or less confident task approach, evidenced by their achievement of 
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fewer attempts/extractions and slower speed in the initial extraction (control 
condition only). Whilst this did not result in poorer performance when it came to 
innovating (discovering new tools, access points, exits and methods on the MMB 
task), this is not to say that such a difference in approach could not have a 
detrimental impact upon innovation in another situation (involving a different task), 
context (such as a social group) or point in time. Ehrlinger and Dunning (2003) 
provide, as one example, a compelling and worrying illustration of the impact of 
women’s negative self-views upon science participation and consequently their 
likelihood of pursuing scientific careers. Crucially, this is motivated not by actual 
performance ability but by pessimistic perceptions of abilities. The educational 
implications are thus profound.  
Whilst we have advanced three primary hypotheses as to why the verbal 
frames may not have had the expected impact on children’s displays of innovative 
behaviour with the MMB task, a further possibility remains. It may be that the 
experimental manipulation, the verbal frames themselves, were simply too weak or 
subtle to generate a normative effect. Verbally-communicated normative information 
may well prompt individuals to increase their exploration and innovation, but exactly 
what forms the content of this information may be key. Future research that varies 
the information contained within normative frames, and how this information is 
conveyed, will be essential to more definitively establish the role of normativity in 
innovation.  
We have documented in the current study the apparent absence of a 
normative effect of verbal frames on 8- to 9-year-olds’ innovative behaviour. We 
propose that in an individual learning situation, older children’s own motivations to 
solve a task, whether to demonstrate superior ability to others or to gain competence 
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and mastery, outweigh the propensity to align behaviour with that of peers, 
particularly when those peers are absent. In future research, the inclusion of younger 
participants, the introduction of demonstrations of peer behaviour, and the 
documentation of perceived abilities prior to task attempts, would help isolate the 
factors at work in our findings.  
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Chapter 6  
Innovation takes time: Children’s novel behaviour production is aided by 
increased time, and prompted opportunities to interact with and 
explore a tool-use task 
 
Abstract 
 
The current study set out to gain a more comprehensive and ecologically-valid 
understanding of children’s exploration and innovation abilities. Following the 
provision of social information and acquisition of personal experience with a novel 
puzzle box (Multiple-Methods Box, Phase 1; Carr, Kendal, & Flynn, 2015: Chapter 
3), 4- to 9-year-old children (N = 199) were permitted additional prompted attempts 
with the MMB in a second task phase. The MMB offers multiple exploration and 
innovation opportunities, by providing numerous tool, access point and exit action 
components and allowing for their various combinations. Having previously 
evidenced high levels of imitative fidelity and low rates of innovation (specifically 
directed toward the exit door of the box, which varied in its reliability), children 
were seen to produce a significantly greater number of tool, access point and exit 
innovations with increased time and opportunity to explore the box along with 
explicit instructions and prompts to do so. The social demonstrations observed prior 
to participants’ first round of attempts in Phase 1 were of lesser influence in Phase 2, 
with the social method being enacted on fewer attempt trials. Nonetheless, the 
exploration of those participants who had initially observed a more efficacious social 
method (75% and 100% success conditions) was selectively enhanced in the case of 
two outcome variables. In discovering imitation to decrease with age and innovation 
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to increase, this study replicated the developmental trends reported in Phase 1 and 
supports the competence-based interpretation advanced. The results importantly 
indicate that experimental approaches with short timeframes in which innovation 
may be evidenced could underestimate children’s capacity to produce novel 
behaviour.   
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6.1 Introduction 
 
Within developmental psychology, children have received various accolades: 
as ‘cultural magnets’ (Flynn, 2008), sophisticated explorers (Legare, 2014), faithful 
yet selective social learners (Over & Carpenter, 2013), and ‘like’ scientists (Gopnik, 
2012). Yet, very rarely, if ever, are children regarded as ‘innovators’. Here, we see a 
distinct separation between children as they are naturally observed in everyday life, 
as creators of complex, novel, imagined scenarios within pretend play (Nielsen, 
2012) as one example, and children as they are observed in typical experimental 
contexts, as exemplary social learners and, by and large (at least until late childhood; 
e.g., Beck, Apperly, Chappell, Guthrie, & Cutting, 2011; Carr, Kendal, & Flynn, 
2015), poor tool makers and modifiers of social information (innovators). Certainly, 
young children seem to experience great difficulties with innovation. Their ability to 
innovate appears particularly hampered following social demonstrations (Carr et al., 
2015; Wood, Kendal, & Flynn, 2015) and when presented with ‘ill-structured’ tool 
innovation problems (which lack the information required to get from a start state to 
an end state; Cutting, Apperly, Chappell, & Beck, 2014).  
Aside from inducing explanations of developing cognitive capacity and 
flexibility, canalisation to existing information, and obstacles such as functional 
fixedness (see Carr, Kendal, & Flynn, accepted (Chapter 2), for further discussion), 
we may question whether part of children’s innovation difficulties lie in ‘simpler’ 
matters; specifically, whether existing experimental approaches and procedures 
provide sufficient time with new physical materials for children to generate novel 
ways of successfully manipulating them. In the real world, innovation with tools or 
other objects would not naturally be expected to occur within a set time frame - let 
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alone a relatively short one. Findings are beginning to emerge that suggest the 
context in which innovation is assessed will be a determinant of its production. For 
example, comparing known rates of tool innovation on the hook task in a school 
setting (Beck et al., 2011) with those obtained in a museum, Sheridan, Konopasky, 
Kirkwood, and Defeyter (in press) report a facilitatory effect of the latter 
environment upon children’s innovation. This raises the interesting possibility that 
the open use of materials and availability of time and opportunity to explore can aid 
children’s innovation difficulties.  
The current study set out to achieve greater external/ecological validity by 
investigating whether children’s innovation may be facilitated by simple 
experimental manipulations: extended time to interact with and explore a novel task, 
and repeated prompts to try out new behaviours. By testing these manipulations in an 
experimental phase that took place after children had gained observational and 
personal experience of a socially demonstrated method that varied in its efficacy 
(success at extracting a reward from a novel puzzle box; Carr et al., 2015), a second 
study objective could be achieved. This second objective involved examining the 
extent to which prior social information, seen to promote imitative fidelity (Carr et 
al., 2015), continued to influence the range of novel task behaviours that children 
attempted, evidenced in their exploration and innovation.  
The importance of exploratory learning for children’s cognitive development 
is well known. Exploration not only facilitates the general learning process, by 
providing opportunities to discover information beyond that which can be visually 
obtained, it enables “new, unexplained and previously unexpected” causal 
mechanisms and relations to be uncovered (Bonawitz, van Schijndel, Friel, & 
Schulz, 2012, p.232). It is a means through which explanatory hypotheses may be 
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tested (Legare, 2012, 2014) and new evidence gathered when confronted with 
ambiguous or conflicting information (Cook, Goodman, & Schulz, 2011; Schulz & 
Bonawitz, 2007; van Schijndel, Visser, van Bers, & Raijmakers, 2015). Children are 
seen to be remarkably sophisticated and selective explorers. From preschool age, 
they are sensitive to pedagogical instruction, such that they appear to “explore more 
when they can rationally infer that there is more information to be learned” 
(Bonawitz, Shafto, Goodman, Spelke, & Schulz, 2011, p.329). Following 
demonstrations of a target function of a novel toy, pre-schoolers show reduced 
exploration and discovery of fewer additional toy functions compared with children 
in non-pedagogical conditions (who did not witness demonstrations of the target 
function, or witnessed an interrupted or ‘naïve’ demonstrator; Bonawitz et al., 2011). 
In the event that confounded information is received regarding the causal structure of 
a toy (e.g., it is ambiguous which toy lever operates which toy puppet), pre-schoolers 
are motivated to explore more than those for whom information is not confounded in 
an attempt to resolve such uncertainty (Schulz & Bonawitz, 2007). This enhanced 
exploratory response extends to situations in which inconsistent outcomes are 
observed (Legare, 2012). Indeed, children appear driven to explain unusual or 
unexpected events by increasing their exploration and hypothesis-testing towards 
them - generating new knowledge in turn (Legare, 2014).  
Later in childhood, around 6 to 7 years of age, children demonstrate 
proficiency in recognising, and compensating for, under-informative individuals. 
Given identical demonstrations from teachers, but different prior knowledge 
regarding their informativeness (whether they had previously been seen to commit a 
‘sin of omission’), children explore a novel toy more broadly in response to the less-
informative than more-informative teacher (Gweon, Pelton, Konopka, & Schulz, 
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2014). In view of this evidence, it stands to reason that children will benefit from 
increased opportunities to explore a novel apparatus; perhaps inferring, from the 
provision of more time, that there are more causal connections (and functions) to be 
found. Findings from open diffusion experiments offer further support, wherein 
children’s continued interaction with a task apparatus promotes exploration and 
allows for the appearance of innovative modifications of existing behavioural 
approaches within the participating playgroup (Whiten & Flynn, 2010).  
Of course, there are a number of factors that play into the likelihood of 
children exploring (and potentially innovating) or reproducing observed information 
(imitating). In all of the above studies, children appear motivated to explore in 
response to the type or quality of information that is acquired from others. However, 
personal prior beliefs and experience also regulate learning. In Bonawitz et al. 
(2012), different prior beliefs induced in two groups of children regarding the 
balancing of an asymmetrically-weighted block overrode subsequently-presented 
identical evidence and prompted “distinctive patterns of exploratory play” in 6- to 7-
year-olds (Bonawitz et al., 2012, p.226). The opportunity to acquire personal 
experience with a task before witnessing social demonstrations, and discover 
solutions for oneself, has a similar differential impact upon 4– to 6-year-old’s 
exploratory behaviour. Consistent with Bonawitz et al.’s (2011) finding of restricted 
exploration following instruction, children given immediate social demonstrations of 
a solution to a novel puzzle-box task (without the chance to first interact with the 
task themselves) display behavioural canalisation to that solution. Unlike children 
who receive demonstrations after acquiring personal information, they were less 
likely to explore and innovate alternative behaviours, and optimally incorporate the 
social solution as one within a repertoire of others (Wood et al., 2013, 2015). 
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Exploratory behaviour was thus reduced by initial social demonstrations, and 
encouraged by successful prior, personally-acquired information. Without prior 
personal information, children arguably acquired a false belief that, beyond the 
solution demonstrated, there were no further solutions to be found (see Bonawitz et 
al., 2011). A clear implication of this research is that children need additional 
support, prompts and/or motivation to explore and innovate following the provision 
of social demonstrations. 
An important moderator of the effect of prior experience is how difficult that 
experience proves to be. When young children have difficulty achieving a goal (such 
as opening a drawer to retrieve a toy) versus an easy experience of doing so, they are 
more likely to precisely imitate the adult’s ensuing demonstrated means 
(Williamson, Meltzoff, & Markman, 2008). This is even the case when children 
observe a difficult experience second-hand (Williamson & Meltzoff, 2011). 
Interestingly, for those who have an easy initial experience, they do not discount the 
novel socially demonstrated means but, like the older sample of children in Wood et 
al. (2015), incorporate it into their behavioural repertoires in the event that their own 
personally-acquired means no longer proves effective (Experiment 3, Williamson et 
al., 2008).  
Direct personal experience with a task provides important knowledge 
regarding one’s (perceived) competency to complete it. Previous research suggests 
that exploration and innovation will be detrimentally impacted, and imitation 
enhanced, when a negative perception of one’s own proficiency is gained (see 
Morgan, Rendell, Ehn, Hoppitt, & Laland, 2012). In the current study, all 
participating children had previously witnessed social demonstrations before being 
able to attempt the task themselves (first round of attempts, Phase 1; Carr et al., 
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2015). Their experiences of ‘difficulty’, arising from variations in method efficacy, 
thus occurred during and after social demonstrations – not before. Rather than 
negatively impact their own perceived competency, low efficacy of the 
demonstrator’s method appeared to drive exploration and innovation (as limited as 
this innovation was). However, the longevity of this effect, and the propensity of 
individuals in higher observed efficacy conditions to innovate, given additional time 
and prompts to do so, is unknown.    
It is evident that a range of factors, only some of which are reviewed above, 
regulate the degree to which children imitate or explore solutions to novel tasks. As 
research into the factors that facilitate innovation is still in its infancy, insights are 
limited. Nonetheless, various manipulations to the hook invention task (Beck et al., 
2011) cast doubt on the capacity of verbal instructions (Cutting, Apperly, & Beck, 
2011), suggestions (Chappell, Cutting, Apperly, & Beck, 2013), and practice with 
task materials (bending pipe-cleaners: Beck et al., 2011; Cutting et al., 2011) to aid 
innovative tool making. They rather suggest that children’s innovation difficulties 
arise from more intrinsic task properties (its ill-structured nature as aforementioned). 
We extend this research by incorporating explicit instructions and prompts to 
perform alternative behaviour in an innovation by modification (rather than 
innovation by novel invention) task. Given children’s fidelity to social 
demonstrations of tool use (e.g., Hopper, Flynn, Wood, & Whiten, 2010), such 
prompts are likely to prove more effective when they occur after, rather than before, 
the provision of social information
1
. These prompts to try other ways to retrieve the 
                                                          
1 We note that the prompts serve a fundamentally different purpose in the current study 
compared to tool invention studies. Here, the aim is to not to prevent children from 
perseverating on an incorrect response (Chappell et al., 2013), but to encourage children to 
deviate from the socially demonstrated behaviour (and indeed any novel behaviour they 
themselves attempted in the first phase of the task) to generate as many new solutions as 
possible and a more comprehensive picture of children’s overall ‘innovativeness’.  
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reward from the box, and see how many ways could be found, occurred in 
combination with extra attempts for the child at the task. Unlike in the first 
experimental phase (Carr et al., 2015), wherein only one tool insertion was permitted 
per attempt (thus, in effect, ‘capping’ exploration), attempts were considerably less 
constrained in the second phase thereby allowing for more behaviours to be enacted. 
We predicted that with additional opportunity (time) to explore the task, and explicit 
prompts to do so, children would evidence greater innovation. We made no prior 
predictions regarding the continuing role of efficacy (Phase 1 experimental 
condition) in children’s exploration and innovation. However, in line with our 
previous findings, we anticipated that the oldest age group of children (8-9 years) 
would be least likely to display continued fidelity to the (ineffective) socially 
demonstrated method, and most likely to produce a greater range of novel 
behaviours.  
 
6.2 Method 
 
6.2.1 Participants 
 
 Two hundred and fifty-six children (128 males), aged 4-9 years, from three 
primary schools in the North East of England participated. These children had all 
completed a first task phase with the ‘Multiple-Methods Box’ (MMB; Carr et al., 
2015), a novel puzzle box from which a reward can be extracted using tools. 
Participants had witnessed the demonstration of a reward retrieval method that was 
efficacious on 0 of 8 trials (0% success condition, N = 60), 2 of 8 trials (25% success 
condition, N = 48), 6 of 8 trials (75% success condition, N = 50), or 8 of 8 trials 
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(100% success condition, N = 51). The efficacy of the method, manipulated via the 
discrete locking and unlocking of the exit door of the box, was mirrored in 
participants’ own attempts with the task (Phase 1; see Carr et al., 2015, for further 
information). For Phase 2 of the task reported here, it was necessary to exclude data 
from ten children due to procedural changes in Phase 1 following their participation. 
These changes could be controlled in the first phase, but not in this second phase. 
We note that their exclusion does not bias the sample in any way; indeed, the same 
findings emerged from Phase 1 when analyses were re-run in their absence.  
Children assigned to the control condition in Phase 1 (N = 47) were also not 
included in Phase 2 as they received no social demonstrations with the MMB. This, 
therefore, reduced the sample to 199 participants (98 males), separated into three age 
groups as in Phase 1: 4-5 years (N = 57, M = 5 years 5 months (5;5), range 4;10-
5;11), 6-7 years (N = 76, M = 7;0, range 6;0-7;10), and 8-9 years (N = 66, M = 8;10, 
range 8;0-9;9).  
  
6.2.2 Materials 
 
 The same novel puzzle-box task used in Phase 1, the MMB (Figure 6.1), was 
used in Phase 2, whereby several different tools, access points and exits could be 
used to remove a sticker-containing capsule. It was possible to continue examining 
children’s novel behaviour on this task owing to the wide range of behavioural 
options offered. Not only were there multiple tools, access points and exits available, 
but these could be used in a multitude of combinations. 
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Figure 6.1. The Multiple-Methods Box (MMB) and associated tools. (a) Access 
points labelled 1-5: (1) ‘Social’, small inverted T-shape, used in social 
demonstrations, (2) ‘End’, large inverted T-shape, opposite ‘Social’, (3) ‘Dial’, 
circular hole, revealed by aligning the circle of a dial with a circle in the side of the 
box, (4) ‘Dial Opposite’, and (5) ‘Entry Chute’, a circular hole into which the reward 
was dropped. (b) Three tools were available, from right to left: fork, hook and sweep. 
The position of the capsule in relation to each tool demonstrates the main method of 
manoeuvre. The fork and sweep tool could be joined and used in combination to 
extract the reward, with the extra length affording extraction across the full length of 
the MMB, and can be seen in the reflection at the base of the box (a).  
 
6.2.3 Design 
 
 Children from each age group continued to be categorised according to the 
experimental condition to which they were randomly assigned in Phase 1 (0% 
condition, N = 50; 25% condition, N = 49; 75% condition, N = 50; 100% condition, 
Hole in platform floor, 
leading to exit door 
(circled, below left) 
  
2 1 
4 
3 
5 
(a) (b) 
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N = 51). There was nothing to distinguish these groups, in terms of further 
experimental manipulations, in Phase 2 of the task.  
 
6.2.4 Procedure  
 
Children were tested individually in a quiet area of their school. Immediately 
following Phase 1 of the task, where they had up to eight attempts to retrieve 
capsules following the witnessed demonstrations, they received the following 
instructions: “I’m going to give you some more turns with the box. But this time, are 
there any other ways you can try to get the egg [capsule] out of the box that you 
haven’t tried before? See how many different ways you can find.” Between attempts, 
prompts such as “Are there any other ways?” were provided. These served as 
reminders to the participants of the new task aim (to find new ways as opposed to 
simply retrieving the capsule from the box, as in Phase 1).  
Unlike in Phase 1 for 0-75% participants, whose experience of efficacy was 
manipulated via the locking and unlocking of the exit door, the door of the box was 
always unlocked for all participants in Phase 2. Furthermore, whereas an attempt in 
Phase 1 was defined as “the insertion of a tool into the box with the purposeful 
intention, or realisation, of making contact with the capsule prior to the tool’s 
extraction” (Carr et al., 2015, p.325), one attempt in Phase 2 could comprise up to 
five such tool insertions to allow for greater exploratory behaviour. If no outcome 
was produced following the fifth tool insertion (that is, the capsule was not retrieved 
from one of the box exits), the experimenter retrieved the stuck capsule and re-baited 
the box. Re-baiting of the box, whether following successful extraction on behalf of 
the participant or five unsuccessful tool insertions, signified the start of a new 
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attempt. The removal of the lid of the box, concealed by a large fabric sheet, allowed 
capsules to be quickly removed by the experimenter when necessary. Participants 
were given a maximum of eight attempt trials, over a period of five minutes. If the 
eight trials were not completed within this time, testing ceased.  
To gain greater insight into children’s preferred task behaviour as well as 
their affordance understanding in relation to the MMB, two questions followed 
participants’ attempts. Behavioural responses to the first, “Can you show me the best 
way to get the egg [capsule] out of the box?”, provided an indication of how many 
children, after two rounds of individual attempts and repeated 
permission/instructions to deviate from the socially demonstrated method, continued 
to adhere to what they had originally observed, and the extent to which this was 
influenced by the observed efficacy condition they experienced in Phase 1. The 
second question, “Can you tell me all the different ways you can get the egg 
[capsule] out of the box?”, assessed both children’s verbal competence in identifying 
different ‘ways’ and the number of exits they recognised in addition to the socially 
demonstrated door. At the end of testing all children were praised for their 
performance and rewarded with a sticker irrespective of their level of success (small 
stickers collected during testing were traded for one larger and more desirable 
sticker).  
 
6.2.5 Coding and analysis 
 
 The number of (i) attempts (maximum = 8), (ii) reward extractions, and (iii) 
enactments of the Phase 1 socially demonstrated method (fork tool through ‘Social’ 
access point, capsule to exit door via hole in floor) were recorded. All subsequent 
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coding was conducted in reference to participants’ behaviour in Phase 1 of the task. 
Four primary variables were of interest: the number of new tools, new access points, 
new exits, and new methods (specific combinations of tools, access points and exits) 
used by participants, with ‘new’ denoting their absence in Phase 1 of the task. 
However, several more nuanced measurements were noted for these variables. 
Specifically, we distinguished between new tools and new access points that were 
discovered (used as part of the five tool insertions per attempt but not used together 
with an exit to bring about an outcome, i.e., were abandoned prior to a different 
tool/access point being selected) and new tools/access points that were used as part 
of a method (used to manoeuvre the capsule to an exit and, on the majority of 
occasions, effect a successful reward extraction; exceptions include failure to open 
the exit door, as described below). Thus, if a tool/access point was discovered in 
Phase 1, but not used as a part of a reward extraction method until Phase 2, it was 
coded here as a new tool/access point used as part of a method. The 
discovery/method distinction was not necessary for the number of new exits given 
that any new exit that was discovered automatically results in an outcome (capsule 
extraction). With regard to the number of new methods, we distinguished between 
those that were successful (led to capsule extraction) and those that were produced 
irrespective of success (methods using the door as an exit were unsuccessful if the 
participant falsely believed the door to be locked or failed to discover its opening 
mechanism). Table 6.1 provides an overview of the variables described. 
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Table 6.1 
Variables Subject to Statistical Analysis 
Variable Description 
Attempts Total number of attempts made (max. 8), with each 
attempt comprising success or up to five tool insertions  
Extractions Total number of successful reward extractions, 
irrespective of extraction method (max. 8) 
Social Method 
Enactments 
Total number of enactments of Phase 1 socially 
demonstrated method (max. 8) 
New Tools/Access Points 
Discovered 
Total number of new tools/access points attempted, but 
not used in successful combination with an exit to bring 
about an outcome (were abandoned prior to an 
alternative selection) 
New Tools/Access Points 
Used in a Method 
Total number of new tools/access points used in 
successful combination with an exit to bring about an 
outcome (reward extraction, or capsule to exit door) 
New Exits Total number of new exits used 
New Methods Total number of new methods (new combinations of 
tool, access and exit) enacted, irrespective of success 
New Successful Methods Total number of new methods (new combinations of 
tool, access and exit) enacted that led to successful 
reward extraction(s) 
Note. ‘New’ denotes that the tools/access points/exits/methods were not seen in 
Phase 1 of the task.  
 
 From these individual variables, total scores were generated for each 
participant regarding the total number of new tools, access points, exits and methods 
used across Phases 1 and 2 of the task – critically excluding the components of the 
socially demonstrated method. This provided an overall measure of participants’ 
‘innovativeness’. In addition, the tool, access point and exit demonstrated by the 
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children as the ‘best way to get the egg out of the box’ were recorded. Owing to 
difficulties achieving unambiguous responses to the second question (“Can you tell 
me all the different ways you can get the egg out of the box?”), this data was 
excluded.  
 As the data were not normally distributed, non-parametric tests were used. 
All statistical tests were two-tailed, and a Bonferroni correction applied where 
multiple follow-up tests (Mann-Whitney or Wilcoxon rank-sum) were performed to 
control for Type I error rates. Corrections were made for tests within, rather than 
across, variables given that we were interested in the nuances of children’s behaviour 
(that is, how they performed in relation to a number of aspects of the MMB task).  
 
6.3 Results 
 
 Whereas all but two of the 199 participants produced the full eight attempts 
in Phase 1 within the five minute time limit, attempt number was slightly reduced in 
Phase 2 (mean number of 6.6 attempt trials, out of a maximum of 8) as a probable 
outcome of the more lenient attempt criteria. Nevertheless, the high number of 
attempts demonstrates a continued level of interest and interaction. Only one 
participant (a 4- to 5-year-old male) failed to produce any further attempts. There 
were no significant differences in the number of attempts between the sexes (Mann-
Whitney U = 4868, z = 0.21, p = .84), ages (Kruskal-Wallis H(2) = 3.16, p = .21), or 
Phase 1 conditions (H(3) = 3.46, p = .33). In view of these findings, and the 
recognition that controlling for attempt number would not control for the number of 
tool insertions participants made per attempt, we did not standardise participants’ 
scores by the number of attempts they made. 
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As indicated by a mean number of 5.7 capsule extractions, Phase 2 attempts 
were not always successful. This could have been the result of continued 
unproductive behaviour (if the five tool insertions per attempt were exceeded, the 
start of a new attempt was necessitated) or failure to discover the opening of the exit 
door. In the first section of the results, we explore whether participants demonstrated 
continued fidelity to the socially demonstrated method, and whether this differed as a 
function of age, or, as explored in the second section, discovered novel behaviours. 
The third section considers the role of prior observational/personal experience of 
efficacy in relation to the MMB (acquired in Phase 1) on participants’ subsequent 
innovative behaviour (in the current Phase 2). Finally, behavioural responses to the 
question of ‘best’ extraction method are investigated.  
 
6.3.1 Did Children Continue to Reproduce the Socially Demonstrated Method 
in the Second Task Phase? 
 
The majority of participants (62%; 123 of 198) performed the socially 
demonstrated method at least once. Compared with Phase 1, however, it was 
performed on fewer attempt trials (mean number of 1.97 trials in Phase 2 versus 4.89 
trials in Phase 1). Given the slight discrepancy in total number of attempts between 
the phases, as reported above, this was not subject to statistical analysis.  
Mirroring Phase 1 findings (reported in Carr et al., 2015), reproduction of the 
socially demonstrated method in Phase 2 was mediated by age (Kruskal-Wallis H(2) 
= 12.40, p = .002). The number of social method enactments was significantly higher 
for the youngest age group (4-5 years, N = 57, Mdn = 3, SD = 3.19) when compared 
with 6- to 7-year-olds (Mdn  = 1, SD = 2.16; Mann-Whitney, N = 76, U = 1626.00, z 
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= -2.38, p = .017) and 8- to 9-year-olds (Mdn = 1, SD = 1.52; N = 66, U = 1219.00, z 
= -3.35, p = .001; see Figure 6.2). The latter two groups did not significantly differ 
(U = 2148.5, z = -1.54, p = .12). There were also no significant differences between 
the experimental conditions to which participants were assigned in Phase 1 (H(3) = 
4.19, p = .24), wherein different experiences of demonstrated method efficacy were 
gained. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2. Median number of social method enactments by age group. *p < .05, ** 
p < .005 
 
 Age differences were also found in relation to the number of novel methods 
produced by participants in Phase 2 (H(2) = 24.24, p < .001) and in Phases 1 and 2 
combined (total methods; H(2) = 32.73, p < .001), irrespective of method success. 
** 
* 
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Significantly fewer novel methods in Phase 2 were performed by 4- to 5-year-olds 
(Mdn = 2, SD = 1.51) compared to 8- to 9-year-olds (Mdn = 3, SD = 14.49; U = 
942.50, z = -4.85, p < .001; Figure 6.3), and significantly fewer novel methods 
summed across Phases 1 and 2 for 4- to 5-year-olds (Mdn = 2, SD = 2.04) compared 
to both 6- to 7-year-olds (Mdn = 3, SD = 2.19; U = 1476.00, z = -3.19, p = .001) and 
8- to 9-year-olds (Mdn = 5, SD = 1.82; U = 790.50, z = -5.60, p < .001). Six- to 
seven-year-olds also produced significantly fewer novel methods in Phase 2 (Mdn = 
2, SD = 1.81) than 8- to 9-year-olds (U = 1777.50, z = -3.04, p = .002), and 
significantly fewer novel methods across Phases 1 and 2 when again compared to the 
oldest age group (Mdn = 3, SD = 2.19; U = 1772.00, z = -3.04, p = .002). Though the 
difference between the 4-5 age group and 6-7 age group was significant for novel 
methods in Phase 2 (U = 1700.50, z = -2.16, p = .03), this did not remain significant 
following Bonferroni correction.  
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Figure 6.3. Median number of novel methods (irrespective of success), by age group, 
for Phase 2 and Phase 1 & 2 combined. *p < .005, **p < .001 
 
6.3.2 Did Participants Innovate More Novel Tools, Novel Access Points and 
Novel Exits in Phase 2 of the Task Compared With Phase 1?  
 
 To determine whether the second phase of the task afforded participants a 
greater opportunity to discover alternative tools, access points and exits, comparisons 
of Phase 1 and Phase 2 behaviour were undertaken with Wilcoxon signed-ranks 
tests. However, to account for the reduced opportunities to discover these 
components in Phase 2, if one or more components were already discovered in Phase 
1, it was necessary to calculate and analyse proportional scores. Thus, scores were 
calculated as a proportion of the maximum number of tools/access points/exits that 
* 
* 
** 
* 
** 
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remained to be discovered (or used in a method, in line with our distinction; 
discounting those of the socially demonstrated method). Proportional scores were not 
calculated for number of new methods, given that there was no specified maximum 
value for this variable, or total number of tools/access points/exits discovered or used 
across Phases 1 and 2, as summing these scores accounted for the potentially reduced 
behavioural potentials at either individual phase.  
Whilst there was no difference in the number of novel tools discovered in 
Phase 1 (Mdn = 0.2, SD = 0.2) compared with Phase 2 (Mdn = 0.2, SD = 0.24; 
Wilcoxon signed-ranks z = -0.9, p = .37), participants used significantly more novel 
tools as part of a method in Phase 2 (Mdn = 0.2, SD = 0.21) than Phase 1 (Mdn = 0.2, 
SD = 0.15; z = -2.65, p = .008). With regard to novel access points, participants not 
only discovered significantly more in Phase 2 (Mdn = 0.25, SD = 0.29) than Phase 1 
(Mdn = 0, SD = 0.22; z = -4.09, p < .001), they also used significantly more in a 
method in the later phase (Mdn = 0.25, SD = 0.27; Phase 1: Mdn = 0, SD = 0.18; z = 
-5.80, p < .001). Similarly, participants used significantly more novel exits in Phase 
2 of the task (Mdn = 0, SD = 0.38; Phase 1: Mdn = 0, SD = 0.14; z = -6.27, p < .001), 
and enacted significantly more new methods (Mdn = 2, SD = 1.71; Phase 1: Mdn = 1, 
SD = 1.23; z = -7.51, p < .001). It would not be appropriate to consider the number of 
successful methods in this case, as success was manipulated in Phase 1 by the 
locking/unlocking of the exit door.  
 A significant difference in the ‘type’ of innovations performed by 
participants was observed in Phase 1 of the task; specifically, they discovered 
significantly more novel tools throughout their attempt trials than access points or 
exits (and significantly more novel access points than novel exits). This finding was 
reproduced here, both when incorporating the new tools/access points discovered 
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variables (Friedman’s ANOVA χ2(2) = 10.64, p = .005) and the new tools/access 
points used in a method variables (χ2(2) = 8.70, p = .013). We term new discoveries 
‘used in a method’ as reflective of innovation (if we postulate that innovations 
should be successful; Carr et al., accepted). In the current study (Phase 2) we found 
that participants innovated significantly more access points (Mdn = 0.25, SD = 0.27) 
than tools (Mdn = 0.20, SD = 0.21; z = -3.22, p = .001). The difference between exits 
(Mdn = 0, SD = 0.38) and access points (z = -0.53, p = .60), and exits and tools (z = -
1.28, p = .20), was not significant. 
 Examining the total number of tool, access point and exit innovations 
performed by participants across Phases 1 and 2 (with the raw as opposed to 
proportional scores), significant differences remained in the ‘type’ of innovations 
produced (χ2(2) = 36.61, p < .001). This was specifically evidenced by a significantly 
greater total number of tool innovations (Mdn = 1, SD = 1.04) compared to exit 
innovations (Mdn = 0, SD = 1.20; z = -5.63, p < .001), and significantly greater 
access innovations (Mdn = 1, SD = 1.18) again compared to exit innovations (z = -
4.50, p < .001). There was no significant difference in the total number of tool 
innovations and access point innovations made by participants (z = -1.78, p = .07). 
 To investigate whether there was a relation between the number of tool, 
access point and exit innovations produced in Phases 1 and 2 (that is, whether 
children were consistent in achieving low or high levels of innovation across task 
phases), correlational analyses with proportional scores were undertaken. Whilst no 
correlations between Phase 1 and Phase 2 innovative behaviour were found in 
relation to tools (Spearman’s rs = -0.10, p = .15), access points (rs = 0.11, p = .12) or 
methods (rs = 0.13, p = .08), although the latter was approaching significance, a 
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significant positive correlation was found between the number of exit innovations 
produced in Phase 1 and Phase 2 (rs = 0.29, p < .001).  
 
6.3.3 How Did Efficacy of the Social Method in Phase 1 Affect Subsequent 
Innovation? 
 
The focus in Phase 1 was on participants’ level of exit innovation, given that 
modifications to the exit were the only way in which behaviour could be made more 
efficacious, yet low rates of exit innovation were observed. We were thus interested 
to discover whether more individuals went on to discover alternative exits when 
provided with additional attempts at the MMB task in the current Phase 2. Out of 
175 participants who did not discover a novel exit in Phase 1 (i.e., any exit other than 
the socially-demonstrated door), 46 went on to discover at least one novel exit in 
Phase 2. This equates to a discovery rate of 26.3%, a marked leap from the 12.4% 
reported previously for Phase 1. With regard to the 24 individuals who did discover 
at least one novel exit in Phase 1 (N = 26 in Carr et al., 2015, but two removed due to 
aforementioned procedural changes), 13 of these (54%) went on to discover at least 
one more novel exit in Phase 2 of the task.  
Using proportional scores, the number of exit innovations produced in Phase 
2 was not seen to be significantly affected by Phase 1 condition (Kruskal-Wallis: 
H(3) = 2.63, p = .45), but was significantly affected by age (H(2) = 8.01, p = .018). 
Children aged 4-5 years produced significantly fewer exit innovations in Phase 2 
(Mdn = 0, SD = 0.30) than children aged 8-9 years (Mdn = 0, SD = 0.46; U = 1418, z 
= -2.36, p = .018). However, this was only approaching significance following 
Bonferroni correction (corrected p = .017). Children aged 6-7 years also produced 
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significantly fewer exit innovations (Mdn = 0, SD = 0.35) than the oldest age group 
(Mann-Whitney U = 1895, z = -2.43, p = .015). There was no difference between 4- 
to 5-year-olds and 6- to 7-year-olds (U = 2133.5, z = -0.02, p = .98). The distribution 
of Phase 2 innovators, across sex, age, and condition can be seen in Table 6.2. 
 
Table 6.2 
Number of Phase 2 Exit Innovators According to Three Categories of Participant 
Characteristics (Age, Sex, and Phase 1 Condition) 
Participant Characteristics Number  
4-5 years 13 
6-7 years 14 
8-9 years 19 
Male 25 
Female 21 
0% success 9 
25% success 10 
75% success  17 
100% success 10 
 
 Participants’ discovery of novel access points (H(3) = 4.89, p = .18), and use 
of these access points in methods (H(3) = 3.31, p = .35), in Phase 2 was not 
significantly influenced by Phase 1 condition, nor was the total number of access 
points innovated across phases (raw scores; discovered: H(3) = 1.71, p = .63; used in 
methods: H(3) = 2.44, p = .49). This was not so for the use of tools. Significant 
differences between Phase 1 efficacy conditions were uncovered when looking at the 
number of novel tools discovered in Phase 2 (H(3) = 8.46, p = .04), novel tools used 
in methods in Phase 2 (H(3) = 10.91, p = .01), and total number of tool innovations 
across the phases (raw scores; for tools used in methods only, see Figure 6.4: H(3) = 
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8.19, p = .04). Looking specifically at tools used in a method, given its closer 
association with innovation as aforementioned, participants who experienced 0% 
success with the socially demonstrated method in Phase 1 produced significantly 
fewer tool innovations in Phase 2 (Mdn = 0, SD = 0.16) compared with participants 
who experienced 100% success (Mdn = 0.2, SD = 0.23; U = 820.5, z = -3.27, p = 
.001). All other condition comparisons were non-significant, or became so following 
the application of Bonferroni corrections. Likewise, participants assigned to the 
100% condition in Phase 1 (Mdn = 2, SD = 1.07) produced significantly more tool 
innovations across Phase 1 and 2 than participants assigned to the 0% condition 
(Mdn = 1, SD = 0.89; U = 886.50, z = -2.78, p = .006). This difference in rates of tool 
innovation between conditions was not evident in Phase 1.  
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Figure 6.4. Mean number of tool innovations (used as part of a method) across 
Phases 1 and 2 of the task by experimental condition. Although non-parametric 
statistics were conducted, the means are displayed here given that the median score 
for the 25%, 75% and 100% group was 2. *p < .05  
 
 A significant effect of Phase 1 condition was found when examining the 
number of novel methods produced by participants in Phase 2 (H(3) = 9.04, p = .03), 
and number of these methods that were successful in extracting the capsule (H(3) = 
9.57, p = .02). Individuals assigned to the 75% demonstrated success condition in 
Phase 1 produced significantly more novel methods in Phase 2 (Mdn = 2, SD = 1.85) 
compared to those in the 0% condition (Mdn = 2, SD = 1.69; U = 839.00, z = -2.88, p 
= .004). Though participants in the 0% condition also produced fewer novel methods 
* 
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than those in the 100% condition (Mdn = 2, SD = 1.61; U = 971.00, z = -2.10, p = 
.035), this was not significant following Bonferroni correction.  
 
6.3.4 Did Participants’ Prior Experience of Efficacy Influence Their Selection of 
the ‘Best’ Tool, Access Point, and/or Exit? 
 
 Each component that formed a part of the socially demonstrated method (fork 
tool, ‘Social’ access point, exit door) were demonstrated as ‘best’ by the majority of 
participants (tool = 59.2%, access = 70.4%, and exit = 73.6% respectively). 
Importantly, however, this meant that 80 participants deviated from selecting the 
fork tool, 58 from the ‘Social’ access point, and 52 from the exit door. Participants’ 
Phase 1 condition did not significantly affect their choice of ‘best’ tool (Pearson chi-
square, N = 196, χ2(3) = 1.06, p = .79) or ‘best’ access point (N = 196, χ2(3) = 1.63, p 
= .65), but did affect their choice of ‘best’ exit (N = 197, χ2(3) = 8.41, p = .04). 
Investigating this result further with chi-square tests of the possible pairwise 
comparisons, participants in the 0% demonstrated success condition significantly 
differed in their selection of ‘best’ exit compared to participants in the 100% 
condition (χ2(1) = 8.19, p = .004, Bonferroni corrected p = .008).  As can be seen in 
Table 6.3, participants who experienced 0% success with the exit door in Phase 1 
were significantly less likely to select the door (and more likely to select an 
alternative exit) compared with participants who experienced 100% success with the 
exit door in Phase 1.  
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Table 6.3 
Participants’ Demonstration of the ‘Best’ MMB Exit According to the Experimental 
Condition to Which They Were Assigned in Phase 1 
Efficacy of door Door selected Alternative exit selected 
0% 32 18 
25% 33 13 
75% 35 15 
100% 45 6 
 
 In selecting a method to demonstrate as ‘best’, most participants (161 of 196; 
82%) opted to demonstrate a method they had performed previously (either in Phase 
1 or Phase 2 of attempts, or both). Hence, 35 participants performed a brand new 
method. Interestingly, whereas 25 of these demonstrated a novel combination of 
actions with an exit they had already discovered, 10 individuals demonstrated a 
method accompanied by an exit innovation (that is, these 10 participants had used 
only the door as an exit in Phase 1 and 2, but used a new exit (one of the top holes of 
the box) when asked to show the ‘best’ method to extract the reward).  
 
6.4 Discussion 
 
 Following the provision of social information and opportunity to acquire 
personal experience with a novel puzzle-box task (Phase 1; Carr et al., 2015), the 
current study provided 4- to 9-year-old children with additional time to interact with 
the MMB, along with reduced constraints (more lenient attempt criteria; allowing 
children up to five, rather than just one, tool insertion per attempt) and explicit 
instructions and prompts to try other/different ways. These manipulations were 
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designed to allow for a more comprehensive and ecologically-valid understanding of 
children’s exploration and innovation abilities. The findings provide a strong 
indication that experimental approaches with short timeframes in which novel 
behaviour may be evidenced will underestimate children’s capacity to innovate. Not 
only did children demonstrate reduced fidelity to the Phase 1 socially demonstrated 
method in Phase 2 of the task, by enacting the observed method on fewer attempt 
trials, they also produced a greater number of tool, access point and exit innovations 
in the later phase, evidencing successful exploratory learning. Effects of age and 
Phase 1 experimental condition were also found, and explained below.  
 
6.4.1 Fidelity to the Phase 1 Socially Demonstrated Method 
 
 Overall, participants displayed reduced fidelity to the socially demonstrated 
method (observed prior to their first round of attempts in Phase 1) when provided 
with additional attempts at the task. This was not an effect of memory, as the 
majority of participants reproduced the social method at least once in Phase 2 and 
identified its tool (fork), access point (‘Social’) and exit (door) action components as 
the ‘best way’ to retrieve the reward. Having had the opportunity to pursue affiliative 
(social) and/or instrumental (learning) goals through faithful imitation in the first 
phase of the task (see Over & Carpenter, 2013), and acquire understanding and 
personal experience of social method efficacy, children produced less imitation in 
the second round of attempts. When explicit encouragement was given to consider 
other ways to retrieve the egg from the box, this highlighted the opportunities for 
further information gain through individual exploration. In combination with our 
Phase 1 findings (Carr et al., 2015) and the current exploration findings (Section 
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6.4.2), it appears that there was a trade-off between instruction and exploration, akin 
to that reported by Bonawitz et al. (2011), in the first phase of the task when 
participants’ attempts immediately followed social demonstrations. In this way, 
social information initially limited children’s ‘hypothesis space’ (Schulz, 2012) 
wherein novel behaviour could be considered.  
 Mirroring Phase 1 findings and supporting the competence interpretation 
previously advanced (Carr et al., 2015), the observation of lowered imitation fidelity 
appeared driven by developmental advances in cognitive capacity and/or flexibility 
to produce novel alternative behaviour with age – and thus also potentially inhibit 
copying of what was observed. The association between innovation and age has been 
noted elsewhere, in both human children (Beck et al., 2011) and non-human primates 
(e.g., Kendal, Coe, & Laland, 2005; Reader & Laland, 2001). Whilst these results 
suggest that younger children are more susceptible to the social motivations and 
pressures of imitation, opposite evidence is found in the array of studies 
documenting selective copying at preschool age, the imitation of inefficient tool use 
by older, but not younger, children (DiYanni, Nini, & Rheel, 2011), and increasing 
‘over-imitation’ from childhood into adulthood with causally ambiguous tasks 
(McGuigan, Makinson, & Whiten, 2011).  
 In addition to demonstrating the highest levels of (continuing) imitation, the 
youngest participants (4-5 years) produced significantly fewer novel methods in 
Phase 2, and Phases 1 and 2 combined, than the older age groups. Thus, whilst it is 
possible that young children possess greater flexibility in their exploration than older 
children (Gopnik, Griffiths, & Lucas, 2015), owing to their reduced bias for existing 
knowledge, this does not play out in their interactions with more complex 
instrumental tasks such as the MMB. The oldest participants (8-9 years), by 
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comparison, were the most proficient in producing Phase 2 exit innovations. Exit 
innovations were regarded of most importance in Phase 1 given their capacity to 
change the outcome of the task: the top access points of the box are not reliant upon 
whether the exit door opens. Though the exit door was always unlocked in Phase 2, 
we had intended to prompt the use of alternative exits with reference to “different 
ways to get the egg out of the box”. The capacity to produce novel modifications to 
pre-existing behaviour, increasing solution efficacy in Phase 1 and behavioural 
diversity in Phase 2, is vital for cumulative culture (Tennie, Call, & Tomasello, 
2009). This capacity is arguably of even greater value when it is not reliant upon the 
previously-acquired behaviour becoming redundant or non-functional (as has been 
examined in non-human primates; see, for example, Hrubesch, Preuschoft, & van 
Schaik, 2009; Lehner, Burkart, & van Schaik, 2011). Of course, it must be 
acknowledged that environmental variability and change, that serves to alter the 
availability of behavioural options, is a major source of behavioural flexibility 
(Lefebvre, Whittle, Lascaris, & Finkelstein, 1997) and is even hypothesised to 
potentially underlie the evolution of human’s cultural capacity (Richerson & Boyd, 
2005). Children evidence behavioural flexibility in seeking multiple alternative ways 
to solve a task, even when a demonstrated method is viable (current study; although 
the unlocking of the door may not have been discovered by some children for whom 
it was locked in Phase 1), and by flexibly incorporating multiple task solutions into 
their behavioural repertoires (Wood et al., 2013, 2015).  
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6.4.2 Exploration: Impact of Opportunity and Initial Observed Behaviour 
Efficacy 
 
 In line with our hypothesis, children evidenced greater exploration (here, akin 
to discovery of novel action components) and innovation (successful use of novel 
action components in a reward extraction method) with increased opportunity to 
explore the MMB task and explicit prompts to do so. Controlling for the potentially 
reduced number of behavioural options available in the later phase, participants 
discovered and used more access points in Phase 2 compared with Phase 1, as well 
as using more novel exits and enacting a greater number of new methods. Whilst no 
more tools were discovered in Phase 2 than Phase 1, participants were able to more 
effectively use them to bring about an outcome (turning tool exploration into tool 
innovation). With the extra experience afforded by exploration, children were 
plausibly able to discover additional action possibilities, or ‘affordances’ (Gibson, 
1977), in relation to the properties of the MMB, but also particularly with regard to 
the tools (perhaps owing to the greater variability in their length and shape).  
The increased discovery and use of action components in Phase 2 supports 
findings from the substantial literature on children’s exploration. Exploration 
supports learning (e.g., Bonawitz et al., 2012; Piaget, 1930; Singer et al., 2006) by 
engendering, in the current study, an appreciation of how action components may 
successfully be used. Moreover, with greater opportunity to explore a novel object, 
and continued motivation to do so, children seek to gather new and relevant 
information in a manner analogous to play (Gopnik & Wellman, 2012), and children 
continue exploring when they infer (or, in our case, are indirectly informed via 
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prompts) that there is more to be learned (Bonawitz et al., 2011) and when personal 
attempts at a task can be made (Wood et al., 2013, 2015).  
 It is not only greater understanding of object properties (or functional 
affordances) that children gain through exploration, regarding, for example, the 
suitability of tool shapes and lengths for given access points (reducing their random 
and unsuccessful application), but causal knowledge (Cook et al., 2011). This was of 
relevance for Phase 1 wherein some children (25% and 75% success conditions) 
were confronted with an exit door that opened on some occasions but not others, 
with no obvious explanation for the discrepancy. Given that causal ambiguity and 
unexpected events are seen to prompt selective exploration (Cook et al. 2011; 
Legare, 2012; Schulz & Bonawitz, 2007), we might have expected different patterns 
of exploration, and ultimately innovation, for those children who initially 
experienced uncertainty in the social method (25% and 75% conditions) compared to 
those who did not (0% and 100% conditions) – if social information continues to 
impact children’s behaviour over time (i.e., in the second task phase). Whilst we 
found some support for differences in exploration and innovation between Phase 1 
conditions, this was limited.  
We provide three explanations as to why more extensive support was not 
uncovered in this regard. First, unlike other studies (e.g., Cook et al., 2011), it was 
not physically possible for children to uncover the causal mechanism controlling the 
exit door (it was manipulated via a remote control device), meaning exploration that 
was theoretically directed towards uncovering causal relations could not be 
accurately defined or inferred. Second, the exit door was unlocked throughout Phase 
2. Depending upon whether this was recognised by children, this would have 
resulted in differing beliefs regarding the necessity of new behaviour and arguably 
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the type of exploration that was required. Had the exit door continued to be locked or 
unlocked in line with participants’ Phase 1 condition, a greater effect of prior 
experience upon exploration may have been seen. Third, as will be discussed, there 
are various explanations (aside seeking to uncover causal relations) as to why 
participants may have explored differently in Phase 2.  
 The differences uncovered in Phase 2 as a result of Phase 1 condition suggest 
that observing efficacious behaviour facilitates subsequent exploration. Participants 
previously assigned to the 75% success condition produced significantly more novel 
methods than participants assigned to the 0% condition, and 100% participants were 
significantly more likely than 0% participants to explore (and innovate) tools in 
Phase 2 and Phases 1 and 2 combined. This enhanced exploratory effect for children 
in higher-efficacy conditions was only seen with regard to two outcome variables, 
therefore the result cannot be overly emphasised. Nonetheless, they require 
explanation. It may have been that these children were simply more bored in the 
second task phase having had greater success with the social method in the first, 
prompting a heightened exploratory response. It is also possible that lack of success 
with the social method was normalised for 0% participants (and to a lesser extent 
25% participants), who observed the experimenter repeatedly failing to extract the 
reward. This may have reduced their expectations of discovering novel behavioural 
alternatives. This supposition is counteracted somewhat, however, by the greater 
discovery of novel exits for 0% participants in the first phase of the task, evidencing 
adaptive increase of solution efficacy.  
 As we proposed in Carr et al. (2015), the 75% and 100% participants can 
plausibly afford to explore more than the 25% or 0% participants in the knowledge 
that they already have a functional method in their repertoire; thus, potentially better 
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ways of accomplishing the goal could be sought, with the social method kept in 
reserve. Consistent with Legare’s (2012) observation of children exploring more in 
an effort to resolve unusual events, children in the 75% success condition produced a 
greater number of novel methods than children in the 0% success condition. Yet, if 
increased exploration follows inconsistent outcomes, it is unclear why this would not 
also be the case for 25% participants who likewise experienced uncertainty in the 
success of the social method. Here, it is probable that there is an interaction with 
confidence: greater confidence is gained with the knowledge that one already has a 
(largely) functional method in one’s behavioural repertoire. The 25% and 75% 
conditions are united in causal ambiguity, but potentially disparate in confidence-
inducing effects. Participants’ perceptions of self-efficacy (Bandura, 1997), altered 
by observed behaviour efficacy, could impact upon competency beliefs, intrinsic 
motivation, achievement behaviours (such as persistence), with ultimate behavioural 
consequences for performance (see, for example, Eccles & Wigfield, 2002).  
 It appears that there is a subtle distinction between encouraging directed 
innovation by showing children behaviour that is low in efficacy (increasing the 
likelihood that they solve the exit door problem; Phase 1), and encouraging more 
general exploration by showing children behaviour that is high in efficacy (such that 
they try out, in the present case, a greater number of new methods and tools). 
Children appeared to innovate by necessity in Phase 1, in order to meet the goal of 
retrieving the capsule from the box. In Phase 2, the instructed goal was to find other 
ways to retrieve it. There may have been more of a role for intrinsic motivation and 
confidence in the later phase, accounting for the variation in between-condition 
effects. Importantly, as earlier stated, these effects are not generalisable to all 
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outcome variables. What we may have captured is simply variation in individual 
children’s proclivity for some forms of exploration.  
 
6.4.3 Innovation: Rates and Types 
 
 Unlike in Phase 1, rates of exit innovation in Phase 2 were not affected by 
efficacy condition, supporting the exploration-innovation distinction outlined above 
(and the instilment of discrete phase goals). With roughly equal numbers of exit 
innovators found across age, sex and condition groups, it appears that it was the extra 
time, attempts and explicit instructions/prompts that drove the increased rates of exit 
innovation in Phase 2; not, as in Phase 1, experience of social method efficacy. 
However, when asked to demonstrate the “best way to get the egg out of the box”, 
those who had previously experienced 0% success with the exit door were 
significantly less likely to demonstrate it as a ‘best’ exit than those who had 
experienced 100% success with the exit door. Thus, whilst prior experience of 
efficacy did not serve to differentially increase or decrease use of novel exits in 
Phase 2, that experience had a lasting influence – so much so, that children for whom 
the exit door was always problematic dissented from selecting (that is, 
demonstrating) the same exit as the experimenter. This is a presumably difficult act 
given children’s desire to affiliate (Over & Carpenter, 2013).  
  Rates of exit innovation were, however, significantly affected by task phase. 
Whereas only 24 individuals of the current sample innovated by discovering at least 
one novel exit in Phase 1, 46 more went on to innovate in this way in Phase 2. As 
children were not explicitly informed about the unlocked exit door in Phase 2, but 
had to discover this for themselves, it is not possible to definitively know whether 
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children innovated out of presumed necessity (still regarding the exit door as 
unreliable) or whether the increased innovation was a result of children’s greater 
exploration. The significantly higher rates of tool and access point innovations, 
which accompanied the higher rates of exit innovations, would appear to support the 
latter proposal. It is also intuitive that the more time and opportunity one has to 
explore, the greater the likelihood of making innovative discoveries. This is reflected 
in open diffusion experiments, whereby innovative modifications to ‘seeded’ 
behaviour emerge with time and repeated opportunities to interact with a novel 
apparatus (Whiten & Flynn, 2010).  
 Across both phases, more tool and access point innovations were produced 
than exit innovations. Children ostensibly continued to struggle with conceptualising 
the top holes of the box as exits after they have been observed as access points, an 
observation that is fitting with the difficulties incurred by functional fixedness. 
Functional fixedness, the fixation upon the demonstrated or learned design function 
of an object as the proper, conventional or normative way to use it, is seen to present 
a very real challenge for children’s problem solving following demonstrations of tool 
or object use (e.g., German & Defeyter, 2000; German & Barrett, 2005; Hernik & 
Csibra, 2009). Seeing an object, or a component of that object, as ‘for’ a particular 
function will necessarily constrain alternative and creative conceptions of its 
possible uses (Defeyter, Avons, & German, 2007). This will be a crucial 
phenomenon to target in efforts to enhance and promote innovative problem solving.  
 Interestingly, there was some evidence of consistent individual differences in 
children’s (exit) innovativeness. Correlational analyses revealed that those who 
innovated more exits in Phase 1 also innovated more exits in Phase 2. Moreover, half 
of the Phase 1 exit innovators continued to be innovative in Phase 2 by discovering 
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at least one more novel exit. Though this could be hinting at the possibility of an 
innovative trait, with some children appearing to be more consistently innovative 
than others, it might also be an effect of learning: that is, learning that the top holes 
of the box can function as exits as well as access points. With repeated prompts, 
those who have this knowledge go on to use more of them. We have provided 
support elsewhere (Carr, Kendal, & Flynn, in prep: Chapter 4) for some consistency 
in children’s behaviour on tasks assessing constructs related to innovation, but this is 
more likely a domain-specific propensity for some children to engage in individual 
learning (as opposed to an explicit propensity for innovation). Nevertheless, this 
would help account for the findings uncovered here.  
 
6.4.4 Summary 
 
Supporting our hypothesis, participants demonstrated greater exploration and 
innovation in the second phase of the task compared with the first. This may have 
been the result of one or a combination of factors, including: increased time to 
explore the MMB, enabling further opportunities for affordance learning (and 
possibly causal learning); explicit instructions and prompts to try different ways, 
simultaneously promoting deviation from observed behaviour and overcoming issues 
of permission; enhanced task-related knowledge and confidence owing to prior 
personal attempts; or simply greater ‘distance’ from social information, thereby 
reducing its salience. Future studies are required that isolate and observe the effects 
of these individual variables. It would be interesting to discover if instructions and 
prompts to explore and try “other ways” has a differential impact upon novel 
behaviour production that occurs in the aftermath of social demonstrations (whilst 
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suggested here, its effects cannot be untangled from that of the additional 
manipulation of time). Moreover, the role of instruction has typically been examined 
as a component of instrumental skill acquisition, along with social and pedagogical 
learning. Yet there is also clearly the potential to exploit children’s sensitivity to 
instruction by encouraging deviation from information that is known to seeking 
information that is unknown. 
In addition to phase effects, age effects were uncovered that were 
complementary to those previously reported (Phase 1; Carr et al., 2015) and support 
a competency-based interpretation of the ontogenetic development of innovation. 
Finally, whilst there was reduced fidelity to the Phase 1 socially demonstrated 
method, there was evidence of some lasting effect of social information, evident in 
the (selectively) enhanced exploration of 75/100% participants and demonstrations 
of ‘best’ reward exit. These findings add to the cautionary research of Bonawitz et al. 
(2011) and others regarding the use of social information and its capacity to 
constrain and limit the discovery of novel information.  
Findings of the prior study (Carr et al., 2015) and current study intriguingly 
hint at the potential for social information quality to impact upon children’s 
subsequent exploration and innovation in qualitatively different ways; with low 
observed behaviour efficacy appearing to prompt innovation (Phase 1), and high 
observed behaviour efficacy prompting more general exploration (new tools and 
methods only; Phase 2). This corroborates reasoning regarding the theoretical 
distinction of exploration and innovation (e.g., Reader & Laland, 2003). If 
exploration leads to innovation (Carr et al., accepted), however, we might have 
expected the higher-efficacy participants to have not only explored but innovated at a 
significantly higher rate. Yet, this was only seen to be the case with tool innovations 
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for 100% participants. We cannot rule out the proposition that exploration leads to 
innovation (by promoting new learning) on the basis of only two significant findings 
regarding efficacy condition and exploration. Future work is clearly required to more 
fully address these relations. Follow-up studies are also required wherein no time 
limit is imposed (perhaps only limiting attempt number) in order to observe 
children’s truer capabilities, and investigations into the role of motivation and 
confidence in children’s exploration and/or innovation.  
In order to avoid hasty deductions and ultimately underestimations of 
children’s innovative capacities, a movement is needed toward experimental 
procedures that more accurately reflect the contexts and environments in which 
novel behaviour is produced, such as open diffusion studies over extended time 
periods. Allowing more time for innovation, particularly in the aftermath of social 
demonstrations, is a clear first step.  
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Chapter 7  
General Discussion 
 
This thesis aimed to investigate childhood innovation. This work was 
undertaken in a limited, albeit growing, field of research and knowledge regarding 
children’s ability to produce novel behaviour, an ability which is integral to human’s 
cultural success and future capacity to adapt. Specifically, the thesis addressed 
questions relating to: (i) what it means to innovate; (ii) when children innovate, as a 
function of both development and context; (iii) who innovates, and whether there is 
consistency in individual differences; (iv) which factors appear to facilitate the 
appearance of innovation; and, finally, (v) how innovation may be enhanced and 
promoted. The discussion provides an integrated overview of the findings, 
addressing how they contribute to, and have wider implications for, our 
understanding of innovation from cognitive, developmental and cultural evolutionary 
perspectives. It concludes with a consideration of the applications of the current 
work, its limitations, and future directions.  
 
7.1 Childhood Innovation Critically Develops with Age  
 
 Children demonstrate an early-emerging capability to not only use tools 
(McCarty, Clifton, & Collard, 2001; Rat-Fischer, O’Regan, & Fagard, 2013), but to 
acquire enduring tool categories (Phillips, Seston, & Kelemen, 2012), understand 
tool functionality and design (Casler & Kelemen, 2005; Hernik & Csibra, 2015), 
utilise causal information and feedback to guide tool-based learning (Bechtel, 
Jeschonek, & Pauen, 2013), and faithfully acquire (McGuigan, Whiten, Flynn, & 
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Horner, 2007) and transmit (Hopper, Flynn, Wood, & Whiten, 2010) tool-use 
behaviour following its observation. However, in spite of such sophisticated skills, it 
appears that children’s ability to innovate in this domain is limited. Corroborating 
existing accounts of the infrequency of innovation in early and middle childhood 
(Beck, Apperly, Chappell, Guthrie, & Cutting, 2011; Hanus, Mendes, Tennie, & 
Call, 2011; Nielsen, 2013), findings from Chapter 3 document that only a small 
percentage of children (12.4%) aged 4-9 years innovated by discovering a novel exit 
to that demonstrated by an experimenter on the Multiple-Methods Box (MMB) task. 
This was despite some children witnessing a reward retrieval method that was never 
effective (0% success condition) or variable in its effectiveness (25% and 75% 
success conditions) with regard to achieving the task goal. The findings from 
Chapter 3 extend those of existing studies by suggesting that innovation in the 
aftermath of social demonstrations (akin to innovation by modification) is 
challenging even beyond middle childhood (8-9 years; see the following section for a 
discussion of the implications of this finding). Nevertheless, in an important and 
novel discovery, instances and rates of children’s innovation on the MMB task were 
enhanced with increased time and explicit instructions to explore (Chapter 6).  
 As Legare and Nielsen (2015) state, there are a number of compelling 
reasons why children, and young children particularly, should possess tool 
innovation capabilities. For example, beyond those set out earlier regarding 
children’s early use and understanding of tools, younger children are ostensibly less 
constrained by existing knowledge than older children, enabling them to better use 
task evidence to more accurately select between abstract causal hypotheses (Gopnik, 
Griffiths, & Lucas, 2015). Moreover, younger children are less susceptible, or more 
‘immune’, than older children to effects of functional fixedness (Defeyter & 
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German, 2003; German & Defeyter, 2000), wherein the learned design function of 
an object hinders consideration of its novel alternative use. Two recent studies raise 
the possibility that innovation skills are indeed present in young, specifically 
preschool-age, children (Subiaul, Krajowski, Price, & Etz, 2015; Tennie, Walter, 
Gampe, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2014), considerably earlier in development than 
has been reported elsewhere. There are some important discrepancies to note, 
however, between the innovation that is required in these and other (e.g., Chapter 3, 
Chapter 5; Beck et al., 2011) studies. First, Subiaul et al. (2015) examine innovation 
that is achieved through ‘summative imitation’; that is, the novel combination of 
different actions performed by different models (see also Section 7.2). As the novelty 
is evident in action combination, it transpires that the actual behaviours to be 
combined (allowing compartments of a puzzle box to be opened for reward retrieval) 
have already been individually observed. Thus, there is no novel behaviour 
production as such. Second, in the case of Tennie et al. (2014), 4-year-old children in 
diffusion chains were seen to innovatively modify an inefficient observed means of 
completing a task (transporting dry rice). However, not only did this require 
selecting an alternative pre-made and obviously available tool, as opposed to the 
novel modification or production of a tool/tool-use behaviour, but such alternative 
tool selections were only found when children observed the inefficient tool use of 
peers as opposed to adults. This is in keeping with a ‘copy adults’ bias that is known 
to be salient for young children (Wood, Kendal, & Flynn, 2012), and could be 
partially responsible for the low rates of innovation observed in Chapter 3 (given the 
presence of an adult demonstrator). These considerations are not, however, to 
diminish the contributions of these studies; clearly, they are important illustrations of 
the beginnings of cumulative cultural capabilities in young children. Rather, these 
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considerations are intended to emphasise the imperative relation between the form of 
innovation that is being assessed, implicating factors such as task difficulty and 
associated cognitive requirements, and abilities or developmental trajectories that are 
observed (Section 7.2).  
As with other studies examining novel behaviour production (e.g.., Beck et 
al., 2011), no evidence was found here of a facilitatory effect of young children’s 
potentially greater flexibility upon innovation (or exploration). Thus, whilst “the 
apparent limitations in children’s knowledge and cognitive abilities may actually 
sometimes make them better learners” (Gopnik et al., 2015, p87), the advantages 
possessed by younger children in this regard do not appear sufficient to aid 
innovation, which additionally requires capabilities that develop throughout 
childhood (such as enhanced information processing and executive functions, which 
are necessarily implicated in novel problem solving). As a result, older children’s 
bias for existing knowledge and their susceptibility to functional fixedness 
necessarily compounds appearances of innovation when their otherwise enhanced 
cognitive capacities would better allow for them.  
 A reliance on, and apparent reluctance to deviate from, the observed 
behaviour of adults, as seen in Chapter 3 and to a lesser extent in Chapter 6 
(following explicit instructions to explore and find “other ways”), is consistent with 
children’s established proclivity for social learning and their (evolved) bias toward 
ostensive signals of communicative acts (natural pedagogy: Csibra & Gergely, 
2009). Adults normatively expect children to learn (Tomasello, 2016), and this is 
communicated through instruction or pedagogy. A bias for social learning in 
childhood may be considered adaptive in view of the large number of instrumental 
skills and cultural behaviours that must be acquired, both to allow individual survival 
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and success and to demonstrate affiliation with one’s social group (Legare & 
Nielsen, 2015; Uzgiris, 1981). High fidelity imitation also permits the learning of 
cognitively opaque artefact use and cultural practices (Gergely & Csibra, 2006) 
which are prevalent in human societies (Boyd, Richerson, & Henrich, 2011), thus 
making even ‘over-imitation’ (the reproduction of causally irrelevant actions; Lyons, 
Young, & Keil, 2007) an adaptive learning strategy. From a cultural evolution 
perspective, social learning is also less ‘costly’ than asocial/individual learning 
(Boyd & Richerson, 1985), at least when there are some asocial learners in the 
population tracking environmental variability.  
Children, thus, appear distinct from other animal species who have been 
thought to “use social information primarily as plan B, or a backup when personal 
information is too costly to obtain, unreliable or outdated” (Rieucau & Giraldeau, 
2011, p.950; Kendal, Coolen, & Laland, 2009). Nevertheless, this thesis has 
presented evidence for adaptive informational trade-offs in children’s learning 
(increased rates of innovation in response to inefficacious observed behaviour; 
Chapter 3), along with preliminary evidence for behavioural consistency in 
children’s propensity (or preference) to engage in asocial/individual learning 
(Chapter 4). This latter result resonates with findings of consistency in social 
information use in adults (Molleman, van den Berg, & Weissing, 2014; Toelch, 
Bruce, Newson, Richerson, & Reader, 2014), such that individuals resemble 
conformists or mavericks (Efferson, Lalive, Richerson, McElreath, & Lubell, 2008). 
Evidence for individual preferences in social and asocial learning in childhood is 
also emerging (e.g., Flynn, Turner, & Giraldeau, accepted). Children are not 
indiscriminate and blind copiers (see also Over & Carpenter, 2012, 2013), a finding 
compatible with the dangers of social learning fixation (or ‘cultural conformism’, 
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such as population collapse: Whitehead & Richerson, 2009) and the evolution of 
contingent strategies that enable individuals to switch between social and 
asocial/individual learning (e.g., Boyd & Richerson, 1995; Enquist, Eriksson, & 
Ghirlanda, 2007; see also Section 7.3).  
 Could it be that the challenge of innovation (by modification) in childhood is 
linked with imitation, such that children’s true innovation capabilities are largely 
overshadowed by an imitative learning bias? Or is it that innovation has a protracted 
development, reliably emerging much later in childhood when it has a more adaptive 
function to serve? The answer is likely a combination of both these explanations. 
Innovation is made more difficult for children immediately following the provision 
of social information, at least partially owing to their inclination to imitate, and 
particularly in dyadic contexts (involving an adult and child) where normative 
expectations for learning apply. Yet, as children’s cognitive competency increases, 
as a result of age and experience (in line with general developmental trends of 
cognitive improvements throughout childhood), their innovation increases (see also 
Beck et al., 2011) and imitation decreases (Chapters 3 and 6). It is not that children 
are incapable of flexibly deploying imitation prior to this time; they evidence 
selectivity and flexibility in their social learning from an early age (e.g., Koenig & 
Sabbagh, 2013; Nielsen, 2006). Rather, there appears to be a developmentally-driven 
leap from the ability to vary the extent and fidelity of one’s imitation (dependent 
upon contextual and social cues) to the ability to produce novel behavioural 
alternatives.  
Interestingly, although this thesis discovered the overall trend was for 
increasing innovation with age (Chapters 3 and 6), some young innovators were 
found. This perhaps hints at earlier-emerging innovation capabilities, in those less 
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constrained by social information, than suggested by the general trends. However, as 
revealed in Chapter 3, young innovators were considerably fewer in number (five 4- 
to 5-year-olds and seven 6- to 7-year-olds) than older innovators (fourteen 8- to 9-
year-olds). Age differences in (exit) innovators in Chapter 6 (where children 
received further prompted attempts at the MMB task) were less pronounced, though 
still in the direction reported here. Also, utilising the operational criteria advanced in 
Chapter 2, there was some evidence for qualitative differences in the innovation of 
children at different ages. For example, the discovery of more than one novel exit 
became increasingly likely with older age, suggesting that older children were more 
capable of learning, and generalising, from the outcomes of their new behaviour. 
This supports Legare and Nielsen’s (2015) proposal that, with the knowledge and 
experience of age, innovation transitions from that of a less systematic ‘blind’ form 
to a more systematic ‘directed’ form. The former may be more likely to capture 
innovations due to accident and chance, and the latter innovations resulting from 
intentionality. Of course, this is a general supposition; even adults also learn and 
innovate as a result of serendipitous accident and chance. Whether innovations are 
accompanied by learning (which may be more likely with advances in cognition) 
will help determine the cultural consequences of novel behaviour (as proposed in 
Chapter 2).  
 
7.2 Innovation Can be Theoretically and Practically Delineated 
 
 Theoretical work within the fields of cultural evolution and evolutionary 
anthropology, along with non-human animal research, has been instrumental in 
establishing different sources (Mesoudi et al., 2013), types (e.g., Ramsey, Bastian, & 
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van Schaik, 2007) and forms (Lewis & Laland, 2012) of innovation. Not only is 
there an acknowledgement that these forms have potentially very different cognitive 
requirements, but their cultural implications are known to vary (Lewis & Laland, 
2012). A major question concerns whether such differences and variations may be 
discerned early in human ontogeny, suggestive of the distinct evolutionary function 
and development of innovation’s various forms.  
 In the handful of studies that have explicitly examined childhood innovation 
prior to the work of this thesis, innovation of one particular form had been studied: 
that of novel invention (independent problem solving). The hook task (e.g., Weir, 
Chappell, & Kacelnik, 2002; Beck et al., 2011) has been most widely used, requiring 
participants to innovate a hook (or other functional) tool from a pipe-cleaner in order 
to retrieve a sticker-containing bucket from the bottom of a narrow and transparent 
tube. Importantly, this is a task that largely necessitates asocial/individual learning 
for its solution. The inclusion of ‘largely’ is an acknowledgement of the fact that 
children bring prior experience to the task, perhaps acquired socially, that provides 
some understanding of the properties and uses of pipe-cleaners; it cannot be said, 
therefore, to be entirely independent of social influence. Nonetheless, the task cannot 
either be said to heavily or directly implicate social information: children are 
presented with the task without opportunities for specific task-related prior social 
learning. Yet, it is often an evaluation of information acquired socially that induces 
innovation. Judging “that a novel solution to a problem generates superior returns 
than does an (observed) established behaviour” (Laland, 2004, p.10, parentheses 
added), and proceeding to modify existing behaviour in such a way as to 
theoretically improve it, is a process or form of innovation that is quite different to 
that described above. Moreover, as will be discussed further, it requires somewhat 
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distinct skills. Given that innovation has a number of forms, of which novel 
invention is only one, it makes sense to consider and examine the various guises of 
innovation, especially when seeking to determine, and make generalisations about, 
children’s capabilities in this domain.  
 In Chapter 2, the argument was advanced that innovation may be 
advantageously delineated into innovation by novel invention (when novel behaviour 
results from asocial learning) and innovation by modification (when social influences 
are directly implicated). Whilst this thesis empirically examined both forms, by 
presenting the MMB task in the absence of prior social demonstrations (Chapter 3, 
control group, and Chapter 5) and following social demonstrations (Chapters 3 and 
6), the latter have been of particular importance in providing support for the 
proposed invention-modification distinction. As theorised, findings suggest that 
these two forms of innovation do indeed possess distinct developmental trajectories 
(though the extent to which this is task-specific needs to be examined) and have 
different primary difficulties (indicative of different cognitive requirements) 
associated with them. The two developmental trajectories have already been touched 
upon in Section 7.1. Whereas Beck et al. (2011) discovered children to reliably 
innovate by independent invention (perform at ‘mature levels’) on the hook task at 
around 8-9 years, with 80% of individuals at this age producing a hook or other 
functional tool, innovation by modification was challenging even for 8- to 9-year-
olds in their interactions with the MMB task following social demonstrations 
(Chapter 3). Specifically, only 14 of 72 children aged 8-9 years (19.4%) successfully 
discovered an alternative exit for the capsule reward. This was in contrast to 9 of 15 
children (60%) of the same age group from the control condition (no social 
demonstrations) who discovered at least one exit. Though not directly comparable, it 
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is also worth noting that nearly all of the 8- to 9-year-olds (96%) who participated in 
the normative study (Chapter 5), without prior social demonstrations of MMB use, 
innovated in this manner. Omitting demonstrations and including peer-reference and 
social comparison information in the task instructions bolstered innovative 
performance (Section 7.4).  
 In the experimental tasks overviewed, the emergence (or reliable appearance) 
of innovation by modification appears more delayed than that of invention
1
. This 
raises the question as to whether they have different underlying cognitive 
mechanisms, or whether novel modification is ostensibly of greater difficulty and 
thus more reliant upon the knowledge and cognitive abilities that accompany age and 
experience (e.g., greater inhibition abilities). In order to successfully modify 
socially-acquired behaviour, one must not only recognise where improvements can 
be made but override components of observed behaviour and then physically 
produce the novel solution. This thesis provides evidence that doing so is difficult 
for children even when confronted with an instrumental task and an explicitly-stated 
goal, conditions which theoretically allow for greater variability and innovation 
(Legare & Nielsen, 2015; Legare, Wen, Herrmann, & Whitehouse, 2015). 
Nonetheless, the task was situated within a social context, with pedagogical cues and 
intentional demonstrations, inducing possible interpretations of conventionality. The 
developmental trends uncovered in Chapter 3, with imitation decreasing with age 
and innovation increasing with age, strongly suggest that innovation by modification 
                                                          
1 A critical caveat to this observation concerns the age/status of the individual from whom 
the to-be-modified social information is acquired. Tennie et al. (2014) provide recent 
evidence that children are capable of innovatively modifying inefficient behaviour (altering 
tool selection) when observing peers, but not adults. This further reinforces the likelihood of 
innovation being constrained by normative expectations of social learning from adults 
(compounded by pedagogical demonstrations).  
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is constrained by immaturity, supporting a competence-based interpretation of its 
development. 
 Primary difficulties associated with the two forms of innovation may stem 
from the information with which children are initially equipped. Whilst the ill-
structured nature of tool innovation tasks is posited responsible for children’s 
difficulties in the case of invention (Cutting, Apperly, & Beck, 2011; Cutting, 
Apperly, Chappell, & Beck, 2014), this cannot fully explain children’s difficulties 
with modification. That is, children do not necessarily lack the transformation 
information that is required to get from a start-state to an end-state; rather, they must 
modify the end-state and/or process. Factors linked to the prior provision of social 
information (including an imitative learning bias, interpretations of conventionality, 
desire to affiliate, behavioural canalisation, inhibitory control, and functional 
fixedness) play a considerably larger role in the case of modification than invention. 
Even with more time to explore the MMB (Chapter 6), rates of innovation were still 
not seen to be as high as that reported by Beck et al. (2011) for invention. Such 
observations are in keeping with children’s more limited spontaneous exploration 
following pedagogical demonstrations (e.g., Bonawitz, Shafto, Gweon, Goodman, 
Spelke, & Schulz, 2011).  
 In Chapter 4, the individuals identified as innovators (Chapter 3), and their 
matched imitator pairs, underwent further testing six months later. The hook task 
was one of several problem-solving tasks administered. Consistent with the 
theoretical separation of invention and modification, the innovators on the MMB 
(modification) task were no more likely than their matched imitators to solve the 
hook (invention) task. If the two tasks are assessing the same form of ‘innovation’, 
we might have expected the innovator-imitator groups to be differentiated on both. 
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Importantly, as set out in Chapter 4, the MMB does appear to be measuring what it 
was designed to assess, increasing confidence in its findings. Specifically, children 
evidenced some consistency in their behaviour on the MMB, glass-ceiling box, Pan-
pipes, and cumulative problem-solving box; suggesting that the MMB is performing 
similarly to existing tasks in the social learning field, validating its use and the 
findings presented throughout this thesis.  
Could it be that the MMB and hook invention task are simply of differing 
difficulties, with one more within children’s zone of proximal development 
(Vygotsky, 1978) than the other? Given that the same number of innovator and 
imitator children solved the hook task (8 of 23 from each group) and failed the hook 
task (15 of 23 from each group), this is unlikely to be simply a difficulty issue. 
However, task difficulty is still important to consider and could account for some 
developmental differences in observed abilities. For example, children’s success 
rates in the floating peanut task (Hanus et al., 2011), assessing invention, resembled 
those of ‘bucket task’ success in Beck et al. (2011) but the percentage of children 
solving the floating peanut task at 8 years was lower by comparison (58% versus 
80%). Future innovation research with other problem-solving tasks and puzzle 
boxes, including children beyond the age of 8-9 years, will more firmly establish 
reliability in developmental differences as a result of tasks and as a result of the 
invention-modification differentiation. Yet, there are very likely disparities in the 
difficulties of invention and modification, and it remains one of the central 
arguments of this thesis that these difficulties, viably arising from the major source 
of information with which individuals are initially equipped (asocial or social), are 
responsible for varying observations of innovation’s developmental trajectory 
(Chapter 3; Beck et al., 2011).  
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Consideration of different forms of innovation is imperative when seeking to 
make inferences about children’s capabilities. The implications, however, extend 
beyond that of experimentation. In fact, this is an issue that impacts upon all aspects 
of innovation research as identified in the introduction to this section, including the 
design of interventions to promote the innovation process. Such interventions will 
need to be targeted to the specific challenges that individuals confront, such as 
whether the ill-structured nature of novel problems or functional fixedness is likely 
to be the primary obstacle, and whether new or pre-existing knowledge must be 
applied to a problem (Kummer & Goodall, 1985) and, thus, whether social 
information is implicated and must be overcome. Chapter 5 is a ready illustration of 
the need to tailor potential interventions/cognitive support to the form of innovation 
being assessed. Children’s innovation on the MMB task, when social demonstrations 
were absent, was not facilitated by the provision of ‘positive’ normative verbal 
information. Whilst various explanations were offered to account for this finding 
(including older children’s greater normative flexibility, lack of pressure to 
‘conform’ to the stated behavioural norm, and the greater salience of individual 
achievement goals), it is possible a different result would have been found had 
normative information accompanied social demonstrations and corroborated the 
referenced normative behaviour. Together with the findings presented in Chapter 3, 
this study suggested that normativity has a larger role to play in innovation by 
modification than innovation by novel invention, when imitation and conformity are 
typically seen to accompany conventional interpretations of observed behaviour.  
The mediating role of imitation in innovation is being increasingly 
recognised, and there is clearly vast potential to generate complementary insights 
into both learning mechanisms (and how children negotiate between them) when 
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examining how they work in tandem (Legare & Nielsen, 2015) – such as in the 
investigations of innovation by modification contained within this thesis. Imitation, 
or ‘summative imitation’, is also implicated in innovation by novel combination 
(Subiaul et al., 2015). Innovating via imitating suggests that imitation could 
potentially facilitate, as well as constrain, novel behaviour production, and 
contribute to cumulative culture (and the operation of the cultural ratchet; Tomasello, 
Kruger, & Ratner, 1993) in different ways – beyond allowing for high-fidelity 
information transmission. Further, the cultural implications of trait combination (the 
“bringing together of two established traits to generate a new trait”; Lewis & Laland, 
2012, p.2171) appear more profound than those of novel invention (Lewis & Laland, 
2012), and even novel modification/refinement. It may be of particular importance to 
dedicate future research to those forms of innovation that strongly drive the 
ratcheting process. A further implication of breaking the barriers between imitation 
and innovation concerns the need for a re-conceptualisation of innovation: it 
evidently is not always an asocial or individual learning process (Subiaul et al., 
2015; Chapter 2).  
 
7.3 In the Context of Novel Tool-Use Tasks, Children’s Innovation Appears 
More State- Than Trait-Based (Although Both are Likely of Importance) 
 
 In addition to the development and forms of innovation, this thesis addressed 
a critical question concerning the consistency of individual differences in innovation 
and potential ‘properties’ or characteristics of innovators. The research contained 
within Chapter 4 was not only a response to the findings of Chapter 3 (in which a 
small subset of children distinguished themselves from their peers by innovating), 
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but, in a novel contribution to the field, a much-needed evaluation of whether 
innovation appears more of a personality trait in humans, as suggested by non-
human animal research, or state-dependent (the result of demographic factors such as 
age and sex, or context, motivation and necessity).  
This objective was achieved in Chapter 4 by examining individual 
differences in constructs of theoretical and/or empirical relevance to innovation, 
including social learning, asocial problem solving, cumulative problem solving, and 
divergent thinking, in children who were earlier differentiated by their innovative 
and imitative behaviour on the MMB task (Chapter 3). Children evidenced only 
selective consistent individual differences in the ‘efficiency’ of their behaviour on 
related puzzle box-type tasks (hinting at domain-specificity of the observed effect), 
reflective of distinct propensities or preferences for asocial/individual learning. 
Adults’ innovation on the MMB could not be predicted by their performance on any 
of the assessed related constructs. Whilst there was some further evidence for 
consistency in children’s innovativeness between Phase 1 with the MMB task 
(Chapter 3) and Phase 2 (Chapter 6), with past innovation positively correlated with 
future innovation (akin to findings in non-humans, e.g., guppies: Laland & Reader, 
1999), it is not possible to exclude an effect of learning which would have similarly 
served to promote continued discoveries of novel alternative exits.  
 Supporting the state-based interpretation of innovation advanced in Chapter 
4, additional thesis findings indicate that innovation in humans is driven by 
contextual factors: by demonstrating that innovation, as measured on the MMB task, 
can be induced with inefficacious social information (Chapter 3) and enhanced with 
time and instructions to explore (Chapter 6). This would surely not be expected if 
individuals’ innovativeness was, in some way, ‘fixed’. It may be that consistent 
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propensities or preferences for social or asocial information exist (for which we 
provide partial support; see also adult samples: Molleman et al., 2014; Toelch et al., 
2014), but not at the expense of the capacity to flexibly and adaptively alter 
behaviour and switch strategies when required. Although “it is not yet known how 
humans combine social and asocial learning so efficiently to generate cumulative 
learning” (Ehn & Laland, 2012, p.103), the beginnings of which are evident in 
childhood (Chapters 3 and 6), adaptive rules that help direct who, when, and what to 
copy (‘social learning strategies’: Laland, 2004; ‘transmission biases’: Boyd & 
Richerson, 1985) go some way towards providing an explanation. Moreover, 
theoretical cultural models, such as that of Enquist et al. (2007), capture a 
(conditional) critical social learning strategy, in which learners transition to 
individual learning when socially-acquired behaviour is unsatisfactory. In this way, 
individual fitness can be enhanced (dependent upon environmental spatial variation; 
see Rendell, Fogarty, & Laland, 2009) and evolutionary trade-offs between reliance 
on costly personal information or cheap but possibly less reliable social information 
avoided (Boyd & Richerson, 1985). By innovating more when faced with 
unsatisfactory and inefficacious social information (an existing strategy is 
unproductive and better or more efficient solutions may be sought; Chapter 3), 
children resemble such ‘critical’ and fluid learners, trading off social information for 
potentially more reliable personal information when it is adaptive and optimal to do 
so (Kendal et al., 2009).   
These results are ultimately greatly encouraging. By casting into doubt the 
idea that some individuals are simply naturally more innovative than others, in line 
with observations of co-variation between innovation and social learning (Reader, 
2003; Reader, Hager, & Laland, 2011) and adaptive trade-offs between the two 
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(Kendal et al., 2009), confidence that all individuals can be innovators - whether by 
natural propensity for asocial information use, with prompts, the provision of 
appropriate contexts, or sufficient motivation – is heightened.  
 
7.4 A Complex Interplay of Factors Facilitate, and Constrain, Children’s 
Innovation 
  
 Research in the social learning field has generated much understanding 
regarding the contexts and social cues that regulate the extent to which children, at 
varying ages, imitate observed behaviour. These include: goal understanding 
(Bekkering, Wohlschläger, & Gattis, 2000; Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello, 2005), 
cues to behavioural instrumentality or conventionality (Clegg & Legare, in press; 
Herrmann, Legare, Harris, & Whitehouse, 2013; Legare et al., 2015), behaviour 
efficacy (Schulz, Hoopell, & Jenkins, 2008; Williamson, Meltzoff, & Markman, 
2008), model characteristics such as age, status, and proficiency (see Wood, Kendal, 
& Flynn, 2013a, and references therein), opportunity for prior personal information 
acquisition (Wood, Kendal, & Flynn, 2013b), personal (or first-hand observational) 
experience of task difficulty (Williamson & Meltzoff, 2011; Williamson et al., 
2008), and so on. The importance of social context, or perhaps more accurately 
interpretations of social context, and a child’s socio-cognitive abilities upon 
imitative fidelity has been emphasised recently (Legare & Nielsen, 2015; Yu & 
Kushnir, 2014). Specifically, interactions between social context interpretation and 
socio-cognitive abilities could be responsible for observed developmental differences 
in children’s imitation. Such a level of understanding will be vital to emulate within 
the field of innovation research.   
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Here, the inclusion of a small selection of contexts and social cues known to 
be implicated in children’s imitation is intended to, first, highlight the array of 
insights that contrast sharply with the comparative few known factors influencing 
children’s innovation, and, second, to make the case that understanding what hinders 
imitation will aid our understanding of what helps innovation (and vice versa). A 
number of studies within this thesis have capitalised upon knowledge of when 
children should viably imitate less, and thus by extension, and with sufficient 
opportunity to do so, go on to innovate by exploring novel behavioural alternatives.  
 By discovering increased innovation on the MMB task in the absence of 
social demonstrations (Chapter 3, control group, and Chapter 5), along with higher 
rates of innovation in response to low observed behaviour efficacy (poor quality of 
social information: Chapter 3) and following prompted opportunities for personal 
information acquisition (time and instructions to explore: Chapter 6), this thesis 
extends understanding of children’s flexible use of imitation and innovation. In this 
way, it contributes towards objectives to achieve a more ‘comprehensive account of 
cultural learning’ (Legare & Nielsen, 2015) that accurately reflects and captures the 
dual contributions of imitation and innovation. As with imitation, it appears that in 
the aftermath of social demonstrations children evaluate model characteristics, and 
the quality of information they possess, before deciding whether or not to innovate. 
Though Chapter 5 did not find that innovation could be enhanced with ‘positive’ 
normative information, relating to the conventionality of peers’ task behaviour 
(referenced children typically find ‘lots of ways’ versus ‘not many ways’), 
investigations of this kind are still highly valuable in suggesting other factors that are 
likely to be of importance and interest to innovation. In the work reported here, there 
is the suggestion that children’s innovation could be assisted by inducing mastery or 
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performance achievement goals, or increasing task-related confidence (see Morgan, 
Rendell, Ehn, Hoppitt, & Laland, 2011) and, in turn, self-evaluations of competence.  
Of the existing studies that have provided insight into the factors that affect 
children’s innovation, they suggest that innovation, by modification, is facilitated by: 
action sequences that prime an instrumental rather than conventional goal (Legare et 
al., 2015), occasions when a low, as opposed to high, past-proficiency model 
matches an original solution of the observer (Wood, Kendal, & Flynn, 2015), 
observation of inefficient solutions from peers (Tennie et al., 2014), and opportunity 
to interact with a task before witnessing social demonstrations (Wood et al., 2013b, 
2015). The overriding impression is that the performance of intentional pedagogical 
demonstrations by adults, but not peers, constrains innovation in the same manner 
that it does exploration (Bonawitz et al., 2011). Due to the ill-structured nature of 
tool innovation problems, innovation by novel invention can be aided by 
observations of pre-made target tools in combination with experience of 
manipulating tool materials (5- to 6-year-olds, but not 4- to 5-year-olds; Cutting et 
al., 2014). However, opportunities to manipulate materials without observation of 
pre-made tools (Beck et al., 2011), instructions to ‘make something’ (Cutting et al., 
2011), and suggestions to try alternative strategies (Chappell, Cutting, Apperly, & 
Beck, 2013), are not sufficient to help children overcome their difficulties with 
invention.   
In Chapter 2, an individual-level pathway to innovation was formulated. This 
pathway was pitched as a starting point for considering how the innovation process 
is facilitated and constrained, and which constructs play a role at each point. With 
the insights attained from the research within this thesis, and to illustrate part of the 
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pathway’s purpose (to be expanded and improved upon), some modifications are 
suggested (see Figure 7.1).  
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Figure 7.1. An updated hypothetical individual-level pathway to innovation. The following modifications (highlighted in gray and 
expanded upon in text) have been made: addition of ‘Confidence’ and ‘Social Information Evaluation’ constructs to the left-hand side 
box; addition of ‘Prompts’ and ‘Affordance and/or Causal Understanding’ constructs to the second box, along with ‘Exploration’ in 
bold font to emphasise its imperative role in the innovation process. 
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Starting from the left-hand side of the innovation pathway (Figure 7.1), 
‘Confidence’ and ‘Social information evaluation’ now appear as additional 
contributing constructs. With regard to the former, it was reported in Chapter 5 that 
children in receipt of peer-performance information that emphasised others’ success 
were faster at first reward retrievals on the MMB task than those who received 
information that emphasised others’ lack of success. This is a likely effect of 
confidence which served to increase the speed with which children initially explored 
the apparatus. Confidence is seen to decrease reliance on social information in adults 
(Morgan et al., 2011) and, by extension, viably increase reliance on personal 
information, serving to promote innovation. Though the role of prior social learning 
was previously acknowledged to potentially contribute to each construct portrayed, 
‘Social information evaluation (if applicable)’ has been added to capture an intrinsic 
component of the innovation by modification process. This thesis has shown that 
evaluations of social information, specifically in relation to its efficacy, not only 
contribute directly to innovation (Chapter 3) but to exploration (possibly via 
increased task-related confidence that accompanies higher observed behaviour 
efficacy: Chapter 6).  
Exploration now appears in bold font in the Figure to emphasise its crucial 
role in the innovation process, yet also its distinct qualitative separation from 
innovation (as originally proposed by Reader & Laland, 2003). With more 
opportunity to explore, and explicit prompts to do so (hence also the inclusion of a 
contributing ‘Prompts’ construct to ‘Exploration’), higher instances and rates of not 
only exit innovations, but tool and access point innovations, were observed in 
Chapter 6. In support of its qualitative separation, prior observed behaviour efficacy 
(as determined by experimental condition in Chapter 3) differentially impacted upon 
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exploration, but not innovation - with one exception. As suggested by this thesis and 
by the research of Wood et al. (2013b, 2015), wherein children incorporated multiple 
task solutions (socially- and personally-acquired) into their behavioural repertoires, 
behavioural canalisation – so often seen in children’s faithful reproduction of 
observed behaviour (e.g., Hopper et al., 2010) - does not appear to fully characterise 
children’s difficulties with innovation. Rather, when given sufficient 
opportunity/attempt trials to explore, they show behavioural flexibility in trying out a 
variety of different methods (combinations of tools, access points and, though less 
likely, exits) to solve the MMB task without remaining ‘stuck’ on the particular 
method that was observed. Adherence to the demonstrated box exit, as seen for the 
majority of participants in Chapters 3 and 6, more greatly resembled an effect of 
functional fixedness than canalisation. For alternative exits to be recognised, 
participants had to reconceptualise the learned design function of the top holes of the 
box (as exits) which functioned as access points in social demonstrations. When no 
social demonstrations were provided, as in Chapter 5, the rates of tool, access point 
and exit innovations were comparable.   
Finally, and relatedly, affordance understanding was incorporated into the 
pathway alongside causal understanding. As explained in Chapter 6, it was not 
possible to accurately define those parts of children’s exploration that were 
theoretically directed towards uncovering a causal mechanism for the MMB exit 
door opening (and thus also subsequent behaviour that stemmed from acquired 
causal understanding). The absence of discernible causal mechanisms may be true of 
other instances of situations that require innovation. Yet, with greater experience, 
and time to interact with, the apparatus, it is highly plausible that children were 
increasing their understanding of the general properties and affordances of the MMB 
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and associated tools; for example, learning which tools were best suited to specific 
access points.  
Future research will help to further develop and refine the innovation 
pathway proposed. However, it will also be essential to look beyond the individual-
level process of innovation to its transmission process (i.e., the innovation content, 
contextual factors and transmission biases that make an innovation more or less 
likely to be adopted by others), to more accurately mirror cultural transmission and 
evolution in experimental studies. 
 
7.5 Educational Applications 
 
 As humans face a host of environmental, social and economic issues at a 
societal and global level, taking steps to instil and advance innovatory ability (and 
the capacity to recognise when and where it may be adaptively implemented) is of 
great importance. Understanding childhood innovation in the context of tool-use 
behaviour, amongst others, is a first step. By searching for consistencies in the 
innovative (and associated social/asocial learning) propensities of individuals at 
different ages, and consistency in contexts and social cues associated with 
innovation, it will be possible to identify factors that are regularly and reliably 
implicated in its appearance. This would, in turn, allow the systematic promotion of 
innovativeness by way of formulating appropriate educational programs, policies and 
interventions. Similarly, uncovering obstacles to exploration and innovation 
production, such as prior social demonstrations, functional fixedness, and lack of 
opportunity to explore, calls for specific training to overcome them (e.g., McCaffrey, 
2012). 
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 Two interventions specifically targeted to innovation by modification have 
been shown successful in this thesis, and a third proposed. First, innovation can be 
promoted by highlighting existing behaviour/information that is inefficacious and 
unsuccessful. Second, giving children time to individually explore, either prior to 
social demonstrations or particularly following social demonstrations, will increase 
the likelihood of observing novel behaviour. Third, to be verified by future research, 
increasing children’s task motivation by inducing mastery or performance 
achievement goals (e.g., with individual learning situations or social comparison 
information) may, in turn, increase their innovation.  
 The thesis findings importantly corroborate existing and accumulating 
evidence for the potential detrimental impact of instructions and demonstrations on 
children’s exploratory and innovative learning (e.g., Bonawitz et al., 2011; Wood et 
al., 2013b, 2015), by producing more conservative learners. As Gopnik (2012, 
p.1627) writes, “Children’s spontaneous exploratory and pretend play is designed to 
help them learn. And pedagogy can be a mixed blessing. Even preschoolers know 
when they are being taught, and quickly take on information from teachers. But 
explicit teaching can also narrow the range of hypotheses that children are willing to 
consider.” Of course, this is not to advocate a sole or primary focus upon individual 
discovery learning in educational settings; clearly, instruction has a vital role to play 
in children’s learning (e.g., Chen & Klahr, 1999; Kirschner, Sweller, & Clark, 2006; 
Klahr & Nigam, 2004; Toth, Klahr, & Chen, 2000) and learning itself is a patchwork 
of experiences in which a multitude of strategies and approaches contribute. The 
potential to integrate and combine exploratory and guidance strategies within 
educational interventions (Weisberg, Hirsh-Pasek, & Golinkoff, 2013) and strive for 
‘pedagogical synergies’ that balance structure and creative freedom (Cremin, 
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Glauert, Craft, Compton, & Stylianidou, 2015) is clear. Continuing communication 
between educational and developmental researchers will only serve to more 
accurately reflect the conditions in which children’s social learning and innovation 
(or creativity) occurs. Certainly, whilst there will be occasions that better necessitate 
explicit teaching and the efficient, rapid transfer of information, there are 
undoubtedly other learning occasions that call for individual exploration and 
discovery, and even others that call for both.  
Children’s exploration and innovation appears to require greater support 
when normative expectations of learning from others apply. In view of children’s 
early-emerging norm psychology (Chudek & Henrich, 2011) and their early displays 
of conformity (Haun & Tomasello, 2011), educators may be sensitive to learning 
situations in which interpretations of social conventionality and social pressure may 
bias and conceal children’s true innovation capabilities. In a similar vein, knowledge 
of model-based biases (Wood et al., 2012) and their effect upon displays of imitation 
and innovation (Wood et al., 2015), could be advantageously applied in the 
classroom.  
 
7.6 Limitations and Future Research 
 
 The research presented in this thesis has a number of limitations, from which 
specific avenues for future research are suggested. The first relates to the MMB task, 
and its use as the sole instrument for assessing children’s innovatory abilities. Whilst 
the design and implementation of this task was necessitated due to the absence of 
suitable alternative puzzle boxes that would allow for a range of novel behaviours to 
be produced, and its use was validated in Chapter 4 (behavioural consistency with 
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other puzzle boxes), the findings reported in this thesis require replication with other 
tasks. These tasks should be of a goal-directed and non-goal directed nature, in order 
to better understand how children’s innovative (and imitative) behaviour is affected 
by indications and interpretations of instrumentality and conventionality (e.g., Clegg 
& Legare, in press) – and how tasks with varying combined degrees of instrumental 
and conventional elements alter adaptive informational trade-offs (of the kind 
reported in Chapter 3) at different ages.  
A participant age range of 4-9 years was selected in this thesis so as to 
capture developmental change. However, to be fully comprehensive, and appreciate 
the interactions between age-related changes in cognitive abilities, interpretations of 
social context, and factors that facilitate innovation, investigations into the 
innovatory abilities of older and younger children will need to be carried out. 
Moreover, examining the ontogeny of different forms of innovation, and the 
difficulties associated with each form throughout childhood, will permit insight into 
how they contribute to cumulative culture. These examinations have already begun 
in the case of innovation by novel invention (Cutting et al., 2014).  The inclusion of 
adult participants into the research contained within Chapters 3 and 4 was highly 
useful as a means of performance comparison with the children and for revealing 
insightful similarities (such as innovation being ostensibly driven by necessity, as 
opposed to opportunity; as in non-human animals: Laland & Reader, 1999). Yet, the 
innovation of adults is, of course, remarkably more sophisticated than that of 
children. It remains to be seen how, and by what means, such leaps in innovative 
ability are made over the lifespan. 
 Advances in knowledge and understanding of constructs related to innovation 
will be of great value in more accurately determining innovation development and 
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the pathways that lead to its production. However, advances in the measurement of 
these constructs will also be of help. As reviewed in Chapter 2, divergent thinking 
and creativity are widely-held precursors of innovation. Failure to find the expected 
relation between these constructs and innovation in Chapter 4 cannot be taken as an 
indication of the absence of a relation, but of disparity in the domains (physical 
versus verbal) in which they were assessed. To verify the contributions of divergent 
thinking and creativity to behavioural innovation (or not), physical tasks to assess 
them are required (e.g., the non-verbal divergent thinking Unusual Box test for 
young children; Bijvoet-van den Berg & Hoicka, 2014).  
Dyadic interactions between an adult and child, though commonly 
encountered by children in home and school environments and typically utilised in 
social learning studies, are not representative of the diversity of social contexts and 
settings to which children are exposed (and in which real-world innovations also 
appear). Extending research from more solitary settings into ecologically-valid social 
settings, such as ‘makerspaces’ (Sheridan, Halverson, Litts, Brahms, Jacobs-Priebe, 
& Owens, 2014), is much needed, and may better reflect the environments in which 
children arguably display their greatest levels of exploration, creativity and 
innovation: play (Bateson & Martin, 2013; Nielsen, 2012). Indeed, there is emerging 
evidence to suggest that children above the age of 3-4 years display greater rates of 
innovation when presented with the hook invention task in a museum environment, 
in which they are free to explore and try out materials, than when presented with the 
same task in a school environment (Sheridan, Konopasky, Kirkwood, & Defeyter, in 
press). Alternative experimental designs such as open diffusions (e.g., Flynn & 
Whiten, 2012; Whiten & Flynn, 2010) would also be suited to engendering a more 
naturalistic view of children’s innovation. Moreover, together with transmission 
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chains, these designs would be appropriate for answering a greater array of cultural 
questions regarding the transmission and adoption of innovations once produced 
(such as in Tennie et al., 2014).  
 It is not only ecological validity that is largely missing in innovation 
research, but also cross-cultural investigations. These are crucial in order to establish 
the extent to which cultural background impacts upon innovation (and other) 
capacities, and hence to determine their cultural universality. Recently, with this aim, 
Nielsen, Tomaselli, Mushin, and Whiten (2014) compared the innovative ability of 
3- to 5-year-old Western children and children living in Bushman communities in 
South Africa using the hook invention task. In spite of the vast cultural and 
environmental differences between these samples of children, both groups evidenced 
similarly poor tool innovation. This led the authors to conclude that “a capacity for 
innovation in tool making is seriously lacking in children prior to the formal 
schooling years even when compared with some non-human species, contrasting 
markedly with the precocity of children’s social learning dispositions and abilities” 
(p393). It will be necessary to extend this research with innovation by modification 
tasks, and observe whether cultural variation in instruction and pedagogy 
differentially affects the readiness of non-Western children to discard and/or improve 
unproductive pre-existing social information.   
 As a final point, it is worth musing on a factor that is undoubtedly a major 
component of innovation, or any form of behaviour change, yet is very difficult to 
directly examine and could only be met with speculation in this thesis: motivation. It 
is possible that those participants who discovered more novel exits in Chapter 3, 
demonstrated more ‘efficient’ performance in Chapter 4, and went on to discover 
additional innovations in Chapter 6, were simply more motivated by the 
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experimental tasks. Operationalising and examining motivation, for example by 
introducing a motivation rating system into tasks, and its role in innovation is an 
imperative future line of research.  
 
7.7 Conclusions 
 
 The evidence presented in this thesis demonstrates that, though childhood 
innovation is rare when compared with rates of social learning (and specifically 
imitation), children are not incapable of innovating. Indeed, the ability to build upon 
pre-existing knowledge and improve it, which is foundational to cumulative culture, 
appears present in children given sufficient support. In the current work, this support 
appeared in the form of inefficacious social information, emphasising the futility of 
social learning, and sufficient opportunity for the physical production of alternative 
and successful behaviour. Difficulties with innovation may vary depending on its 
form, accompanying contextual and social information, and the age of individuals. 
Thus, when it comes to designing interventions, a one-size-fits-all approach is not 
appropriate. Confidence in the potential of interventions to enhance and promote the 
innovation process is gained from findings that innovation appears more state-based 
than trait-based (in the context of novel tool-use tasks). Innovatory ability should 
not, therefore, be viewed as fixed or predetermined, but universal. Importantly, to 
gain a full understanding of innovation, and particularly innovation by modification, 
it is imperative to consider its social side. This thesis testifies to the necessity and 
value of the dual study of imitation and innovation, in light of their dual requirement 
for the operation of the cultural ratchet. The educational implications and 
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applications of this work are profound, and call for a greater emphasis upon 
children’s individual exploration and discovery.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
296 
 
References 
 
Bateson, P., & Martin, P. (2013). Play, playfulness, creativity and innovation. New 
York, US: Cambridge University Press.  
Bechtel, S., Jeschonek, S., & Pauen, S. (2013). How 24-month-olds form and 
transfer knowledge about tools: The role of perceptual, functional, causal, 
and feedback information. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 115, 
163-179. doi:10.1016/j.jecp.2012.12.004 
Beck, S.R., Apperly, I.A., Chappell, J., Guthrie, C., & Cutting, N. (2011). Making 
tools isn’t child’s play. Cognition, 119, 301-306. 
doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2011.01.003 
Bekkering, H., Wohlschläger, A., & Gattis, M. (2000). Imitation of gestures in 
children is goal-directed. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 
53, 153-164. doi:10.1080/713755872 
Bijvoet-van den Berg, S., & Hoicka, E. (2014). Individual differences and age- 
related changes in divergent thinking in toddlers and preschoolers. 
Developmental Psychology, 50, 1629-1639. doi:10.1037/a0036131 
Bonawitz, E., Shafto, P., Gweon, H., Goodman, N.D., Spelke, E., & Schulz, L. 
(2011). The double-edged sword of pedagogy: Instruction limits spontaneous 
exploration and discovery. Cognition, 120, 322-330. 
doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2010.10.001 
Boyd, R., & Richerson, P.J. (1985). Culture and the evolutionary process. Chicago, 
IL: University of Chicago Press.  
Boyd, R., & Richerson, P.J. (1996). Why culture is common, but cultural evolution 
is rare. Proceedings of the British Academy, 88, 77-93. 
297 
 
Boyd, R., Richerson, P.J., & Henrich, J. (2011). The cultural niche: Why social 
learning is essential for human adaptation. PNAS, 108, 10918-10925. 
doi:10.1073/pnas.1100290108 
Carpenter, M., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2005). Twelve- and 18-month-olds copy 
actions in terms of goals. Developmental Science, 8, 13-20. 
doi:10.1111/j.1467-7687.2004.00385.x 
Casler, K., & Kelemen, D. (2005). Young children’s rapid learning about artifacts. 
Developmental Science, 8, 472-480. doi:10.1111/j.1467-7687.2005.00438.x 
Chappell, J., Cutting, N., Apperly, I.A., & Beck, S.R. (2013). The development of 
tool manufacture in humans: What helps young children make innovative 
tools? Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B., 368, 20120409. 
doi:10.1098/rstb.2012.0409 
Chen, Z., & Klahr, D. (1999). All other things being equal: Acquisition and transfer 
of the Control of Variables Strategy. Child Development, 70, 1098-1120. 
doi:10.1111/1467-8624.00081 
Chudek, M. & Henrich, J. (2011). Culture-gene coevolution, norm-psychology and 
the emergence of human prosociality. Trends in Cognitive Science, 15, 218-
226. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2011.03.003 
Clegg, J.M., & Legare, C.H. (in press). Instrumental and conventional interpretations 
of behavior are associated with distinct outcomes in early childhood. Child 
Development.  
Cremin, T., Glauert, E., Craft, A., Compton, A., & Stylianidou, F. (2015). Creative 
Little Scientists: Exploring pedagogical synergies between inquiry-based and 
creative approaches in Early Years science. Education 3-13: International 
Journal of Primary, Elementary and Early Years Education, 43, 404-419.  
298 
 
Csibra, G., & Gergely, G. (2009). Natural pedagogy. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 
13, 148-153. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2009.01.005 
Cutting, N., Apperly, I.A., & Beck, S.R. (2011). Why do children lack the flexibility 
to innovate tools? Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 109, 497-511. 
doi:10.1016/j.jecp.2011.02.012 
Cutting, N., Apperly, I.A., Chappell, J., & Beck, S.R. (2014). The puzzling difficulty 
of tool innovation: Why can’t children piece their knowledge together? 
Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 125, 110-117. 
doi:10.1016/j.jecp.2013.11.010 
Defeyter, M.A., & German, T.P. (2003). Acquiring an understanding of design: 
Evidence from children’s insight problem solving. Cognition, 89, 133-155.  
doi:10.1016/S0010-0277 
Efferson, C., Lalive, R., Richerson, P.J., McElreath, R., & Lubell, M. (2008). 
Conformists and mavericks: The empirics of frequency-dependent cultural 
transmission. Evolution and Human Behavior, 29, 56-64. 
doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2007.08.003 
Ehn, M., & Laland, K. (2012). Adaptive strategies for cumulative cultural learning. 
Journal of Theoretical Biology, 301, 103-111. doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2012.02.004 
Enquist, M., Eriksson, K., & Ghirlanda, S. (2007). Critical social learning: A 
solution to Rogers’s paradox of nonadaptive culture. American 
Anthropologist, 109, 727-734. doi:10.1525/AA.2007.109.4.727 
Flynn, E.G., Turner, C.R., & Giraldeau, L.-A. (accepted). Selectivity in social and 
asocial learning: Investigating the prevalence, effect and development of 
young children’s learning preferences. Philosophical Transactions of the 
Royal Society B.   
299 
 
Flynn, E., & Whiten, A. (2012). Experimental “microcultures” in young children: 
Identifying biographic, cognitive, and social predictors of information 
transmission. Child Development, 83, 911-925. doi:10.1111/j.1467-
8624.2012.01747.x 
Gergely, G., & Csibra, G. (2006). Sylvia’s recipe: The role of imitation and 
pedagogy in the transmission of cultural knowledge. In N.J. Enfield & S.C. 
Levenson (Eds.), Roots of Human Sociality: Culture, Cognition, and Human 
Interaction (pp. 229-255). Oxford, UK: Berg Publishers.  
German, T.P., & Defeyter, M.A. (2000). Immunity to functional fixedness in young 
children. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 7, 707-712. 
doi:10.3758/BF03213010 
Gopnik, A. (2012). Scientific thinking in young children: Theoretical advances, 
empirical research, and policy implications. Science, 337, 1623-1627. 
doi:10.1126/science.1223416 
Gopnik, A., Griffiths, T.L., & Lucas, C.G. (2015). When younger learners can be 
better (or at least more open-minded) than older ones. Current Directions in 
Psychological Science, 24, 87-92. doi:10.1177/0963721414556653 
Hanus, D., Mendes, N., Tennie, C., & Call, J. (2011). Comparing the performances 
of apes (Gorilla gorilla, Pan troglodytes, Pongo pygmaeus) and human 
children (Homo sapiens) in the floating peanut task. PLoS ONE, 6, e19555. 
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0019555 
Haun, D.B.M., & Tomasello, M. (2011). Conformity to peer pressure in preschool 
children. Child Development, 82, 1759-1767. doi:10.1111/j.1467-
8624.2011.01666.x 
Herrmann, P.A., Legare, C.H., Harris, P.L., & Whitehouse, H. (2013). Stick to the 
300 
 
script: The effect of witnessing multiple actors on children’s imitation. 
Cognition, 129, 536-543. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2013.08.010 
Hernik, M., & Csibra, G. (2015). Infants learn enduring functions of novel tools 
from action demonstrations. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 130, 
176-192. doi:10.1016/j.jecp.2014.10.004 
Hopper, L.M., Flynn, E.G., Wood, L.A., & Whiten, A. (2010). Observational 
learning of tool use in children: Investigating cultural spread through 
diffusion chains and learning mechanisms through ghost displays. Journal of 
Experimental Child Psychology, 106, 82-97. doi:10.1016/j.jecp.2009.12.001 
Kendal, R.L., Coolen, I., & Laland, K.N. (2009). Adaptive trade-offs in the use of 
social and personal information. In R. Dukas & J.M. Ratcliffe (Eds.), 
Cognitive ecology II (pp. 249-271). Chicago, US: University of Chicago 
Press.  
Kirschner, P.A., Sweller, J., & Clark, R.E. (2006). Why minimal guidance during 
instruction does not work: An analysis of the failure of constructivist, 
discovery, problem-based, experiential, and inquiry-based teaching. 
Educational Psychologist, 41, 75-86. doi:10.1207/s15326985ep4102_1 
Klahr, D., & Nigam, M. (2004). The equivalence of learning paths in early science 
instruction: Effects of direct instruction and discovery learning. 
Psychological Science, 15, 661-667. doi:10.1111/j.0956-7976.2004.00737.x 
Koenig, M.A., & Sabbagh, M.A. (2013). Selective social learning: New perspectives 
on learning from others. Developmental Psychology, 49, 399-403. 
doi:10.1037/a0031619 
Kummer, H., & Goodall, J. (1985). Conditions of innovative behavior in primates. 
301 
 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B., 308, 203-214. 
doi:10.1098/rstb.1985.0020 
Laland, K.N. (2004). Social learning strategies. Learning & Behavior, 32(1), 4-14.  
doi:10.3758/BF03196002 
Laland, K.N., & Reader, S.M. (1999). Foraging innovation in the guppy. Animal 
Behaviour, 57, 331-340.  
Legare, C.H., & Nielsen, M. (2015). Imitation and innovation: The dual engines of 
cultural learning. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 19, 688-699. 
doi:10.1016/j.tics.2015.08.005 
Legare, C.H., Wen, N.J., Herrmann, P.A., & Whitehouse, H. (2015). Imitative 
flexibility and the development of cultural learning. Cognition, 142, 351-361. 
doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2015.05.020 
Lewis, H.M., & Laland, K.N. (2012). Transmission fidelity is the key to the build-up 
of cumulative culture. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B., 
367, 2171-2180. doi:10.1098/rstb.2012.0119 
Lyons, D.E., Young, A.G., & Keil, F.C. (2007). The hidden structure of 
overimitation. PNAS, 11, 19751-19756. doi:10.1073/pnas.0704452104 
McCaffrey, T. (2012). Innovation relies on the obscure: A key to overcoming the 
classic problem of functional fixedness. Psychological Science, 23, 215-218. 
doi:10.1177/0956797611429580 
McCarty, M.E., Clifton, R.K., & Collard, R.R. (2001). The beginnings of tool use by 
infants and toddlers. Infancy, 2, 233-256. doi:10.1207/S15327078IN0202_8 
McGuigan, N., Whiten, A., Flynn, E., & Horner, V. (2007). Imitation of causally 
opaque versus causally transparent tool use by 3- and 5-year-old children. 
Cognitive Development, 22, 353-364. doi:10.1016/j.cogdev.2007.01.001 
302 
 
Mesoudi, A., Laland, K.N., Boyd, R., Buchanan, B., Flynn, E., McCauley, R.N., … 
Tennie, C. (2013). The cultural evolution of technology and science. In P.J. 
Richerson & M.H. Christiansen (Eds.), Cultural evolution: Society, 
technology, language, and religion (pp. 193-216). Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press.  
Molleman, L., van den Berg, P., & Weissing, F.J. (2014). Consistent individual 
differences in human social learning strategies. Nature Communications, 5, 
3570. doi:10.1038/ncomms4570 
Morgan, T.J.H., Rendell, L.E., Ehn, M., Hoppitt, W., & Laland, K.N. (2012). The 
evolutionary basis of human social learning. Proceedings of the Royal 
Society B., 279, 653-662. doi:10.1098/rspb.2011.1172 
Nielsen, M. (2006). Copying actions and copying outcomes: Social learning through 
the second year. Developmental Psychology, 42, 555-565. doi:10.1037/0012-
1649.42.3.555 
Nielsen, M. (2012). Imitation, pretend play, and childhood: Essential elements in the 
evolution of human culture? Journal of Comparative Psychology, 126, 170-
181. doi:10.1037/a0025168 
Nielsen, M. (2013). Young children’s imitative and innovative behaviour on the 
floating object task. Infant and Child Development, 22, 44-52. 
doi:10.1002/icd.1765 
Nielsen, M., Tomaselli, K., Mushin, I., & Whiten, A. (2014). Exploring tool 
innovation: A comparison of Western and Bushman children. Journal of 
Experimental Child Psychology, 126, 384-394. 
doi:10.1016/j.jecp.2014.05.008 
Over, H., & Carpenter, M. (2012). Putting the social into social learning: Explaining 
303 
 
both selectivity and fidelity in children’s copying behavior. Journal of 
Comparative Psychology, 126, 182-192. doi:10.1037/a0024555 
Over, H., & Carpenter, M. (2013). The social side of imitation. Child Development 
Perspectives, 7, 6-11. doi:10.1111/cdep.12006 
Phillips, B., Seston, R., & Kelemen, D. (2012). Learning about tool categories via 
eavesdropping. Child Development, 83, 2057-2072. doi:10.1111/j.1467-
8624.2012.01827.x 
Ramsey, G., Bastian, M.L., & van Schaik, C. (2007). Animal innovation defined and 
operationalized. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 30, 393-437.  
doi:10.1017/S0140525X07002373 
Rat-Fischer, L., O’Regan, J.K., & Fagard, J. (2013). Handedness in infants’ tool use. 
Developmental Psychobiology, 55, 860-868. doi:10.1002/dev.21078 
Reader, S.M. (2003). Innovation and social learning: Individual variation and brain 
evolution. Animal Biology, 53, 147-158. doi:10.1163/157075603769700340 
Reader, S.M., Hager, Y., & Laland, K.N. (2011). The evolution of primate general 
and cultural intelligence. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B., 
366, 1017-1027. doi:10.1098/rstb.2010.0342 
Reader, S.M., & Laland, K.N. (2003). Animal Innovation: An introduction. In S.M. 
Reader & K.N. Laland (Eds.), Animal Innovation (pp. 3-35). Oxford, UK: 
Oxford University Press.  
Rendell, L., Fogarty, L., & Laland, K.N. (2010). Rogers’ paradox recast and 
resolved: Population structure and the evolution of social learning strategies. 
Evolution, 64, 534-548. doi:10.1111/j.1558-5646.2009.00817.x 
Rieucau, G., & Giraldeau, L-A. (2011). Exploring the costs and benefits of social 
304 
 
information use: An appraisal of current experimental evidence. 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B., 366, 949-957. 
doi:10.1098/rstb.2010.0325 
Schulz, L.E., Hooppell, C., & Jenkins, A.C. (2008). Judicious imitation: Children 
differentially imitate deterministically and probabilistically effective actions. 
Child Development, 79, 395-410. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8624.2007.01132.x 
Sheridan, K., Halverson, E.R., Litts, B., Brahms, L., Jacobs-Priebe, L., & Owens, T. 
(2014). Learning in the making: A comparative case study of three 
makerspaces. Harvard Educational Review, 84, 505-531. 
doi:10.17763/haer.84.4.brr34733723j648u 
Sheridan, K.M., Konopasky, A.W., Kirkwood, S., & Defeyter, M.A. (in press). The 
effects of environment and ownership on children’s innovation of tools and 
tool material selection. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B. 
Subiaul, F., Krajkowski, E., Price, E.E., & Etz, A. (2015). Imitation by combination: 
Preschool age children evidence summative imitation in a novel problem-
solving task. Frontiers in Psychology, 6, 1-13. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01410 
Tennie, C., Walter, V., Gampe, A., Carpenter, M., & Tomasello, M. (2014). 
Limitations to the cultural ratchet effect in young children. Journal of 
Experimental Child Psychology, 126, 152-160. 
doi:10.1016/j.jecp.2014.04.006 
Toelch, U., Bruce, M.J., Newson, L., Richerson, P.J., & Reader, S.M. (2014). 
Individual consistency and flexibility in human social information use. 
Proceedings of the Royal Society B., 281, 20132864. 
doi:10.1098/rspb.2013.2864 
Tomasello, M. (2016). The ontogeny of cultural learning. Current Opinion in 
305 
 
Psychology, 8, 1-4. doi:10.1016/j.copsyc.2015.09.008 
Tomasello, M., Kruger, A.C., & Ratner, H.H. (1993). Cultural learning. Behavioral 
and Brain Sciences, 16, 495-511. doi:10.1017/S0140525X0003123X 
Toth, E.E., Klahr, D., & Chen, Z. (2000). Bridging research and practice: A 
cognitively based classroom intervention for teaching experimentation skills 
to elementary school children. Cognition and Instruction, 18, 423-459. 
doi:10.1207/S1532690XCI1804_1 
Uzgiris, I.C. (1981). Two functions of imitation during infancy. International 
Journal of Behavioral Development, 4, 1-12. 
doi:10.1177/016502548100400101 
Vygotsky, L.S. (1978). Mind in society: The development of higher psychological 
processes. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.  
Weir, A.A., Chappell, J., & Kacelnik, A. (2002). Shaping of hooks in New 
Caledonian crows. Science, 297, 981. doi:10.1126/science.1073433 
Weisberg, D.S., Hirsh-Pasek, K., & Golinkoff, R.M. (2013). Guided play: Where 
curricular goals meet a playful pedagogy. Mind, Brain, and Education, 7, 
104-112. doi:10.1111/mbe.12015 
Whitehead, H., & Richerson, P.J. (2009). The evolution of conformist social learning 
can cause population collapse in realistically variable environments. 
Evolution and Human Behavior, 30, 261-273. 
doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2009.02.003 
Whiten, A., & Flynn, E. (2010). The transmission and evolution of experimental 
microcultures in groups of young children. Developmental Psychology, 46, 
1694-1709. doi:10.1037/a0020786 
Williamson, R.A., & Meltzoff, A. (2011). Own and others’ prior experiences 
306 
 
influence children’s imitation of causal acts. Cognitive Development, 26, 
260-268. doi:10.1016/j.cogdev.2011.04.002 
Williamson, R.A., Meltzoff, A.N., & Markman, E.M. (2008). Prior experiences and 
perceived efficacy influence 3-year-olds’ imitation. Developmental 
Psychology, 44, 275-285. doi:10.1037/0012-1649.44.1.275 
Wood, L.A., Kendal, R.L., & Flynn, E.G. (2012). Context-dependent model-based 
biases in cultural transmission: Children’s imitation is affected by model age 
over model knowledge state. Evolution and Human Behavior, 33, 387-394. 
doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2011.11.010 
Wood, L.A., Kendal, R.L., & Flynn, E.G. (2013a). Whom do children copy? Model- 
based biases in social learning. Developmental Review, 33, 341-356. 
doi:10.1016/j.dr.2013.08.002 
Wood, L.A., Kendal, R.L., & Flynn, E.G. (2013b). Copy me or copy you? The effect 
of prior experience on social learning. Cognition, 127, 203-213. 
doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2013.01.002 
Wood, L.A., Kendal, R.L., & Flynn, E.G. (2015). Does a peer model’s task 
proficiency influence children’s solution choice and innovation? Journal of 
Experimental Child Psychology, 139, 190-202. 
doi:10.1016/j.jecp.2015.06.003 
Yu, Y., & Kushnir, T. (2014). Social context effects in 2- and 4-year-olds’ selective 
versus faithful imitation. Developmental Psychology, 50, 922-933. 
doi:10.1037/a0034242 
 
 
307 
 
Appendices 
 
Appendix Item 1a: Sample consent letter to parents/guardians 
 
 
Department of Psychology 
Durham, DH1 3LE 
Telephone: 0191 3343251 
 
25/06/13 
Dear Parent/Guardian, 
 
My name is Kayleigh Carr and I am a PhD student in the Department of Psychology 
at Durham University. I am writing to ask if you would be willing to allow your 
child to participate in a study that I would like to run at XXX school.  
 
The study considers how children’s decisions to copy actions are affected by 
increasing uncertainty in their outcome. These actions will be performed upon a 
puzzle box, with the aim to retrieve a reward (a sticker) from inside. I am 
interested to discover whether children continue to copy actions demonstrated to 
them regardless of their level of success, or if new methods of reward retrieval may 
be innovated. It is thought that children’s ability to assess the quality of observed 
information changes with age, and this is why your child is being invited to 
participate.  
 
Practically, your child’s participation will involve them working with me for about 
10 minutes in the school. The task is designed to be like a game so that your child 
enjoys the experience as much as possible. However, should your child wish to, 
s/he will be free to withdraw from the study at any time.  It is requested that the 
sessions are video-recorded in order to provide a visual aid for analysing the 
collected data. Certain behaviours may be of interest to me and I may wish to use 
the footage to illustrate these points to other academics beyond the end of the 
study, but this would never be used unless I had your consent (see below). The 
videotapes will be stored confidentially in the Psychology department and then 
destroyed (except for the brief clips for which I have parental consent to use as 
illustrations of academic points). All individual results will be strictly confidential 
and you are free to withdraw your child’s results at any time and without giving 
reason. Finally, I would like to add that this study has the full support of the Ethics 
Committee at Durham University and I have full CRB clearance as verified by the 
staff at the school.  
 
Please return the slip below to a member of staff by XXX notifying me of your 
decision. Should you like any further information, please don’t hesitate to contact 
me using the details above or provide me with your phone number so I can contact 
you.  
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Many thanks, 
 
 
Kayleigh Carr   
 
 
Child’s Name:       
 
Date of Birth (DD/MM/YYYY):     
 
 I am WILLING/NOT WILLING to allow my child to participate in the study 
 
 I would like further information. Please contact me on     
 
 I am WILLING/NOT WILLING for video footage involving my child to be 
viewed by other academics for research purposes 
 
Signed:       Date:     
 
 
Appendix Item 1b: Confirmation of ethical approval for the empirical studies within 
this thesis 
 
 
TO: Kayleigh Carr 
 
FROM: Chair, Psychology Department Ethics Committee 
 
DATE:  3 May 2013 
 
REF: 12/26 - Investigating success-variable environments as contexts for 
childhood exploration and innovation with the use of a novel tool-based 
task 
 
Thank you for submitting the above application to the Psychology Department 
Ethics Committee.  I am pleased to let you know that your application has been 
approved.  The Committee’s approval is conditional upon your meeting requirements 
indicated below. 
 
You must ensure that the actual conduct of your research conforms to the ethical 
guidelines of the BPS (July 2004).  These are posted in the Ethics Committee folder 
on Duo.  One of the requirements is that participants should be fully informed about 
the nature of the proposed study.  This is particularly important if any aspects of the 
study are likely to prove distressing to the participant. 
 
You should also note that, according to the BPS, individual feedback to participants 
regarding their performance on standardised tests should not be given by researchers 
unless they have a professional qualification in psychometrics. 
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If you are working with children, you are advised to read the Guidelines for 
Research Involving Children (available on Duo).  You will also need to apply for 
Enhanced Disclosure from the DBS.  Details of applying for disclosure are given on 
Duo. 
 
Conditions 
 
- None 
 
TO: Kayleigh Carr 
 
FROM: Chair, Psychology Department Ethics Committee 
 
DATE: 18 November 2013 
 
REF: 13/12 - Investigating success-variable environments as contexts for childhood 
innovation (extension to 12/26) 
 
Thank you for submitting the above application to the Psychology Department 
Ethics Committee.  The application has been given reference 13/12: please quote this 
in any further correspondence with the committee.  I am pleased to let you know that 
your application has been approved.  The Committee’s approval is conditional upon 
your meeting requirements indicated below. 
 
You must ensure that the actual conduct of your research conforms to the ethical 
guidelines of the BPS (July 2004).  These are posted in the Ethics Committee folder 
on Duo.  One of the requirements is that participants should be fully informed about 
the nature of the proposed study.  This is particularly important if any aspects of the 
study are likely to prove distressing to the participant. 
 
You should also note that, according to the BPS, individual feedback to participants 
regarding their performance on standardised tests should not be given by researchers 
unless they have a professional qualification in psychometrics. 
 
If you are working with children, you are advised to read the Guidelines for 
Research Involving Children (available on Duo).  You will also need to apply for 
Enhanced Disclosure from the DBS.  Details of applying for disclosure are given on 
Duo. 
 
Conditions 
 
- Completion of a risk assessment and advising the committee of the rating 
 
TO: Kayleigh Carr 
 
FROM: Acting Chair, Psychology Department Ethics Committee 
 
DATE: 20 April 2015 
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REF: 14/33 – Extension and amendment for 12/26: Investigating success-variable 
environments as contexts for childhood exploration and innovation with the use of a 
novel tool-based task 
 
Thank you for submitting the above application to the Psychology Department 
Ethics Committee.  I am pleased to let you know that your application has been 
approved.  The Committee’s approval is conditional upon your meeting requirements 
indicated below. 
 
This is an extension and amendment to a previously approved submission (ref 12/26) 
to modify the initial verbal framing of the task (from one instruction to three 
different instructions for different conditions).  The approval of this project has also 
been extended to 31 July 2015 to allow the research to take place during the current 
school term. 
 
You must ensure that the actual conduct of your research conforms to the ethical 
guidelines of the BPS (July 2004).  These are posted in the Ethics Committee folder 
on Duo.  One of the requirements is that participants should be fully informed about 
the nature of the proposed study.  This is particularly important if any aspects of the 
study are likely to prove distressing to the participant. 
 
You should also note that, according to the BPS, individual feedback to participants 
regarding their performance on standardised tests should not be given by researchers 
unless they have a professional qualification in psychometrics. 
 
If you are working with children, you are advised to read the Guidelines for 
Research Involving Children (available on Duo).  You will also need to apply for 
Enhanced Disclosure from the DBS.  Details of applying for disclosure are given on 
Duo. 
 
Conditions 
 
- The project is undertaken as described in the original ethics submission, other 
than the modification mentioned in the second paragraph above 
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Appendix Item 2: Chapter 4 Supplementary Material  
 
Experiment 1: Additional Task Information/Figures 
 
Transparent glass-ceiling box. The glass-ceiling box (GCB) measured social 
learning ability and the propensity to imitate causally irrelevant actions. Participants 
received two demonstrations on the GCB with the instruction, ‘Watch what happens, 
because I’m going to let you have a go in a minute’, followed by five attempts. In 
line with previous studies (e.g., McGuigan, Whiten, Flynn, & Horner, 2007), 
demonstrations featured causally irrelevant actions (tapping bolt ends three times, 
removing both bolts, and tapping a tool into a top hole three times) and causally 
relevant actions (opening a door and inserting the tool in a hole to retrieve a sticker 
reward). As the task is a two-action design, the bolts could be either dragged from 
the left or pushed from the right with a tool. Similarly, the door could be either lifted 
or slid. Participants only witnessed the drag-bolts then slide-door method as this has 
been shown to be the most salient method in prior control conditions (Flynn, 2008; 
McGuigan, 2012). Between attempts, the box was re-baited behind a fabric sheet 
thus concealing the process from participants. Prompts such as, ‘Now it’s your turn’ 
or ‘Have another go’ were provided. The transparent version of the GCB was used to 
make evident the irrelevancy of the first set of actions. Whilst this alteration has not 
previously been seen to affect rates of imitation in 3- to 4-year-old children (Horner 
& Whiten, 2005), it may enable older children to assess efficiency more effectively.  
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Figure 1. Transparent glass-ceiling box 
 
Pan-pipes. The pan-pipes (PP) is a tool-use task in which the goal is to 
retrieve a capsule, containing a sticker, by moving an obstruction (a cube-shaped 
block) behind which the capsule rests in the upper of the two pipes. No 
demonstrations were provided, thereby allowing an assessment of asocial problem 
solving. The reward could be retrieved using one of three methods: ‘lift’ (the stick 
tool is manoeuvred to lift the T-bar on top of the block and allow the capsule to roll 
under the block and forward to drop into the lower pipe and exit), ‘poke’ (the stick 
tool is inserted into the front opening of the upper pipe through a small flap door and 
used to push the block, and hence the capsule, to the back of the upper pipe where it 
drops into the lower pipe and falls to the exit), and ‘push-slide’ (the stick tool is 
carefully placed at the base of the T-bar on top of the block and used to push the 
block and capsule in the same manner as ‘poke’). Participants were given a 
maximum of 15 attempts or 5 minutes (whichever occurred first) to retrieve the 
capsule. A new capsule was inserted into the PP following every successful retrieval. 
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Upon placing the first capsule into the PP, participants were informed: ‘You can do 
anything you want. You can touch anything on the table. You cannot break it’ (as in 
Hopper, Flynn, Wood, & Whiten’s, 2010, no-information control condition) and 
were handed the stick tool. This was repeated if the child failed to interact with the 
PP after one minute. Following their discovery of a first method (if applicable), 
participants were prompted: ‘Can you do it any other way?’ 
 
 
Figure 2. Pan-pipes 
 
Luria hand game. The Luria hand game is a measure of inhibitory control, 
specifically the inhibition of action. Compared with other inhibitory control tasks, it 
has low working memory and verbal demands (Simpson, Cooper, Gillmeister, & 
Riggs, 2013). Participants were first asked if they could show the experimenter how 
to make a fist with their hand and how they would point their finger. Imitation was 
then primed with a matching game: ‘Now, when I show you my hand I want you to 
make the same shape as me. So if I make a fist I want you to make a fist and if I 
314 
 
point my finger I want you to point your finger’. After several of these trials, it could 
be determined that children had acquired the two actions. Sixteen trials followed in 
which participants had to produce the opposite action to that of the experimenter. 
Children were told: ‘Now the game gets a bit harder. If I point a finger, then I want 
you to show me a fist. And if I make a fist, then I want you to point a finger’. To 
ensure understanding of the rules, there were four practice trials with feedback. The 
16 test trials were given in a pseudo-random order (Fist, Point, P, F, P, F, F, P, P, F, 
P, F, F, P, F, P) without feedback.  
Hook task. The hook invention task was comprised of a long, narrow Perspex 
tube at the bottom of which sat a small bucket containing a sticker, a (29cm) 
pipecleaner, (29cm) piece of string, and two small (5cm) wooden sticks. The latter 
three materials were set alongside the tube. The Perspex tube was too narrow to 
reach into with a hand, thus necessitating the use of the accompanying materials. We 
replicated the procedure of Beck, Apperly, Chappell, Guthrie, and Cutting (2011) to 
ascertain children’s tool invention abilities; that is, their ability to bend the 
pipecleaner into a hook and use it to retrieve the bucket by hooking its handle. 
Unlike Beck et al., we applied a time limit of three minutes as opposed to one 
minute, allowing a longer time for possible innovation. The following instructions 
were provided: ‘Can you see the sticker in the bucket at the bottom of this tube? If 
you can get the sticker out, you can keep it.’  
Cumulative problem solving box. The cumulative problem solving box 
(Dean, Kendal, Schapiro, Thierry, & Laland, 2012) measures sequential problem 
solving, as success on higher (and more difficult) stages of the task are only achieved 
through success at lower (and easier) stages. The box was baited, in view of the 
children, with rewards of increasing desirability (two small stickers, two large 
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stickers, and two erasers). The eraser rewards were introduced so as to provide 
adequate motivation for the older participants compared to Dean et al.’s study. To 
retrieve the small stickers (Stage 1), a sliding door had to be pushed in the horizontal 
plane, exposing a chute through which the reward fell. Stage 2 could be solved by 
depressing a button on either the lower or higher panel of the box, both of which 
allowed further movement of the sliding door and exposure of a second chute. The 
final stage (Stage 3) required the full rotation of a dial, releasing the door to move 
further along and revealing a third and final chute. The same actions could be 
performed on both left and right sides of the box, identical in their design. We 
presented the task to children individually and without demonstrations, stating ‘I’m 
going to put these stickers and rubbers into the box. Let’s see how many you can get 
out’. Children were permitted three minutes of interaction time per stage and were 
prompted, ‘Keep going, there’s a way to get to the next one’ and ‘Do you want to see 
if you can get any more out?’ 
 
 
Figure 3. Cumulative box 
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Alternate uses. The alternate uses task (Guilford, 1967) measures children’s 
divergent thinking and creativity. A paper cup and paperclip were selected as two 
common objects with which children were asked to generate alternate uses: ‘Tell me 
all the different ways you could use this cup/paperclip’. The items were placed in 
front of participants to provide a visual aid. Verbal responses were given, with the 
experimenter carefully noting each one. At the first significant pause in children’s 
responses, they were asked: ‘Can you think of any more?’ If they affirmed they had 
no further responses, the task ended. 
British Picture Vocabulary Scale. The British Picture Vocabulary Scale 
(BPVS, second edition; Dunn, Dunn, Whetton, & Burley, 1997) was used to assess 
children’s receptive vocabulary ability and to generate a proxy measure of verbal 
intelligence. In this task, children were instructed to point to one picture, from a 
choice of four, which corresponded to a word spoken by the experimenter. Testing 
ceased when a participant made eight or more errors in a set of twelve items.  
Sticker disc. The sticker disc (Wood, Kendal & Flynn, 2015) served to assess 
children’s level of neophobia. By situating the sticker disc close to children on the 
testing table during tasks 6 and 7, any spontaneous touch or verbal reference by the 
child, prior to its verbal introduction by the experimenter, was recorded. Upon 
introduction, the instruction was simply, ‘I have a new toy, would you like to play 
with it?’ To gain access to one of the six compartments of the transparent Perspex 
box, within which the stickers were located, a circular panel on top of the box had to 
be rotated and the circular holes on the panel aligned with those of the 
compartments. One of two plastic tweezers, loosely attached to the box, could then 
be used to extract a sticker. The task ended when the first sticker was retrieved, or 
five minutes had elapsed.  
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Figure 4. Sticker disc 
 
Experiment 2: Additional Task Information/Figures 
 
Sweep-drawer-lever box. The sweep-drawer-lever box (SDLB: Wood, 
Kendal, & Flynn, 2013) was selected in place of the pan-pipes to allow for a greater 
diversity of exploratory behaviours (methods can be combined and order of actions 
varied). Like the pan-pipes, it is a puzzle box into which a capsule (containing a 
sticker) is inserted and held in place by defences. Three box mechanisms can be used 
to release the reward: a drawer, a sweep and a lever. By pulling or pushing one of 
these mechanisms, the reward falls to the lower level of the box and may be retrieved 
by lifting or sliding the exit door. The box is transparent, allowing the functionality 
of the mechanisms to be deduced.  
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Figure 5. Sweep-drawer-lever box 
 
 Inhibitory control: Stop-it. The Luria hand game was replaced with a 
computer-administered stop-signal task (Logan & Cowan, 1984; Stop-It: 
Verbruggen, Logan, & Stevens, 2008). The primary task involved discriminating 
between a square and a circle, presented on screen individually, by pressing 
associated response keys. However, on random trials, an auditory stop signal sounds 
requiring participants to inhibit their response. Participants received one practice 
block before the experimental block commenced.  
 Invention: Candle problem. The candle problem was developed as a test of 
problem solving (Duncker, 1945, as cited in German & Defeyter, 2000), requiring 
participants to attach a candle to a vertical board with only a box of tacks and a book 
of matches whilst ensuring that the candle does not drip wax onto the surface below. 
The problem necessitates ‘insight’ insomuch as participants must look beyond the 
conventional function of the tack box (holding tacks) and utilise it as a platform or 
shelf for the candle once emptied. In this way, the problem is also a test of functional 
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fixedness. Though not directly analogous to the hook task administered to children, 
it similarly requires the innovative use of materials to reach a solution. Unlike the 
original candle problem, participants were provided with a box, rather than book, of 
matches with this intended to be the target (shelf) object. Tacks were provided in a 
plastic box, and a cork board was placed, and instructed to remain, upright.  
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Results: GLMMs 
 
The details of GLMM analyses are summarised in the following tables, with 
the significance of the results explained in the main text.  
 
Section 4.2.2.3 
Binomial GLMM (with logit link function)  
Can child innovator-imitator group membership be predicted by our seven critical 
representations of related constructs? 
 
Fixed Effects 
 Coefficient S.E. t p 95% CI 
(lower-
upper) 
Intercept 1.360 4.216 0.323 .749 -7.209 – 
9.928 
Glass-ceiling box 
Irrelevant action 
score 
-0.037 0.031 -1.196 .240 -0.101 – 
0.026 
Pan-pipes 
Number of methods 
0.500 0.638 0.783 .439 -0.797 – 
1.796 
Hook task 
Hook score 
-0.902 0.966 -0.934 .357 -2.865 – 
1.061 
Cumulative box 
Latency to 
completion 
-0.003 0.003 -1.218 .232 -0.008 – 
0.002 
Alternate uses 
Corrected originality 
-1.137 1.693 -0.672 .506 -4.579 – 
2.304 
BPVS 
Standardised score 
0.010 0.033 0.290 .774 -0.058 – 
0.078 
Sticker disc 
Latency to first 
touch 
0.048 0.185 0.258 .798 -0.328 – 
0.423 
S.E. = standard error; CI = confidence interval 
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Section 4.3.2 
GLMM (Poisson distribution with Log link) 
Can adults’ exit innovation performance on the MMB (including innovation 
repetitions) be predicted by our selected constructs? 
 
Fixed Effects 
 Coefficient S.E. t p 95% CI 
(lower-upper) 
Intercept -0.100 1.736 -0.057 .955 -3.691 – 
3.491 
Glass-ceiling box 
Irrelevant action 
score 
-0.014 0.025 -0.562 .580 -0.066 – 
0.038 
SDL box 
Number of methods 
0.002 0.133 0.013 .989 -0.273 – 
0.277 
Stop-It task 
Stop-it latency 
0.001 0.005 0.240 .812 -0.010 – 
0.012 
Candle problem 
Candle score 
0.089 0.539 0.165 .871 -1.026 – 
1.204 
Cumulative box 
Latency to 
completion 
0.000 0.004 0.111 .912 -0.009 – 
0.010 
Alternate uses 
Corrected originality 
1.173 1.435 0.818 .422 -1.795 – 
4.141 
Condition  
(from Carr et al., 
2015) 
1.277 0.553 2.308 .030 0.132 – 2.421 
S.E. = standard error; CI = confidence interval 
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GLMM (Poisson distribution with Log link) 
Can adults’ exit innovation performance on the MMB (excluding innovation 
repetitions) be predicted by our selected constructs? 
 
Fixed Effects 
 Coefficient S.E. t p 95% CI 
(lower-
upper) 
Intercept -0.381 1.760 -0.216 .831 -4.020 – 
3.259 
Glass-ceiling box 
Irrelevant action 
score 
-0.016 0.026 -0.604 .552 -0.070 – 
0.038 
SDL box 
Number of methods 
-0.027 0.138 -0.197 .845 -0.312 – 
0.258 
Stop-It task 
Stop-it latency 
0.000 0.005 0.041 .967 -0.011 – 
0.011 
Candle problem 
Candle score 
-0.534 0.584 -0.915 .370 -1.741 – 
0.674 
Cumulative box 
Latency to 
completion 
0.001 0.005 0.128 .899 -0.009 – 
0.010 
Alternate uses 
Corrected originality 
2.030 1.521 1.334 .195 -1.117 – 
5.176 
Condition  
(from Carr et al., 
2015) 
1.033 0.554 1.864 .075 -0.114 – 
2.179 
S.E. = standard error; CI = confidence interval 
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Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics of task measures to evidence an absence of floor and ceiling 
effects 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Mean SD Minimum Maximum Range 
Glass-Ceiling 
Box 
Irrelevant action 
score 
 
 
40.52 
 
 
16.65 
 
 
0 
 
 
55 
 
 
55 
Pan-Pipes 
Methods 
Latency to first 
 
1.30 
104.52 
 
0.81 
101.57 
 
0 
8 
 
3 
300 
 
3 
292 
Hook Task 
Hook Score 
 
0.43 
 
0.45 
 
0 
 
1 
 
1 
Cumulative 
Box 
Cumulative 
score 
Latency (first) 
Latency (all) 
 
 
 
2.65 
17.87 
244.80 
 
 
 
0.77 
31.04 
196.51 
 
 
 
0 
1 
47 
 
 
 
3 
180 
540 
 
 
 
3 
179 
493 
Alternate Uses 
Fluency 
Flexibility 
Elaboration 
Originality 
Corrected 
originality 
 
7.85 
5.33 
2.00 
2.59 
0.30 
 
4.65 
2.08 
3.06 
2.59 
0.24 
 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
 
22 
9 
14 
9 
0.86 
 
21 
8 
14 
9 
0.86 
BPVS 
Standardised 
score 
 
102.59 
 
12.14 
 
79 
 
131 
 
52 
Sticker Disc 
Latency to touch 
Average latency 
 
1.52 
81.79 
 
2.00 
51.61 
 
0 
18.67 
 
8 
202.67 
 
8 
184 
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